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Abstract 
The Palestinian people form a nation with a rich culture and unity, but they are 
scattered throughout the world with no state of their own. This ‘stateless’ 
condition has a direct impact on Palestinians’ media consumption and media 
production. The reality in the region is harsh; conflicts within and without prevent 
journalists from operating freely. It is in this point that the problem lies: the 
Palestinians need for information is pressing, but as it is a conflict area there are 
major obstacles that impede media outlets from distributing news that would 
answer demands for consistency, accuracy and, most importantly, for real time 
updates. As the findings show, the revolution in new technology has answered 
the  
 
Palestinians’ demands for reception of news from home. The availability of 
hundreds of news websites has eased the diasporic Palestinians’ ability to 
access information; a fact which is highly important at times of major news 
events. The Palestinians in the diaspora are an active audience. They create 
websites and blogs to disseminate their personal stories and to receive updates 
from Gaza and the West Bank from the people who live there. The new 
technologies are bypassing geographical distance and editorial guidelines and 
they help to overcome the news problem, which was significant before the WWW 
revolution, overcoming delays to enable the immediate dissemination of news. 
  
Interestingly enough, the Israeli media is a major information source for diasporic 
Palestinians. The main reasons for using Israeli media are: their professionalism 
and the will to understand the Israelis’ point of view. The researcher is an 
‘outsider’ researcher. The benefits, in this respect, are there is a lack of the 
constraints that a Palestinian researcher might have. This study has contributed 
to knowledge in the fields of diaspora studies, adding to knowledge on those 
diasporic groups that strive for independence and live in conflicted spheres, and 
in the fields of new media and Arab media through Palestinians’ utilisation of new 
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media for political ends, and the expansion of their social networks, which serve 
as transnational meeting places. 
 6
Glossary 
Al-Quds Al-Arabi:  A London based Arabic language daily newspaper. This title 
literally means: Al-Quds – Jerusalem; Al Arabi – The Arab.  
 
Al-Quds:  A Jerusalem based Arabic language daily newspaper. 
Fatah:  The National Palestinian Liberation Movement; victory, occupation  
Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement; enthusiasm 
Haaretz:  The Israeli daily broadsheet newspaper; “The Land” 
Intifada: Palestinian popular rebellion. 
Jihad:   Holy War. 
Nakba:  Misfortune, calamity; disaster, catastrophe 
Al-Nakba:  A term that is being used by the Palestinians to mark the “War of 
Independence” (1948). During this war, Arab armies were defeated and the state of Israel 
was established. This term mainly; describes the Palestinian diaspora that was created 
following these events, and the creation of the refugee problem. 
 
Ghurba: “Absence from the homeland; separation from one’s native country, 
banishment, exile; life, or, place, away from home (The HansWehr Arabic–English 
Dictionary).”  
 
Semites: people who speak Semitic languages. The most prominent semites today are 
Arabs and Jews. In a Biblical sense, semites are people whose ancestry can be traced 
back to Shem, Noah’s eldest son. 
 
Tahadiya:  A short-term calming period between conflicting during which differences are 
not put aside. It was a Tahadiya that stopped most of the violence between Hamas and 
Israel between June and December, 2008. 
  
Umma:  The Islamic community.  
Watan:  Homeland, fatherland. 
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Introduction 
 
This study is a combination of research of few fields. Each is an interesting area and has a 
dynamic that has served as fruitful land for researchers from different disciplines. Having 
said this, the search for new angles that have not yet been investigated and their exposé is 
unique to this research. 
 
The research’s main themes are: migration and Diaspora, Diasporic media, the 
Palestinian Diaspora, new media, news media, audiences, the Arab media, the Arab 
World and the new media and political communication. According to Shiblak: 
 
"There is a shortage of studies on the Palestinian Diaspora, despite the large 
number of important works written mainly on the political context and on specific 
Palestinian refugee situations. In fact, Palestinian refugees were often looked 
upon through the prism of a political perspective. Their existence as a 
transnational community, their civic status in host societies and their personal 
narratives were rarely examined (Shiblak in Shiblak, 2005:7)".   
 
Since Shiblak wrote his account of Palestinian Diaspora studies, two major works have 
been published. The first is Matar’s research on the Palestinian people – What it Means to 
be Palestinian – Stories of Palestinian Peoplehood. This research on Palestinians’ 
personal narratives  tells the personal stories of the Palestinian people, both in and outside 
Palestine, since Matar refers chronologically to the main historical events of the 
‘Palestinian national struggle’ (Matar, 2011: 1). The second work is Aouragh’s research. 
The author discusses the ways Palestinians and pro-Palestinian solidarity activists try to 
achieve political demands via the internet: Palestinian politics of resistance (Aouragh, 
2011). In this context, Aouragh investigates Palestinians in the diaspora, in Jordan and 
Lebanon and in Palestine.  
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Research on Palestinian Refugees was conducted by Robert Bowker (Bowker, 2003). 
Encompassing history, politics and political culture, Bowker explores the impact of 
Palestinian refugee mythologies on the potential settlement of conflict with Israel.  
 
"Little research has been done on the Arab Diaspora and its media consumption. There 
are only three publications, all of which concentrate on the Arab Diaspora in the United 
Kingdom (Rinnawi, 2010: 267). The first is Noureddin Miladi’s study (2006), which 
investigated how the Arab Diaspora in Britain uses and interprets Arab satellite television 
broadcasts in comparison with their response to the BBC and CNN. The second is the 
study of Zahera Harb and Ehab Bessaiso (2006) on the Arab Muslim Diaspora audiences 
in the U.K., in regard to television after September 11th. The third is Dina Matar’s (2006) 
study on the Palestinian Diaspora in the United Kingdom and their reactions to the 
September 11th attacks and media reports on the event. The main conclusion of the three 
studies is that the Diaspora’s members have heavily consumed Arabic satellite television 
since its inception, particularly since they mistrust the local British and Western 
television programmes, because they perceive them to be biased and one-sided against 
Arab and Islam (Rinnawi, 2010: 267)".  
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to this ongoing research into Palestinian Diaspora by 
providing a focused analysis of an area that has been comparatively neglected to date: the 
use of a specific medium - the Internet, for news consumption, by a defined audience: 
Palestinians in Britain. "There is no research that investigates the impact of the Internet 
on the Palestinians in the diaspora and that explores trends in media usage. No study has 
yet been conducted on Palestinian representation on the Internet (Hammer, 2005: 7)". 
This is the first attempt to fill the gap in the existing research. This is audience research, 
with a new focus on investigation that fills an existing gap in knowledge. There is no 
research that compares the use of traditional and new media.  In putting it to the test, I 
interviewed Palestinians who reside in the UK. Unlike the other studies that I mentioned, 
my research refers to Arab audiences outside their country of origin (for further reading 
on its original contribution to knowledge, see page 23). 
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Moreover, this is the first research on the Palestinian community in the Diaspora that has 
been conducted by an Israeli researcher. This adds a new dimension, as other researchers 
of the field are Palestinians (i.e., Matar and Aouragh). Alongside the challenges of being 
an Israeli researcher there are also advantages (extended discussion - page 145).  
 
Before the parameters of this thesis can be more rigorously defined, some background on 
the complex definition of the Palestinian Diaspora and the complex situation of the 
Palestinian media is needed. Diaspora is a new term in migration studies. It refers to 
individuals who emigrate from one country to another. "The term ‘diaspora’ relates to a 
group of people that has been dispersed, or has expanded to at least two countries of the 
world (Schulz & Hammer, 2003: 9)". However, there is controversy among researchers 
on the definition of the Palestinians in the diaspora as migrants. The Palestinians 
themselves indicate a problem, saying that their place of origin is not the place they 
emigrated from but, rather, they are refugees who were uprooted from their actual home.  
 
The Palestinians were displaced from their home in 1948 and, later, in 1967 – and on this 
occasion, many Palestinians became second-time refugees. According to Aouragh, "The 
refugee camps are the reminders that the current Palestinian ‘transnational community’ 
has in effect been created by forced migration (Aouragh, 2011: 77)." What is more, the 
Palestinians lack freedom of movement. Palestinians, who live in the U.K. and wish to 
visit Gaza, cannot do it because of closure restrictions. The fact that the Palestinians’ 
place of origin is an entity in transition, with legal problems of access to the host country 
and having movement restrictions, that emphasise the complexity of the definition of the 
Palestinian Diasporic community.    
 
Palestinians’ use of media for news is not the passive use: watching news. It is also not 
only active use, where they interpret and choose news, but, rather, news from Palestine is 
part of their political and existential daily struggle and identity formation. News media 
also shape the participants’ social contacts.  The centrality of news in the life of 
Palestinians crosses age, occupation and economic status. Most participants look for 
updated news every day, and more then once a day. Sam, a 28 year old student, says: 
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‘The news for me, for the Palestinians, is very important. In Gaza the culture is   
different than the U.K. - people watch news all the time. People are not working    
and they watch news and talk about the news all day. Things happen. In the U.K. 
people watch news only in the morning, before they go to work, and in the 
evening when they come home (Sam).’ 
 
No less important for the participants, is their use of news media they have created. The 
enormous participation in hundreds of blogs, chats and social news websites indicates the 
importance of news in the lives of Palestinians. The importance the participants attribute 
to the news they have been disseminating is for contact with the Arab circle, as well as, 
the ability of Palestinians to use the internet, to publish their news stories in order to 
reach audiences beyond the Arab world. Since the mainstream media would not dedicate 
much space to background information, the Palestinians publish their own personal 
accounts. According to Hanieh, the Internet lets Palestinians speak for themselves, in 
their own voice, without mediation or distortion from outside bodies or interests (‘news 
by newsmakers’). "Those involved in newsworthy events can choose what to present, 
rather than passively allowing others to represent and reinterpret developments in 
Palestine (Hanieh, 1999: 42)". This trend helps Arab, as well as, Western, audiences to 
learn in-depth from news stories from Palestine and the region. 
 
My research seeks to examine how the Palestinians in the U.K. use the media in their 
daily life and to what extent does the internet impact on their news consumption? I was 
looking into questions: around which websites the Palestinians use to read news and 
why? In which language? Do they use Palestinian websites more than international 
websites, or vice versa? Are they creating Palestinian social networks online? Additional 
questions were also examined. 
 
I conducted 52 open-ended, in–depth interviews with Palestinians who reside in the UK. 
They came from different socio-economic backgrounds and different political positions 
In addition to interviews with 52 participants, I discussed my questions with Palestinians 
who were not included in the research for a variety of reasons: either because they were 
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not using the Internet at all and did not want to participate, or because I talked with 
Palestinians that who could not complete the interview because of lack of time. I also 
spoke with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who came to visit the UK, and 
were not included in my research, as they did not belong to the Palestinian Diasporic 
community. In addition to interviews, I used observation as a research method - my field 
work included participation in main Palestinian events. 
 
The purpose of using those research methods was to know the participants personally, to 
learn about the Palestinian media and new media usage and beyond. In other words, it 
was important for me to learn about the participants’ personal background as I linked the 
participants’ personal narratives to their media usage practices. The Palestinians personal 
narratives are also very important for them and they utilise their access to the new media 
in order to discuss and talk about their stories, which can be put together into one story - 
the story of the Palestinian people.  
 
The story of the thesis – ‘The Use of New Media by the U.K.'s Palestinian Diaspora' is 
being told in 6 chapters (not including the introduction chapter) which are linked 
together. Chapter 1 – Literature Review – Diaspora Studies,                                                        
contributes to the understanding of Diaspora discourse and the Palestinian Diasporic 
community’s motivations in the light of technological changes and globalisation. The 
shift from the traditional to the modern media was the publication of the first Arab 
newspaper during Napoleon Bonaparte campaign in Egypt (1798-1801). It was the first 
appeal to the masses from the ruling power. It was only in the 1990’s, with the launch of 
satellite television and the development of the internet, that media which does not act as a 
mouthpiece for governmental actors, has been developed.   
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review –Audiences; New Media,                                                   
Provides a thorough understanding of the Palestinian community in the Diaspora and its 
media usage practices – as the internet is the main medium that the Palestinians use for 
news consumption and news production. As well as an understanding of the gap between 
the Palestinians in their place of origin – Gaza and the West Bank, and the Palestinians in 
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the UK, in terms of their accessibility and their usage of new technologies. Linked to this 
is the gap between the two groups and this relates to their financial and social mobility 
opportunities. Not all Palestinian immigrants to the U.K. have the same financial abilities 
(for information about socio-economic backgrounds, see chapter 3).  
 
The third chapter – Methodology, reveals the non-replicable advantages of the individual 
interviews method I chose and the challenges I had to face as an Israeli researcher and as 
a woman. In an era of emails and electronic communication, as far as this research 
concerns, there is still no substitute for real meetings with people. My meetings with the 
participants for the purpose of interviewing revealed a whole world to me, a revelation 
that enriched my research accessibility to the readers, if you may. It starts from my ability 
to see, smell and sense the Palestinians’ customs, eating manners, working places, 
gathering places and more. It goes through my ability to view the Palestinian media 
consumption practices by looking together with them at news websites and chat rooms, 
and the opportunity I had to ask for clarifications where they were needed. The meetings 
were especially important in this research, since it was a learning process for both the 
participants and myself. It goes without saying that individual interviews might lead to 
problems of information reliability and so on (discussion on this issue - in this chapter). 
  
Chapter 4 – Findings - Palestinian and Transnational Arab Media Usage, explains the 
problems affecting the professionalism of the Palestinian media and the reasons for usage 
or non-usage of Palestinian political websites for news. This chapter discusses the use of 
transnational Arab media, and actually helps us to understand the implications of the 
satellite revolution that occurred in the 1990s for the media usage practices of Palestinian 
audiences in the Diaspora. 
 
Chapter 5 – Findings - News from Home and Israeli Media, highlights the importance 
that participants attribute to news. Most of the participants have more interest in 
Palestine’s news than in U.K. news, regardless of the length of their stay in the UK, age, 
gender, occupation and socio-economic status. It also shows that the main medium for 
their news consumption is the internet. According to the data analysis, it is the Israeli 
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media, more specifically, the Israeli news websites, that serve as the main source of 
information for Palestinians in the U.K. Diaspora. One of the important findings of the 
research indicates that more than half of the participants routinely use Israeli media. At 
times of breaking news events, almost half of the participants use Israeli media. This 
finding obviously leads to the question: what is the role of the Arab and Palestinian media 
in the daily life of the participants?  
 
The Conclusion Chapter (Chapter 6) contributes to an understanding of the importance of 
the research, referring to other studies of Diaspora communities. The chapter’s starting 
point is that the Palestinians are a conflict-generated Diaspora. They are therefore highly 
interested in news and politics and use the new media for news consumption and political 
purposes on a large scale. Additional topics that the chapter discusses are the 
methodological advantages and disadvantages of the research in the light of the 
researcher’s identity. The aim is to provide the readers with confidence in the research 
for-political purposes and to raise awareness of the significant contribution of this 
research to the field. 
 
It is important to comment on the time frame of my research. The field work period was 
between May, 2008, and January, 2009. Until December 2008, there was no significant 
violence, as a result of the Tahadiya’ period.  In December, 2008, the Gaza War broke 
out or, as it is being called in the Arab world, the Gaza Massacre. The war ended in 
January, 2009. During the process of interviewing, in July 2008, there were 2 terror 
attacks in Jerusalem.  
 
My research was actually conducted in a period that included two major conflicts 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. During the period of my field work, on 27th 
December 2008 Israel opened Operation Cast Lead, hitting targets across the Gaza Strip. 
According to IDF officials, this was to fight the increasing launch of rockets from Gaza 
into Israel. This operation ended on 17th January, 2009, as IDF troops withdrew from the 
Gaza Strip. Almost 4 years after the end of the Gaza War, in November, 2012, while I 
was engaged in writing up, Israel launched ‘Operation Pillar of Cloud’ in Gaza. The 
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reason, according to Israeli officials, was a resumption of rocket fire from Gaza into 
Israel. After 8 days of intensive fighting, the two sides in the conflict, agreed on the 
implementation of a ceasefire. The conflicts discussed above are very important in 
demonstrating the research arguments. A detailed discussion on this issue is included in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The analysis of the interviews refers to the period during which the field work was 
carried out (If I had had to conduct further interviews they would have had to be analysed 
in other research). Having said that, I did not detach myself from the participants or from 
the research itself once I completed the field work. I continue to follow the Palestinian 
and Arab news websites. I also receive updates from Palestinian individuals and bodies 
about social news networks online. I learn from the emails I receive about the expansion 
of the social networks, as well as about major news stories on the Palestinians’ agenda. 
 
The primary language of the majority of the interviews was English, although 
occasionally also Arabic and/or Hebrew were used. In these cases, interviews are 
translated by the author. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review – Diaspora Studies                                                           
 
Introduction 
My research is audience research that investigates the Palestinian Diasporic community 
in the UK. I interviewed Palestinians, both Muslims and Christians. The theoretical 
framework of my research relates to Muslim Palestinians for two main reasons. Firstly, 
since Islam and Muslims are relevant in current world-wide political discourse. "In the 
New World Order, since the collapse of communism, Islam has been constructed as the 
new enemy of the West in a bi-polar relationship around a conceptualisation which draws 
on Huntington’s thesis of the ‘clash of civilisations’ (Poole, 2002: 54)." Secondly, since 
they are a larger group – the Muslim form 99.3% of the population in the Gaza Strip, the 
Christians form 0.7% in the West Bank, the Muslims are 75% and Christian and others 
are 8% of the population (The World Factbook, 2011).  
 
There is an ongoing debate in regard to the definition of the Palestinian Diaspora. The 
core issue of this debate is the question as to whether Palestinians in the diaspora should 
be defined as immigrants or refugees. I will refer to this debate extensively in this 
chapter. Firstly, I would like to explain the historical background, to demonstrate the 
roots of this question.  
 
The Palestinian Diaspora resulted from the dispersal of the Arab population that was 
living in mandated Palestine. Their dispersal turned them into a community living in hope 
of returning home (Harik in Sheffer, 1986:315). At present, the right to return is one of 
the main issues influencing Palestinian society. Ben-David argues that Diaspora actors 
are unique in putting emphasis on community as an activity type, and on Diaspora and 
the right of return as a primary cause. Non-Diaspora actors, however, are mainly 
dedicated to solidarity as activity and Palestinian rights and the boycotting movements 
(of Israel), as the primary cause (Ben-David, 2012: 459). 
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 On a formal level, a UN resolution (194) relates to this problem. The Palestinian 
community in the U.K. operates their own channels through which to deal with this 
question. For example, the Palestinian Return Centre. The Palestinian Right of Return 
Coalition is a Diaspora actor which highlights the tension relating to the homogeneity of 
the Palestinian Diaspora, in terms of both refugee and non-refugee communities (Ben-
David, 2012: 468). 
 
According to Mahmoud, "The proliferation of associations like the Palestine Return 
Centre and the Palestinian Right to Return Coalition (Al-Awda), are testimony to the 
Palestinian attachment to the right of return, which is highlighted through petitions and 
marches. This has succeeded in rallying Palestinians from all social classes (Mahmoud in 
Shiblak, 2005:99)".  
 
In his research, published as: ‘Migration, Information Technology, and International 
Policy’, Brinkerhoff claims that there is no clash between migrant talk of return and 
appreciation of the host country. ‘The motivation to express an identity is natural and 
common to all human beings. Whether addressed in cyberspace or in the physical world, 
diasporans face a psycho-social need to develop and express their hybrid identities and to 
experiment with the integration of alternative and additional values and conceptions, 
including those representing liberal values. Given hybridity, affirming the homeland 
identity, and even talk of return, do not mean that diasporans do not value or embrace 
their adopted country and society (Brinkerhoff, 2010: 41)’.  
 
At the time of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, in what is known by the 
Palestinians as the nakba (the catastrophe), the Palestinians experienced the loss of the 
land on which they lived and have since been scattered. The second dispersal of 
Palestinians occurred following the 1967 war, which led to a new exodus from the West 
Bank and Gaza (Smith, 1986: 98). The largest Palestinian community outside Gaza and 
the West Bank is in Jordan (Smith, 1986: 91). After the establishment of the new 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1950, Palestinians became approximately half of the 
country’s population (Takkenberg, 1998: 155).  
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"The Palestinian Diaspora is an incipient Diaspora (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 148)". The 
presence of large numbers of Palestinians in Europe is a relatively new phenomenon (the 
Palestinian Diaspora has been in formation over the past century), compared to their 
presence in the Arab world or America, though the size of their population in Europe is 
on the increase. The largest communities are in Britain, Germany, Spain and the 
Scandinavian countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinians who worked for the 
Palestine government during the British Mandate period (1920 -1948) and several 
thousand students emigrated to Britain (Smith, 1986: 91). Young people who left in 
search of an education were more eager to take up the challenges involved in making a 
new life. They planned to get educational degrees that could help them in Palestine, and 
upon return they wanted to make a home and have a family in Palestine. Despite the fact 
that many of them did not plan on emigrating for good, a considerable number stayed 
abroad. The same is true of work migrants, who usually left because of economic 
depression and lack of employment and who sought jobs and higher wages in other 
countries.   
 
For Palestinians who left Palestine to study, as well as for those who were born and grew 
up abroad, the host country’s educational system played an important role in their 
socialisation into the host society. While most Palestinians who left Palestine were 
peasants, there was also a minority of Palestinians who were from the middle classes. 
This distinction is important in studying their ability to participate in the host country’s 
economy, thereby facilitating integration into the host country’s society. Upon their 
flight, peasants lost their main source of livelihood- the land-and became refugees. The 
poorer of those refugees were a source of manual labor for host economies, or they were 
unemployed. At the same time, Palestinians with a higher education moved to oil-rich 
Arab countries, in whose economies their skills were valued. At the other end of the 
social and economic scale, there is the economically successful exiled bourgeoisie 
(Hammer, 2005: 18-19). 
  
"During actual time of war, Palestinian migration occurred because of political 
persecution, economic pressure and the eviction of political activists (Hammer, 2005: 
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15)".  There is flow of migrants who seek a better life, including students and 
professionals, as well as unskilled migrants. Hanafi describes the demographics of the 
Palestinian Diaspora and its history, under four main categories: economic migrants to 
South America in the 19th century; the dispersal of 700,000 Palestinians from Israel to 
neighbouring countries during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war; the second wave of 
displacement following the Six Day War in 1967; and more recent waves of political and 
economic migration to Europe and the United States, which started in 1977 and which 
was influenced by political events such as the 1982 Israel- Lebanon War, the 1991 Gulf 
War and the Intifadas of 1987 and 2001 (Hanafi, 2003). 
 
"It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Palestinians living in Europe, as they are 
statistically invisible. In most cases, they are classified together with other immigrants 
from the countries from which they last arrived or added to the category of stateless 
persons. In Britain, for example, all immigrants from the ‘Middle East’- including 
Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab East - are put in the same basket (Shiblak in Shiblak, 
2005,12)." "…The majority of Muslims (in Britain) are from South Asian extraction, in 
particular Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Poole, 2002: 54)."  
 
Nevertheless, Shiblak’s rough estimate, which is based on various sources, suggests that 
there are 20,000 Palestinian residents in the U.K. (Shiblak in Shiblak, 2005: 13).  My 
Palestinian sources, including the Palestinian ambassador to the United Kingdom, 
indicate the same estimated number. 
 
The Palestinian community is not concentrated in specific cities in Britain, but, rather, is 
scattered in different areas: London, The Midlands (Leicester, Birmingham), West of 
England (Devon), Northern England (Manchester, Leeds), Oxfordshire (Oxford), 
Cambridgeshire (Cambridge), as well as in other areas.  
 
There are few scholars who have written about the Palestinian Diaspora, notably Shiblak 
(2005), who has published an overview of the Palestinian Diaspora with a focus on 
Europe; and Schulz (2003), who has written about the historical context and the 
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formation of the Palestinian identity. There is also Smith’s publication (1986): The 
Palestinian Diaspora 1948 -1985. A recently published book is Dina Matar’s research on 
the Palestinian people:  What it Means to be Palestinian – Stories of Palestinian 
Peoplehood.  Matar tells personal stories of the Palestinian people, from both in and 
outside Palestine, as she refers, chronologically, to the main historical events of the 
‘Palestinian national struggle’ (Matar, 2011: 1). Additional work is research by Miriyam 
Aouragh. The author discusses the ways in which Palestinians and pro-Palestinian 
solidarity activists try to achieve political demands via the internet: Palestinian politics of 
resistance (Aouragh, 2011). In this context, Aouragh investigates the Palestinians in the 
diaspora in Jordan, Lebanon, and in Palestine.  
 
According to the perception of a few research projects, there is a problem with the 
definition of Aouragh’s research, as a study of the Palestinian Diasporic community. As I 
will explain later, there are scholars who accept the use of the term Diaspora for 
Palestinian communities living outside the Arab region. However, they argue against 
using it in the case of Palestinians who live in Arab host states. As I claimed earlier in 
this chapter, approximately half of Jordan’s citizens are Palestinians. Even more, the 
historic Palestine was created as an artificial state from the British administrated greater- 
Palestine region, which included trans-Jordan (equivalent to Jordan today). I would like 
to refer to the demographics of the Palestinians, in order to demonstrate this point. 
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2009): 
 
"3.24 million Palestinians live in Jordan (29.8%). 1.78 Million (16.3%) in the 
other Arab countries, 1.25 million (11.5%) live in Israel, and Palestinians living in 
foreign countries is estimated to be 618 thousand (5.7%)." 
 
Research conducted by Ben-David (Ben-David, 2012) on the link between Diaspora and 
non-Diaspora actors, analyses web-based networks of Palestinian communities in 
Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Australia, the United States, Canada, Spain, Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay. The findings reveal that Diaspora and non-Diaspora actors operate as 
two distinct but intertwined networks. The ties between Diaspora and non-Diaspora 
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actors are stronger than among Diaspora actors. I will refer to Ben-David insights in the 
chapters that follow.  
 
My research is a pioneering effort in the field. The new dimension I add in my study is 
the investigation of the Arab Disasporic audience and their use of the new media. It is the 
first research that explores the use of a specific medium - the Internet, for news 
consumption, by a defined audience - Palestinians in Britain. There is no research that 
investigates the impact of the Internet on the Palestinians in the diaspora and explores 
trends in media usage. Furthermore, Western research has tended to focus on the 
Palestinian population that is more accessible - those who live in Gaza and the West 
Bank, and not on those outside the Palestinian territories (Smith, 1986: 90). Following the 
first Intifada (1987-1991), however, conditions have changed and today access to 
Palestine is limited. 
 
"The limited research that exists into the use of technologies amongst minority 
groups falls into two categories, the more theoretical work which explores the 
networks of transnational communities and the role of media forms supporting 
particular diasporic formations; and administrative research which examines the 
demographic patterns of uptake of New Information and Communication 
Technologies (NICT’S) by minority communities within national contexts. 
Studies in Britain on multimedia and society rarely allude to minority usage 
(Poole, 2002: 52;53)…" 
 
The research is audience research, with a new focus of investigation that fills an existing 
gap in knowledge. The focus is not the influence of the media in general on either 
Palestinians’ identity as individuals or the influence of news on the notions of ‘belonging, 
community and social action’ (Matar, 2005: 66). This subject was investigated by the 
scholar Dina Matar in her PhD thesis - ‘News, Memory and Identity – The Palestinians in 
Britain’. In addition, Aksoy and Robins published research about the influence of satellite 
TV on the Turkish community in London (Aksoy and Robins, 2000). There is research 
about the rising power of the new media in the Arab world (Alterman, 1998). However, 
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Alterman did not put his assumptions to a test – he did not interview Arab media users. 
Alterman talks about the influence of the new media on the audience in Arab countries, in 
general. A reference to Alterman’s work is included in this chapter. 
 
A recent study of the Arab Diaspora in Europe and transnational media (Rinnawi, 2012), 
explores the media consumption of members of the Arab minority in Germany. The 
majority of Arabs in Germany are of Palestinian or Lebanese origin and came from 
Lebanon during the civil war between 1973 and the mid-1980s (Rinnawi, 2012: 1452). 
The main claim of the study is that the access of minority members to Arab satellite 
media in the 1990s has strengthened their sense of belonging to their Arab homelands and 
their identity (Rinnawi, 2012: 1451).  
 
 Existing publications investigate satellite Television as the medium that has the potential 
to free viewers from government controls on national media (Sakr, 2001). My research 
focus on the internet shows that its substantial growth started at the same time – the 
1990’s, and its massive use has begun in the last decade. As Sakr claims, satellite 
television did not remove governmental restrictions. For the owners of the private Middle 
Eastern satellite channels, "Television ventures could be seen to oil the wheels of 
business as television programmes provided an additional medium of exchange with 
investment partners and allies worldwide" (Sakr, 2001: 206). The broadcasting of satellite 
television entailed limitations to governmental influence, if we look for example at the 
Qatari television network, Al Jazeera (discussed later in this chapter).Decisions on 
agenda setting are carried out by professional editors, who hold the power to determine 
content. In contrast, the internet allows unprofessional individuals to create websites for 
the dissemination of news without governmental control. To put it in Hanieh’s words, 
multi-media formats help break the domination of mainstream media by choosing which 
images of Palestine are presented, and how (Hanieh, 1999: 41). 
 
According to Georgiou, "the development of Diasporic global media spaces that are 
beyond state control and the gate-keeping of mainstream media are some of the major 
developments in globalisation (Georgiou in Sarikakis and Thussu, 2006: 133)". The 
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owners of websites can invite policy makers to participate according to their own 
editorial decisions. What is more, a major problem relating to mainstream media is 
audience trust. In recent years, audience trust in the institutions of the mainstream media 
has been fading in many developed countries, according to a study explores the impact of 
news media skepticism on audience news patterns (Bennet, Rhine and Flickinger, 2001; 
Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Kiousis, 2001; Kohut and Toth, 1998). The concept of 
mistrust in media applies to the particular context of audience relations with the news 
media. It is the feeling that the mainstream media are neither credible, nor reliable, that 
the news media get in the way of society rather than helping society (Tsfati, 2010:23). 
Hegemony is a central concept in understanding the potential influence of media in 
society. In the version of Marxist theory inaugurated by Antonio Gramsci, hegemony 
is the name given to a ruling class's domination through ideology, through the shaping of 
popular consent (Gitlin, 1980:9). 
 
The theory of hegemony argues that since elites control mainstream media, it is their 
perspectives that are given prominence. Hegemony is a central component to the 
conceived historical divides between the alternative and mainstream press as many would 
argue that it is the fundamental reason that the alternative press exists (Kenix, 2011: 10). 
 
The advantage of the internet over television broadcast is significant: as a result of the 
political and military situation in Palestine, television stations are being closed and this 
affects also Palestinians in the U.K. who would like to watch Palestinian channels on 
satellite television. According to Tsfati, when people mistrust the media, they seek 
alternatives. One important alternative to the mainstream media is found in online news 
sources (Tsfati, 2010: 22).  
 
Many of the features of the internet – connectivity, boundlessness, lack of control – do 
not settle easily with traditional news values. Online current-affairs sites audiences are 
offered more diversified news items and increased control over news flow. As there is a 
significant development in the online environment, internet credibility has changed as 
well. According to Johnson and Kaye, credibility scores increased considerably from 
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1996 to 2000, but then declined in 2004. In 1996, online media was still a new 
phenomenon, and the internet was perceived as an unregulated outpost where anyone 
could express his views. The internet was considered at least as credible as mainstream 
media. As online credibility dropped, researchers suggest that as people are becoming 
more savvy internet users, they are better able to distinguish reliable sources for 
unreliable ones (Johnson and Kaye, 2010: 71). 
 
In her research on Media Representations of British Muslims, Poole says that it is evident 
that the media do reproduce the dominant ideologies of the society which they are a part. 
She argues that the media also construct their own 'meanings' through signifying 
practices: 
 
"Representation is not then a transparent process of re-presenting an objective reality. 
There is always a mediating effect whereby an event is filtered through interpretive 
frameworks …News, then, provides its audiences with interpretive frameworks , ways of 
seeing the world and defining reality (Poole in Poole, 2002: 23)." Poole hypothesis is, 
that images of Islam will form a 'particular symbolic universe, a relatively stable and 
recognisable world of (TV) news' (Dahlgren and Chakrapani, 1982:45).  
 
The next issues of investigation are: internet use opportunities and constraints, the public 
sphere and internet use, and the Arab public sphere. On the basis of his research into the 
development of media institutions from the seventeenth century to the present day, 
Habermas accounts for the emergence and disintegration of what he calls the public 
sphere. The definition Habermas gave to the public sphere, in 1964 was: 
 
"By ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all 
citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in 
which private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave 
neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like 
members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state 
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bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted 
fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and 
the freedom to express and publish their opinions – about matters of general 
interest. In a large public body, this kind of communication requires specific 
means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today 
(1964) newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the 
public sphere. We speak of the political public sphere in contrast, for instance, to 
the literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected to the 
activity of the state (Habermas, 1974: 49)."  
 
In his developed account, Habermas dealt not only with his normative concept, but also 
with its historical manifestations. He identified a number of social forms – that 
constituted the physical site of the bourgeois public sphere. As modern capitalism 
developed, this public sphere was destroyed. On the one hand, the transformation of the 
printed press into a large-scale commercial undertaking meant that it was profit, rather 
than public enlightenment, that dominated the thinking of media producers. On the other 
hand, the growth of large-scale firms and parties meant that debate was no longer 
concerned with the rational discussion of issues of public concern, but with wrangling 
over the interests of different powerful political actors. This decline, Habermas called  
‘Re-feudalisation’ since it represented a retreat to an earlier form of public life in which 
its only function was to act as an arena for the display of power.  
 
The electronic marketplace that provides citizens with an environment in which they can 
meet through surfing the web has been considered by many experts to be a modern 
translation of the concept of the public sphere conceived by Habermas. New media are 
seen to permit "the sphere of private people to come together as a public to engage 
themselves in a debate over general rules.” Habermas considered that the progressive 
interweaving of state and society would bring about the end of the bourgeois public 
sphere. He also believed that this would bring about the transformation of the media. 
Rather than representing a forum for rational debate, the public sphere has become a 
venue in which contrasting interests compete, completely excluding the citizens. The 
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public sphere has thus progressively ceased to be a space that is 'open' to the members of 
a society and that has acquired, instead, the features of a place in which different 
organisations represent interests and attempt to achieve a consensus between themselves 
and the representatives of government. In this context, it is no longer possible for citizens 
to participate in a rational debate on questions of public concern (Bentivegna, 2002: 52).    
 
Habermas’ formulation and transformation of the public sphere, has been subject to 
criticism, particularly with regard to its historical validity, and to the degree of 
congruence between this historical reality and the claims of the normative concept. 
Sparks identified three of these criticisms as being the most important: 
1. Historians have demonstrated that the evidence does not support the existence of 
any such bourgeois public sphere.  
2. It has been shown that the bourgeois public sphere was very far from universal in 
scope.  
3. It has been argued that the modern mass media, in extending the audience for 
political debate and widening the scope of the nature of the political, actually 
constituted a massive extension of the public sphere, rather than marking a ‘re-
feudalisation’ (Sparks in Thussu, 1998: 111-112).  
 
Critiques of Habermas, such as that of Thompson, for example, remain skeptical about 
such a stance and have put forward a mixture of historical, conceptual and practical 
difficulties relating to Habermas’s work in this respect. Slevin refers to Thompson’s 
criticism, and examines what impact it has on opportunities and constraints associated 
with internet use. 
 
The public sphere was not open to all:  there is considerable historical evidence; 
Thompson claims that the public sphere that Habermas describes was never open to all, 
but was very much restricted to the educated and propertied élites. It was also a male 
preserve. Moreover, Habermas neglects the role of popular social movements, which 
were often at odds with the public sphere, and ignores the commercial character of the 
early press (Thompson, 1995: 69). Slevin suggests that new communication technologies, 
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such as the internet, together with some of the developments that have transformed 
modern societies, make it almost impossible to establish a specific historical 
interpretation of a public sphere as a collective goal (Slevin, 2000: 72). 
 
The recipients of media products are not passive consumers:  Thompson criticises 
Habermas’s idea of the ‘refeudalisation’ of the public sphere in that it treats the recipients 
of media products as passive consumers (Thompson, 1995: 69). According to Slevin, 
such criticism must not detract from Habermas’s more general point that we must be 
aware of certain important issues. The internet opens up unprecedented opportunities for 
participatory opinion formation, making it even more urgent for us to explore how 
individuals and collectivities, might actively participate in critical discussion and debate 
(Slevin, 2000: 78). 
 
The traditional model of publicness is no longer adequate: Thompson asserts that it no 
longer provides an adequate way of thinking about public life today because new forms 
of mediated publicness, facilitated by the mass media, are mostly non-dialogical in 
character. This means that information is predominantly channeled one way, from the 
producer of information to the receiver. However, Slevin in his research of Internet and 
society says, that the interactive qualities of the internet create new possibilities for 
participatory opinion formation (Slevin, 2000: 78).  
 
In his article: ‘Is there a global public sphere?’ Sparks examines the question as to 
whether a global public sphere exists. Globalisation is identified by three points:  
1. We are now living in a qualitatively new epoch in which a concept of 
‘globalisation proper’ is central to an understanding of social life. 
2. Theories of globalisation seek to stress their distance from determinist, and 
particularly Marxist, accounts of social life. 
3. Following directly from this, theorists of globalisation tend to stress the 
autonomous power of the cultural and are symbolic in their explanation of social 
reality (Sparks in Thussu, 1998: 109).   
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Sparks derives four hypotheses from the above general principles:  
1. Because we are living in a globalised world, we expect to find global media. They 
will not be bounded by the shape of the state system of the past, but will be 
responsive to supra-state needs and values. 
2.  Global media employ a technology, and bear a content, that is quite different 
from the state-bounded media of the preceding epoch. The technology is one that 
exceeds the limitations of state boundaries, and the content is such as to be 
distinct from the parochial concerns of the older media. 
3.  The expectation is that these media are relatively well-developed. 
4. Because globalisation is characterised by a high level of cultural autonomy, the 
expectation is that the location of the media and their content will be distinct from 
world trading relations or world political structures (Sparks in Thussu, 1998: 109-
110). 
 
This conclusion to this research (‘is there a global public sphere?’) is that the evidence of 
globalisation in the mass media is weak. ‘Some media have made some steps in that 
direction, but their total audiences are very small and are completely dwarfed by the scale 
of the audiences for purely state-based media. What is more, the audience for these new 
‘global’ media is disproportionately amongst the élite, and need to understand a world 
language, either as native speakers or as an additional tongue, in order to benefit from this 
material. Nor is there strong evidence that these emerging global media are seriously 
eroding the national media. If we need to abandon the term ‘global public sphere’ as 
being inadequate to designate what we have been analysing, then a better one is needed. 
The one that fits the evidence best is ‘imperialist, private sphere’ (Sparks, 1998: 119).’   
Green refers to Habermas’s concept, the public sphere, with a focus on techno-culture. 
She says that the public sphere is an issue of relevance to techno-culture since techno-
culture is a major site through which the public sphere operates. The public sphere is the 
space between ‘the private’ and ‘the state’, and is a locale within which the state can be 
criticised. Green claims that Habermas’s concept harks back to an earlier society when 
state and business interests were unable to control a public-sphere of free-flowing ideas 
and information. In the West, free speech has been identified as an important component 
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of the public sphere. The mass media are techno-cultural sites for the creation of the 
public sphere – providing a framework within which the public issues of the day are 
discussed (Green, 2002:116). 
 
In his writing, Habermas is highly critical of the mass media. These concerns are echoed 
by Holmes’ argument (Holmes, 1997:34) that broadcasting ‘cellularises’ social 
interaction into domestic groups – the groups within which broadcasting is consumed. In 
his research of virtual identity, Holmes suggests that: ‘the greater the dependence of the 
individual on television, the less dependent s/he becomes on the public sphere which is 
being displaced in practice; and the more such a public sphere, particularly in its 
architectural/compositional aspects, withers away’.  Holmes sees the growth of techno-
culture as resulting from the withering face-to-face social culture. 
 
Several researchers, both Western and Arab, agree on the nature of globalization, 
particularly in its independence from time and space. Globalization has been attributed to 
four different concepts: internationalization, liberalization, universalization and 
Westernization. The latter concept has probably been the most widely used among Arab 
researchers when debating the impact of globalization.  
 
"For instance, the Arab scholar Al-Yasin, sees cultural globalization as a major challenge 
for Arabs. Negative effects lie probably in the exchange of cultural and media products, 
as it is generally assumed that the center (the West) will be the main exporter, that the 
periphery (the East) will be the main receiver, and that messages coming from the center 
may contain values deemed to be threatening for local cultures.  
 
Al-Jabri explains the Arab attitude to the West as being dual in nature: on the one hand, 
Arabs associate the West with colonization and hegemony, but on the other hand it is also 
associated with freedom, modernity and science. Western cultural products are flowing 
into the Arab region and with the emergence of satellite channels, Arab governments can 
no longer control the content offered by these channels (Mellor, 2007: 12)". 
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The internet has created a new Arab public sphere by allowing Arab audiences to 
disseminate their news stories, as well as to receive an international perspective. In other 
words, the internet has transformed the media practices of the Arab public. As Lynch 
argues, "The new public sphere is not limited to television. Prior to internet distribution, 
sensitive regimes could easily stop newspapers at the border. Dissemination on the 
internet gives these newspapers far greater reach than ever before (Lynch, 2006: 29)". 
 
The Internet did not, though, abolish the scrutiny and suspicion of the audience who use 
certain websites, as they say that political influence exists. The internet is also not 
available to every one, insofar as it requires some technical equipment, computer skills 
and a command of English (Hammer, 2005: 7). Having said that, the benefits of the 
internet are in the lack of censorship and in helping to defy the repression of everyday 
life, in Palestine by overcoming the limitations of checkpoints and occupation, thus 
generating feelings of ‘mobility’ and ‘political autonomy’ (Aouragh, 2008: 110). 
The issue I investigate is which medium Palestinians in the U.K. use most and which 
websites, the television channels and publications they prefer to consume for news, and 
why? I explore the phenomena of internet usage by the Palestinians. The Palestinians do 
not have an established media market ‘back home’ and they have to have immediate 
access to news and information, as well as a comprehensive picture, because of the rapid 
developments in their region. There is a developed discourse about the Arab new media – 
such as the satellite television channel, Al Jazeera, that brought the information 
revolution into the reach of a global audience. According to a 2002 report on Middle East 
communication: 
 
"Al Jazeera is center-stage in the modernisation of Arab-language broadcasting 
(Zayani in Zayani, 2005: 1)." 
 
However, there is no research that compares the use of the traditional and the new media, 
putting it to the test: I interviewed Palestinians who reside in the UK. Firstly, I would like 
to relate this to the discourse around Diaspora. 
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Diaspora – New Term; Old Discourse 
Diaspora is a relatively new term in migration studies. It refers to individuals who 
emigrate from one country to another. The term ‘Diaspora’ relates to a group of people 
that has been dispersed, or has expanded, to at least two countries of the world (Schulz & 
Hammer, 2003: 9). According to Tololyan:  
 
"The term Diaspora that once described Jewish, Greek and Armenian dispersion, 
now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like 
immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas 
community and ethnic community, as Diasporic (Tololyan, 1991: 4-5)." 
 
The Arabic term ghurba is often translated as diaspora but does not embody the English 
connotations, which closely associate it with a Jewish diaspora, now universalized, 
along with the Armenian and the Greek. Parmenter notes that it is often 
translated as diaspora but that it refers more specifically to “the experience of being a 
stranger separated from one’s familiar home (Peteet, 2007: 639).” 
 
The Digital Diaspora concept is important for a thorough understanding of the theoretical 
framework. This concept reflects the engagement of its members in activities related to 
information technology. Three characteristics are required in the social infrastructure in 
order for a digital diaspora to emerge as part of the fabric of society. They are 
‘immigration’, ‘information technology connectivity’, and ‘networking’. Digital Diaspora 
is characterised by mobility, a multimedia environment and by its global engagement, 
which reflects its ongoing relations with multiple diasporic sites and the overseas 
homeland (Laguerre, 2010: 49-50, 62).  
 
In defining the concept ‘Diaspora’, Fazal and Tsagarousianou refer to the violent 
meaning of the concept: "The original meaning of the word diaspora originated from the 
Greek language concerning migration and colonisation. However, within the context of 
the Jews, Africans, Palestinians and Armenians, the concept of diaspora attained an evil 
and violent meaning. Within this frame, diaspora achieved the connotation of 
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displacement from a homeland, and therefore of a collective traumatic experience (Fazal 
& Tsagarousianou, 2002: 7)". 
 
Saffran limits the term Diaspora to communities that meet specific criteria, which include 
dispersal to two or more geographic areas, attachment to the homeland, a measure of 
alienation from the host society, a collective memory of the homeland, an aspiration to 
return to the homeland, a commitment to restore the homeland and a derived collective 
consciousness and solidarity gained from a relationship with the homeland (Saffran, 
1991: 83). 
 
As Tsagarousianou points out: 
 
"It was partly the product of a desire among scholars to explore new dimensions 
of human mobility… Moreover, it was intended to link phenomena associated to 
human dispersion with broader theoretical advances associated with globalization, 
postmodernity and post-colonialism (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 4)". 
 
Diaspora has become a key term in contemporary theorising about immigration, ethnicity 
and identity since it emphasises the ways in which identities have been, and continue to 
be, transformed through relocation, cross-cultural exchange and interaction (Gillespie, 
1995: 7). According to Tsagarousianou, Diasporas primarily inhabit transnational social 
fields, and their transnational character distinguishes them from related concepts and 
phenomena. In her book on Diasporic Cultures, she says: 
 
"To be sure, migrants are not just individuals that happen to be out of place…they 
constitute part of, and institute transnational (out of place) relationships, networks, 
communities, economic, movements. They set in motion processes of imagination 
of themselves as transnational communities, as Diasporas (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 
3)". 
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As Clifford says: "Diasporic cultural forms are deployed in transnational networks built 
from multiple attachments, and they encode practices of accommodation with, as well as 
resistance to, host countries and their norms. Diaspora... involves dwelling, maintaining 
communities, having collective homes away from home (Clifford, 1994: 307-8)". 
 
Over the past 20 years, transnationalism has become a major paradigm in migration 
studies (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999; Vertovec, 2009). This approach reflects a 
"growing disjunction between territory, subjectivity and collective social movement" 
(Appadurai, 1996:189). It:  
 
"Captures various economic, cultural and political practices and dynamics that cut 
across national borders, thus generating new social morphologies such as 
transnational communities, networks and social spaces (Nedelcu, 2012: 1341)." 
 
"Transnationalism is a term that is poorly defined, similarly to the concept 
‘globalisation’. However, some of its characteristics can be identified, these are the 
processes immigrants use to sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their 
societies of origin and their places of settlement (Matar, 2005:19)."  
 
In talking about transnationalism in relation to my research, there is complexity in the 
definition – should Palestinians be observed as part of the Arab nation, or do they form a 
separate nation? In other words, should transnationalism be defined as forming relations 
within the Arab world, or only beyond the Arab world? Is it an Arab nation at all? In this 
respect, I agree with Anderson, who argues that "a nation is an imagined political 
community, because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow members or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communication (Anderson, 1991: 6)". 
  
Moreover, what links the Arab people is not necessarily being part of the same nation. 
According to Lewis, whereas Arabism, a strong sense of identification with the Arab 
nation as a collective unity, seems to be waning, Islamism has gained currency in recent 
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years. In the Middle East, the primary identities are those acquired at birth. These are of 
three kinds. The first is the family, the clan, the tribe, developing into the ethnic nation. 
The second is by place. The third is the religious community (Lewis, 1998: 6). 
 
In contrast to this position, Conner argues that with the partial exception of Morocco, the 
symbols, institutions, and popular allusions of leaders, are, in the case of the Arab states, 
designed to foster an image of the state’s inhabitants as part of a larger Arab nation and 
an image of the state’s territory as part of a ‘Great Arab Homeland’ that extends from the 
Persian Gulf to the Atlantic. Conner points to factors that indicate, in his view, the focus 
of the Arab nation rather than state particularities. In five of the eighteen Arab countries, 
the formal title of the state serves to remind the populace of their trans-state ethnic 
identity. State flags and symbols also often reflect an Arab-wide, rather than a state-wide, 
focus. Fifty percent of the eighteen flags fall into this category. Emphasis on Arabness, 
rather than on state identity, is also pronounced in the case of state constitutions. The  
ethno-political myth of a common Arabness has been tested in recent years as a result of 
the huge numbers of Arabs who have migrated from their own state to other Arab states 
(Conner, 1986: 33- 35). 
 
"Anderson’s theorisation remains central to debates on media and identity because it 
serves to highlight the relevance of symbolic products, including media, in a world in 
which communities and communications are no longer bounded by singular places or 
spaces and distinct cultures (Matar, 2005: 17)." 
 
The digital revolution created a new phase in transnationalism. Information and 
Communication Technologies enabled new forms of migrant transnationalism that were 
characterised not only by the growing intensity of transnational exchanges and activities, 
but also by a system of communication that allows migrants to connect with multiple, 
geographically distant and culturally distinct worlds with which they identify and in 
which they participate on a daily basis (Vertovec, 2009).   
 
Cohen (2008) identifies nine common features of Diaspora:  
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1. "Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign 
 
regions; " 
 
2. "alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland in search of work,  
 
 in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; " 
 
3. "a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location,  
 
 history, suffering and achievements; " 
 
4. "an idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a collective  
 
commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its  
 
creation;" 
 
5. "the frequent development of a return movement to the homeland that gains  
 
Collective approbation even if many in the group are satisfied with only a  
 
vicarious relationship or intermittent visits to the homeland; " 
 
6. "a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a  
 
sense of distinctiveness, a common history, the transmission of a common cultural  
 
and religious heritage and the belief in a common fate; " 
 
7. "a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance or the 
 
             possibility that another calamity might befall the group; " 
 
 
8. "a sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other  
 
countries of settlement even where home has become more vestigial; and" 
 
 
9. "the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a  
 
      tolerance for pluralism (Cohen, 2008: 17)." 
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However, the concept ‘Diaspora’ remains problematic: 
 
"This problem has been exacerbated by the increasing use of the concept as a 
metaphor to signify a global condition of mobility, to describe any community 
that has emigrated and/or whose numbers make it visible in host communities and 
to describe the space where migrant communities reside’ (Matar, 2005: 135)". 
 
In his work Global Diasporas, Robin Cohen attempts to bypass these conceptual 
dilemmas by shifting the emphasis from the historical use of the term to a wider 
framework that sees it as a particular kind of migration, defined not just by physical 
movement, the forced or voluntary shifts of populations from one society under stress to 
another, but also by its psychological implications for the sense of longing, loss and the 
possibility of return, which are the common dimensions of the diasporic condition.  
 
"Moreover, transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by 
exclusive territorial claims. In the age of cyberspace, a Diaspora can, to some 
degree, be held together or re-created through the mind, through cultural artifacts 
and through a shared imagination (Cohen, 1997: 26)".  
 
Cohen's nine points model (Cohen, 1997: 180), however, has come under criticism. As 
Sreberny notes, Cohen suggests a model that assumes rootedness as the driving force in 
the diasporic experience, which are the very elements that need to be investigated and 
explored (Sreberny in Cottle, 2000: 180).  
 
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Palestinian Diaspora is an incipient 
Diaspora. Modern Diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origin residing and 
acting in host countries yet maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their 
homelands. It is evident that as a result of recent waves of labour migration to Europe, the 
Persian Gulf, and North America, new Diasporas are constantly being formed. The 
Hispanics in the United States, the Pakistanis and Palestinians in the Gulf Area, the Turks 
in Western Europe and the Israelis in the United States and Canada are thus establishing 
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themselves as new Diasporas in these countries. Due to a growing political awareness of 
these Diasporas, resulting from changed attitudes toward them in certain host countries in 
the West and due to improved systems of communication, the cultural, political and 
economic activities of these Diasporas will not diminish but will, rather, expand. 
Substantial elements in the Irish community in the United States have become 
increasingly involved in support of the IRA; the Greeks in the United States are engaged 
in a similar revival in their increased activities on behalf of their homeland and, finally, 
American blacks continue to show interest in African matters and especially in 
developments in South Africa. Modern Diasporas can flourish in pluralistic societies in 
the West, especially as far as their transnational-activities are concerned. After the initial 
settling-down period, some of these new Diasporas have started to mobilise and organise 
for political action both at the domestic and international levels (Sheffer in Sheffer, 1986: 
3-5). 
 
In the discourse on and of the Palestinians in Britain, there is an ongoing debate around 
the use of the term Diaspora. I would like to explain the challenge to the use of the term 
‘Diaspora’ in the Palestinian context.   
 
The Palestinian Nation – Narrative of Refugees 
Before talking about the Palestinian case, I would like to draw on the main terms relating 
to this discussion:  
 
"A nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound 
together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry. Nations have ‘objective’ 
characteristics which may include a territory, a language, a religion, or common 
descent, and ‘subjective’ characteristics, essentially a people’s awareness of its 
nationality and affection for it (Kellas, 1998:3)."  
 
"Nationalism is both an ideology and a form of behaviour. The ideology of nationalism 
builds on people’s awareness of a nation to give a set of attitudes and a programme of 
action. These may be cultural, economic or political. In all cases, nationalism seeks to 
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defend and promote the interests of the nation. The political aspect of nationalism is seen 
most clearly in the demand for national self-determination, or ’home rule’ (Kellas, 
1998:4)." 
 
The Palestinians were displaced from their home in 1948 and again, later, in 1967. On the 
latter occasion, many Palestinians became second-time refugees. This experience leads to 
the fact that the Palestinians define themselves as refugees and not as immigrants. They 
stress the non-voluntary component of leaving their home. To put it differently, the 
Palestinians feel like ‘reactive migrants’ – those who do not have a choice about whether 
and where to emigrate (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 30). The term ‘reactive migrants’, coined 
by Richmond, is, though, a simplistic one. There is a reasonably high number of 
Palestinians who have immigrated into the U.K. from choice, for a variety of different 
reasons, such as study or work opportunities. However, the non voluntary dispersal of the 
Palestinians is such a strong component in their collective identity, that even those who 
have managed to integrate in the U.K. define themselves as refugees and not as 
immigrants. They refer to the fact that their place of origin is not a state, and to the fact 
that their family was displaced and their original home is not the actual location that they 
left to emigrate to the U.K. Aouragh claims that the refugee camps are reminders that the 
current Palestinian ‘transnational community’ has, in effect, been created by forced 
migration (Aouragh, 2011: 77). 
 
National Diasporas are defined and formed by constantly changing dynamics between the 
national and the transnational. One has to remember in the Palestinian case, the 
establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993, which has radically changed 
the balance between the national and transnational components of the Palestinian 
Diaspora, necessitating the rethinking of the Palestinian Diaspora in terms of 
transnational networks in times of rising Palestinian nationalism and a process of state-
building. In many ways, the Palestinian struggle for statehood was initiated by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which was, historically, a Diasporic 
organisation (Peteet, 2007:637). Both Palestinians and Jews claim that Palestine is their 
homeland, and, in general, neither is prepared to concede the other’s claim. Conflicting 
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nationalisms of this kind are not unusual. Irish nationalists (and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Ireland) and Unionists both claim Northern Ireland for their nation, and the 
territory of South Africa was claimed for the Afrikaaner nation and for the black African 
nation. However, Zionism adds an extra dimension to Israeli nationalism, which makes it 
more of an ethnic nationalism than a social nationalism. Israel is an ethnic nation rather 
than a social nation, in that it is explicitly the nation of the Jews, and cannot, in theory, 
become a nation in which Jews are a minority (Kellas, 1998: 170–172). Though, there is 
more than one Semite group in Israel.  
 
"Palestinians who wish to immigrate to the U.K. have to obtain a visa. Many 
Palestinians’ requests for visas are denied by the British authorities. The most important 
factor in determining to which country a Palestinian migrant would go is legal access to 
that country. European countries have accepted limited numbers of Palestinians as 
refugees or immigrants. Many Palestinian migrants have experience of illegal entry and 
the complicated ways to legalise one’s status in different countries (Hammer, 2005: 16)." 
 
Moreover, the Palestinians lack freedom of movement. Palestinians who live in the U.K. 
and wish to visit Gaza cannot do it because of closure restrictions. The Rafah crossing 
was sealed by the Egyptian Authorities after Hamas took control of Gaza in June, 2007. 
Israel also shut its crossings with Gaza, in 2007.  Some Palestinians who were able to 
emigrate to the U.K. live with painful memories, as Reem told me: 
 
 ‘I am still a daughter of the occupation. When I see a soldier or a policeman, I 
have to stop. I am still afraid from them like I am in a curfew. I have a problem 
with people in uniform because they control checkpoints (Reem, London, July, 
2008).’ 
 
"The stories about treatment at borders and airports, the anxiety of travelling and the 
denial of visas and travel permits are uncountable and are major feature of Palestinian 
existence (Hammer, 2005: 14)." These three factors – being stateless, having problems of 
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legal access to the host country and having movement restrictions, also emphasise the 
complexity of the definition of the Palestinian Diasporic community as such.    
 
For the reasons mentioned above, many participants realise that their Diasporic status will 
not change and they will not return to their home. Unlike most of the Diasporic 
communities in the U.K., the Palestinians migrated from an entity to a state and not from 
a state to a state. It could thus be the case that Palestine will remain an imaginary ‘state’ 
for them. Cohen explains that, traditionally, Diaspora is understood in terms of migration 
and colonisation. Tsagarousianou talks about the implications of the process of 
decolonisation and migrant flows from the former colonial peripheries to the European 
nation-states in the 1950s (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 22). Although talking about 
colonisation in the context of migration, Cohen differentiates between migrants who are 
agents of colonisation, and the Palestinians, who are passive victims (Cohen, 1997). 
Tsagarousianou argues that "Whereas Cohen's distinction (1997) between the categories 
of 'victim', labour, trade, imperial and cultural diasporas take into account the diversity of 
diasporic experience, they do not really take on board the phenomena of late modern 
transnational mobility that takes significantly novel forms that cannot be readily 
discarded as having no relevance to the study of diasporic phenomena (Tsagarousianou, 
2007: 28)."  
 
"Until recently, some Palestinian and Arab scholars (Kodmani, 1997) found the term 
Diaspora problematic for use in the Palestinian case. They looked upon the use of the 
term as an implicit acceptance of the dispersal of the Palestinian community, assuming 
that they were no longer refugees uprooted from their country by force and unable to 
receive permission to return to their homes (Shiblak, 2005: 8)". Harik (1986), accept the 
use of the term Diaspora for the Palestinian communities living outside the Arab region. 
They argue, though, against using it in the case of the Palestinians who live in Arab host 
states. Harik asserts that their similarity in language, religion and cultural background and 
their being a majority, as in the case of Jordan, made it difficult to look upon the 
Palestinian communities in Arab countries as Diasporic communities (Harik in Sheffer, 
1986: 315). 
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Saffran also refers to the Diasporic condition of the Palestinians in Arab states. He argues 
that the Palestinian fate resembles that of the Jews and Armenians in its displacement, in 
its preservation of a collective memory of the homeland, its desire for return, and in its 
connected communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America, and 
they can thus be called a Diaspora. However, he points out that those Palestinians who 
live in Arab countries are not altogether strangers there, as they share a language and 
many cultural and religious with their host societies. They may not have full political 
rights in these countries, but many of them enjoy economic prosperity. Moreover, in his 
view, the Palestinians lacked community consciousness before uprooting and cannot now 
agree how to define the physical boundaries of their homeland. Safran concludes that 
Palestinian refugees and expellees show a strong ‘collective Diaspora consciousness’, 
although it is more diluted in the case of the Palestinians who are well integrated into 
Western countries (Saffran, 1991:88). 
 
The basic structure and orientation of Palestinian society is acknowledged by Palestinians 
to be fundamentally no different from those of the other Arab societies surrounding it. 
Given that they share language, religion, social customs and, occasionally, family ties, 
Palestinians have tended to stress their commonalities with neighboring Arab societies. 
Religion, dialect, food, and patterns of urban and village life are important to the 
Palestinian sense of identity. However, Bowker suggests that those broad similarities in 
cultural background and practices between refugee communities and host societies are 
not by themselves sufficient to ensure successful adaption and assimilation of refugees 
into the non-refugee communities surrounding them. "Even in situations where the 
refugee population lives in areas of close historical contact, such as the cultivated zones 
of Jordan, ongoing feelings of separateness on the refugees’ side, and stigmatization on 
the part of some resident communities, have shaped the situation that refugees face. In 
addition to such social and cultural factors that promote distinctive identity, refugees have 
their own political interests and demands (Bowker, 2003: 71-72)."   
 
A different approach which also indicates the challenge defining the Palestinian Diaspora 
and the ongoing debate can be found in the book: The Palestinian Diaspora.  Its non-Arab 
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author, Schulz, sees the Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel as 
leading Diasporic lives. They do not live in the Diaspora. Rather, their lives are defined 
by a Diasporic condition. Schulz claims that displacement, dispersal, forced movement 
and constraints on movement have a much wider significance in relation to the 
Palestinians’ case: ‘The predicament of alienation from land, territory, and place defines 
the lives of most Palestinians (Schulz, 2003: 21).’ According to Aouragh, "In Palestine 
itself, the refugees are not exiled – they are not territorial outsiders. They are connected 
through more or less fluid boundaries. This, though, becomes more difficult when 
checkpoints were implemented, dividing the territory into closed units; whereas in the 
Diaspora, most Palestinians are exiled refugees and have never seen their homeland 
(Aouragh 2011: 6; 7)." 
 
Yet, there is a reasonably high number of Palestinians who have immigrated into the U.K. 
from choice, for different reasons, such as study or work opportunities. However, the non 
voluntary dispersal of the Palestinians is such a strong component in their collective 
identity, that even those who have managed to integrate in the UK, define themselves as 
refugees and not as immigrants. They refer to the fact that their place of origin is not a 
state, and to the fact that their family has been displaced and their original home is not the 
actual location that they left to immigrate into the UK. 
 
The Effect of the ‘Refugee Nation’ on the Palestinian Identity 
The condition of Diaspora is one in which the multiplicity of identity and community is a 
key dynamic. The separation of the Diaspora from the ‘natural’ setting of the homeland, 
often leads to an intense search for the negotiation of identity (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 33). 
Having said that:  
 
"What it means to be Palestinian cannot be reduced to a question of identity alone, 
often talked about as a political, national, collective or resistant identity... rather, 
what it means to be Palestinian is about lived experiences and conditions of being 
which change and shift as a result of evolving circumstances and conditions. In 
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…complex ways, these circumstances are linked to the nakba, the catastrophe of 
1948, when the state of Israel was created…(Matar, 2011: preface page)".   
  
Both Syed (2002) and Chapman (2005) agree that a significant factor in the current sense 
of unrest is the repeated and humiliating failures of Arab armies (Syed, 2002: 143). "The 
Six Day War in June, 1967, was a significant factor in the development of Islamism. The 
humiliating defeat of the Arab armies which attacked Israel is seen by Muslims and 
Arabs as the lowest point ever reached by the Muslim world (Chapman, 2005: 36)." This 
failure is a significant element in the appeal of Arab nationalism. This mass sense of 
failure to achieve what are perceived to be essentially Arab objectives in the face of a 
strong West is a potent force which cannot be underestimated (Syed, 2002: 143). 
According to resurgence theorists, the masses turned away from the secular nation-state 
and the ideology of the West, and Islam began to fill the vacuum, empowering people, 
through their faith, with a sense of identity (Milton-Edwards, 1999: 6). A discussion on 
the role of religion in the Palestinians’ life is in a separate section of this chapter. Matar 
describes the Six- Day War as a turning point: 
 
 "The war, dubbed al-Naksa (the setback’), marked a watershed in Palestinian 
history because it tipped the balance of power in favour of the guerrilla 
organisations of the Palestinian Resistance Movement…as a result of the 
war…the Palestinians once again were divided into new geopolitical categories. 
Israel declared the new areas as territories under custody in which military rule 
would apply (Matar, 2011:  91)".   
 
Other researchers hold the same opinion. Joseph, for example, says that as far as the Arab 
Diaspora in the U.S. is concerned: 
 
"The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a turning point. The often indiscriminate attacks 
on and public displays of hatred for Arabs and Arabs - during and after the war 
galvanized Arabs - to organize in America to fend off discriminatory 
representations of themselves and their homelands (Joseph, 1999: 265)". 
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Tamimi adds a positive dimension to the defeat. Paradoxically, Tamimi stresses that after 
they fell under Israeli occupation in 1967, the Palestinians of Gaza had enjoyed a relative 
economic boom. Palestinian workers could, with relative ease, cross into Israel and earn 
good money for a day’s work. Meanwhile, Israelis would come to the Gaza Strip to shop 
(Tamimi, 2007: 11). In the early period of the Palestinian – Zionist confrontation (1948), 
Arab nationalism among the Palestinians was stronger than local Palestinian identity. The 
fact that the Palestinians shared a national identity with the rest of the Arabs made the 
local Palestinian –Zionist quarrel a regional issue and increased the dependency of the 
Palestinians on outside forces for the resolution of their problem. The implications of this 
may be summed up as follows. Firstly, the exodus of the Palestinians was a retreat into 
areas where kin lived and shared the sense of their tragedy and defeat, and the objective 
to continue the struggle. Secondly, Arab states active in the Palestinian – Israeli war 
manifested strong Arab nationalist sentiments that drove them to become involved in the 
Palestinian issue. In one sense, they were in a position almost identical to that of the 
Palestinians in the diaspora. The tide of Arab nationalism was at its peak from the start of 
the Palestinian exodus until the 1970s. To the Arab people, the Palestinian issue became 
the conscience of their nationalism. The identification between the Arab people and the 
Palestinian Diaspora was therefore almost complete (Harik, 1986: 321- 323).  
 
That they are actually refugees or a ‘refugee nation’ (Siddiq, 1995: 87) who do not have a 
state is a strong component in their collective identity. Arab countries do not provide the 
Palestinians with passports, except for Jordan. Jordan is the sole Arab country where 
Palestinians have been able to receive citizenship on a large scale. All registered refugees 
are holders of the Jordanian passport, except for those originating from Gaza (Schulz, 
2003: 46). 
 
"Various factors influence the level of integration into a host society; amongst them are 
their living conditions and place of residence, their legal status and their reasons for 
emigrating. One especially important factor for Palestinians’ integration into host 
societies has been the legal status to which they were entitled. The worst situation can be 
found in Lebanon, where Palestinians are not entitled to passports, but only to a refugee 
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document that grants only the right to residency. Lebanon has refused to consider 
Palestinian refugees for naturalisation and resettlement, mainly on political grounds 
(Hammer, 2005: 17)". 
 
Sheffer claims that the majority of ethnic groups in Western societies prefer to maintain 
their distinct identities (Sheffer in Weiner, 1993: 265). Fazal and Tsagarousianou argue 
that within the context of the diasporic space of ‘England’, there are various identities. 
The ‘Englishness’ entity is constructed within imperial history, both internally as well as 
with rivalries and conquests abroad. However, the encounters of Diasporas with 
Englishness results in appropriation by both sides: the diaspora communities appropriate 
English-ness and the dominant cultural formations appropriate from diasporic cultures 
(Fazal & Tsagarousianou, 2002: 15). 
 
The Palestinians are an ethnic Diaspora, created as a result of expulsion from the 
homeland and settlement in one or more host countries (in contrast to ethnic Diasporas 
that are created by voluntary migration, i.e., the Turks in West Germany). In their host 
countries, Diasporas preserve their ethnic or ethno-religious identity and communal 
solidarity. This solidarity serves as a basis for maintaining and promoting constant 
contacts among the Diasporas’ activist elements. The emergence of Diaspora 
organisations provides the potential for conflicting pressures and for the development of 
dual authority and dual loyalty patterns and problems. In order to avoid undesirable 
conflicts with the norms or laws established by the dominant group in their host 
countries, the Diasporas accept certain rules of the game in these countries. At certain 
periods, however, real or alleged dual loyalties may create tension between elements in 
the host country and the Diaspora (Sheffer in Sheffer, 1986: 9-10). The Palestinians live 
with both identities side by side. They preserve their Palestinian identity and integrate 
into the British society. This is a result of the Palestinian and other ethnic minority 
groups’ growing self-confidence - they proudly maintain their ethno-national identity, 
retain their homeland citizenship, openly identify as members of Diaspora organisations, 
and are not reluctant to act publicly on behalf of their home lands and dispersed co-
ethnics (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 150). This activity is being enabled as a result of the 
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greatest advantage of the internet - it's potential to facilitate social and political change 
through the establishment of activist networks and dissemination of information, formerly 
monopolised by state owned news agencies (Marmura, 2008).  
 
Moreover, the shared events of 1948 brought the Palestinians closer together in terms of 
their collective consciousness, even as they were physically dispersed all over the Middle 
East and beyond (Khalidi, 2009: 22). The Palestinian identity is a strong component of 
Palestinian society in Palestine, as well as in the Diaspora. In talking about the Diaspora, 
I refer to communities in Arab countries and in Western countries. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, Arab countries, except Jordan, do not provide Palestinians with 
citizenship. The fact that they are not wanted in the Arab countries is a reason for keeping 
a distinctive identity. "Historically, Arab states did not support the formation of 
nationalist organisations. The Palestinians thus developed a ‘culture of resistance’. The 
development of a Palestinian culture of resistance outside Palestine planted the seed for 
the emergence of a Palestinian identity as a Diasporic identity or for a deep rift in 
political identity between those Palestinians living ‘inside’ and those living ‘outside’ 
(Hammer, 2005: 36)". 
 
"Palestinian-ness (what it means to be Palestinian) can not be understood without 
acknowledging the impact of dispersal and uprootedness on the ways in which people 
who are living or who had lived in the area formerly known as Palestine began to think of 
themselves as Palestinian or without acknowledging that, since that event, Palestinian 
consciousness has struggled for acceptance and legitimacy in the world (Matar, 2005: 
130)." 
 
Though some elements of Palestinian identity did exist before the dispersal, there is little 
doubt that the experiences in exile have been building blocks in shaping Palestinian- ness 
(Schulz, 2003). In fact, it was in exile that the national mythology of resistance (al-
mukawama) was asserted as a strategy to overcome processes of victimization and to 
transcend the state of dispossession, denial and statelessness (Peteet, 1991; Sayigh, 1997) 
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and it was in Diaspora that the two central poles of 'to suffer' and 'to struggle' and/or 'to 
resist' composing the main components of Palestinian identity. 
 
"The use of active verbs, such as to suffer, to resist and to struggle, is important as these 
verbs reflect passion and action, as well as a temporal dimension (implying something 
done now to achieve a goal in the future). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, notions of 
resisting and struggling galvanised guerrilla attacks against Israel, but as Sayigh (1997) 
argues, it was another human and political disaster (the 1967 war) that led to the 
embodiment of 'struggle' as the prime political principle and a main ingredient in 
Palestinian nation-building (Matar, 2005: 131). " 
 
As Schultz put it, although Palestinians refugees live in countries with similar ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic structures, their ‘outsideness’ in the Arab world was 
striking from early on (Schultz & Hammer, 2003:45). There were accusations, in Arab 
countries, that Palestinians had deserted their cause and their homeland and begged others 
for help (Morris in Bramwell, 1988:255). Referring specifically to the implication for 
their identity, Shiblak says the inability of Palestinian refugees to integrate in host Arab 
societies, and the continuing policies of discrimination against them, contributed towards 
deepening their sense of national identity and of a shared destiny, inside Palestine or in 
exile (Shiblak, 2005:11).  
 
Shiblak’s approach is contradictory to the approach of other scholars, such as Harik, who 
claims, as I mentioned earlier, that it is difficult to define the Palestinians living in the 
Arab countries as living in a Diaspora (Harik in Sheffer, 1986: 315). Shiblak’s argument 
is more convincing. Although the Palestinians share the same cultural background as 
people in host Arab countries, they have their own historical background. Their identity is 
shaped by the historical events and current political situation in Palestine. The 
Palestinians thus have a strong sense of their national identity.  
 
According to Mahmoud, The Palestinians differentiate themselves from the rest of the 
Arab peoples through their territorial losses. Their common bond is the language and the 
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memory of the 1948 catastrophe (Mahmoud in Shiblak, 2005:99). "For refugees, 
emigration was an uprooting. It entailed the loss of family members, land and homes, and 
it implied fear and insecurity about the future. Their only consolation was in the hope that 
they might return soon and in their ability to share their traumatic experience with the 
Palestinian refugee community. Older people, in particular, struggled from day to day, 
trying to survive and to keep the family and the community together. For them, the 
memory of life in Palestine was all that was left. The younger generation had to focus on 
daily life also, but their eyes were additionally on Palestine. For Palestinians who were 
children when they became refugees and, even more, for the generations born outside 
Palestine, the loss of the homeland was total, as they could remember little or nothing 
about it. Their actual socialisation took place, and still takes place, in other counties and 
contexts (Hammer, 2005: 18)".    
 
 Most participants talk about their displacement from home.  For the first generation it is 
a vivid memory, for the second generation, it is a recollection of stories which they 
continue to tell to their community members, as well as to the international community. 
One of the participants, for example, has blogs and she writes for international 
newspapers online about her parents’ story. The majority of participants are also involved 
politically, acting for the right of Palestinians to return to their home. 
 
Though, 'home'/ the nation state idea can have different meanings in the Western and 
Arab context. According to Rabi', one of the very few Arab political scientists who wrote 
on the Islamic state, the Islamic polity is not a state in the European sense (i.e. 
territorially defined), but an organised politico-religious community (umma). The purpose 
of the umma is spreading the message (da'wa) and the function of power and authority is 
to act as the instrument for achieving such a cultural/civilizational mission.  
 
"The state concept is different from the state concept as it developed with the nation-state 
in Europe. In the latter the idea of the civilization function of the state, has declined in 
favour of a purely political function. The Islamic state, by contrast followed in the 
tradition of the Greek and Roman civilisations where the state and the civilizational will 
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were at one. The modern Arab national state should be an instrument for sustaining a 
permanent link between the past, the present and the future. For the nation is not based on 
racial unity but on unity of perception, language and civilisation (Rabi's quote, in Ayubi, 
2008:18)".   
   
I would like to move on, to discuss the identity issues of Palestinians who emigrated to 
Western countries. An existing debate among researches relates to the question: to what 
extent can Palestinians integrate into Western host countries, while keeping their own 
identity. Looking at this question from the perspective of the host countries, some say 
that European host countries accept multiculturalism, while others claim otherwise. This 
issue is especially important in relation to Palestinians in the diaspora, since, as I 
explained earlier, the Palestinians have a strong interest in keeping their culture and 
tradition, as a result of their collective trauma – the nakba. 
 
The issue of preserving an identity is complex, as an identity can change over time. The 
identities of Diasporas are, however, relatively rigid, for they are based on primordial 
components. The identities of Diasporas are based on shared symbolic and cultural 
elements that are firmly anchored in the history of those groups and are still vivid in the 
minds and memories of their core members, especially relating to members of stateless 
Diasporas. Those elements are almost unaffected by the Diaspora’s integration into their 
host societies (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 151). Having said this, neither the members of 
state-linked Diasporas, nor the members of stateless Diasporas will have uniform 
attitudes towards their national histories (Skinner, 1993: 20). Such cultural controversies 
are splitting certain Palestinian communities in the West. 
 
For nationalities without states, political institutions are not fully able to develop their 
own identities, so they must adopt the position of activist commons. Possibilities opened 
up by an alternative cyber culture and a cyborg Diaspora go much further than simple 
communications among natives and immigrants in building a diasporic culture. A digital 
Diaspora can be transformed into a political community and can incite the rise of more 
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engaged political communities by means of activism. Direct contributions to newsgroups 
and blogs on politics could be one of the ways to reach such a community. 
 
However, for this to happen, it would be required to generate activist awareness inside 
the virtual communities of the majority of Diasporas without states. Information nodes 
and digital services would make people more aware of their political possibilities. Prior to 
a direct political discourse, there is a realm for activist work that consists of social and 
cultural realities. That realm has already been used as a first step toward politics in the 
off-line world. For instance, debates, political campaigns, and polls constitute the fabric 
of the political off-line world. This could also be the space in which to generate political 
awareness in the online world (Alonso & Arzoz, 2010, 71).    
 
Migrant integration can be eased when Diasporans have opportunities to express their 
hybrid identities collectively. The term hybridity is described by Bhabha, a scholar who 
has a genuine interest in hybridity. Bhabha stresses: 
 
‘In my own work I have developed the concept of hybridity to describe the 
construction of cultural authority within conditions of political antagonism or 
inequity. Strategies of hybridization reveal an estranging movement in the 
‘authoritative’, even authoritarian inscription of the cultural sign…the hybrid 
strategy or discourse opens up a space of negotiation where power is unequal but 
its articulation may be equivocal. Such negotiation is neither assimilation nor 
collaboration (Bhabha, 1996: 58)’.  
 
Since the late 1970s, social sciences, and especially British cultural studies, have 
developed an interest in the study of identity as a social construct and as positioned 
within historical, economic and cultural systems. Identity construction in relation to 
media and mediated representations developed as an important sub-discipline. This 
interest was initially directed to class identities, but expanded to include gender, race and 
ethnicity. Race and ethnicity studies focused primarily on exclusion, racism, minority 
misrepresentations and, more recently, on audiencehood. Ethnicity became a key concept 
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in addressing cultural difference in multicultural societies. Hall’s (1988) analytical 
concept of new ethnicities emphasises that ethnic identities are not defined at birth, that 
they are less dependent on blood relations and more on cultural belonging, and that they 
are hybrid and the outcome of the meeting of diverse cultures. The theorisation of new 
ethnicities became a starting point for the contextualisation of identity in relation to 
Diaspora and transnationalism. 
  
Following Hall, Chambers (1994) refers to new ethnicities and expands the analysis to all 
identities. Everybody is a stranger in unknown lands and that is part of the human 
condition, not necessarily the outcome of displacement in the era of post-colonialism. Old 
assumptions of race and ethnicity studies about the stability of the binary relation 
minority/majority, and of the nation state as the singular defining cultural and political 
context, become contested. Study of identity, community and social interaction makes 
one become more aware of issues of power in national and transnational scale, of social 
structures within and across societies, and of cultural formations that are neither stable 
nor stranded within the nation. It is in this context that Diaspora gains its significance as 
an operational concept. Diaspora, much more than ethnicity, recognises that identities and 
communities are constructed in transnational spaces, in networks and through mediated 
links between various positions across the globe.  
 
Diaspora recognises continuity in time and in terms of people’s emotional and cultural 
attachment to a community that spreads beyond national boundaries. Diaspora looks at 
the cultural autonomy of groups that settle in certain countries but whose cultural and 
social capital is not defined in a singular way by majorities and mainstream cultures 
(Georgiou, 2006: 45-47). 
 
"Identity was a major concern of both the development and dependency approaches to 
communications (development theory was equated with modernisation, and 
modernisation was seen as a process of diffusion of Western social values. Hence, if 
obstacles to the development process in Third World countries could be solved, then they 
too could march on towards development). Communications and development assumed 
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that mass media would help to legitimise new states and to create a sense of national 
identity. One of the central dimensions of the transition to modernity was felt to be the 
development of affiliations and attachments to communities larger than family, locality, 
tribe and religion. An acute problem facing ‘new’ nations emerging from colonial 
domination was thus the establishment of an ‘integrative revolution’ and a new cohesive 
identity that would combat the fragmenting forces of previous identifications. The 
implication was that the stable continuity of a formal state requires popular identification 
with the notion of a ‘nation’ that the state embodied, and media were thought to play a 
crucial role in developing this sense of ‘national identity’. Critical models, however, 
argued that the manner in which mass media have been introduced in Third World 
countries has frequently posed a threat to pre-existing cultural identities, without 
providing coherent alternative systems of values, beliefs, and practices to supersede the 
past. Modern media may thus be a disintegrating force, undermining the powerful 
solidifying meanings of old cultures, and may play little role in fostering the new, modern 
sense of ‘national identity’ (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994: 8)". 
 
The internet provides important opportunities for creating a sense of identity and 
solidarity around a shared cultural heritage and Diaspora experience. The communities 
created serve to combat feelings of marginalisation among Diasporans, providing them 
with identity and other forms of support as they cope with the Diaspora experience. This 
identity support, in turn, enables diasporans to integrate new ideas, values and 
experiences into their identity’s frame of reference (Brinkerhoff, 2010: 40). 
 
The Palestinians are among the more politically active groups in the stateless Diaspora 
category. Sheffer argues that internal debates continue over the main orientation that the 
Palestinian Diaspora should adopt regarding the future of its homeland. The 
integrationists would settle for cultural and economic autonomy of their homeland; more 
radical elements would argue that a separatist strategy should be followed by that 
segment of the nation who reside in the homeland, with the Diaspora providing support 
for such an effort (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 163). A unified Palestinian identity is 
threatened by the process of individualisation of interests in the context of the Palestinian 
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Authority. Instead of a single goal – Palestinian independence – there are the daily 
difficulties of building a quasi-state that may never be a real state. Institution building 
entails the awarding of resources, the distribution of power and that corruption be dealt 
with. The second important rift is between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and 
those in the Diaspora. While the Palestinian Authority is responsible for Palestinians 
already in the West Bank and Gaza, it is also responsible for negotiating the borders of a 
Palestinian state and the conditions for a right of return, thus speaking on behalf of all 
Palestinians. 
 
"Even if a Palestinian state were, at some point, allowed a law of return, it is likely that 
many Palestinians would not return to settle in Palestine. The right of return would have 
to be an internationally recognised principle that could individually be translated into 
different life decisions. If this point were ever reached, Palestinian identity might have to 
be renegotiated by Palestinian individuals and communities. However, as long as the 
Palestinians are in exile and are not just economic migrants, the national and political 
aspects of Palestinian identity will translate into national demands and can act to unify 
Palestinians (Hammer, 2005: 217)".   
 
Political Islam, Technology and Palestinian Daily Life 
As for integration in the British public sphere, this issue is also negotiable.  
According to Rogers, the major integration issue across most of Europe is Islam (Rogers 
in Weiner, 1993:138). There is, though, diversity between Palestinians in Europe in their 
level of integration into their new host societies (Shiblak, 2005: 15).  
 
Rogers argues that for the two forces – the secular Western European cultures and certain 
aspects of Islam - it will take more time that it has so far taken to integrate other foreign 
populations. He adds that the European host countries hold a different approach as far as 
the kind of support they are willing to give to multiculturalism (Rogers in Weiner, 1993: 
138). On the other hand, Sheffer argues that there is growing respect for ethnic culture. 
Her view is that a recent development has been the openness of Western governments 
towards ethnic minorities (Sheffer in Weiner, 1993:267).   
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Sheffer claims that the ability of ethnic minorities to maintain cultural autonomy, to 
pursue their own traditions, is a result of an attitude change in major Western 
governments, including the British authorities, who are no longer pursuing assimilation 
policies. This is true also in non-Western and non-democratic states, such as Iraq. In most 
of these states, internal separation is still the rule and often the law (Sheffer in Weiner, 
1993:265).   
 
Attempts to institutionalize Islam in Europe, on the one hand, create new legal 
frameworks, political opportunity structures, and cultural repertoires for claims of 
religious recognition. On the other hand, they also strengthen established actors in the 
field of religious governance, and give new legitimacy to historical institutional 
arrangements by reframing them as the representatives of communities of migrant origin 
(Maussen, 2007).  
 
"In addition to the degree of the institutionalization, there is a second factor, which is the 
degree of stateness: in nation-states oriented towards corporatist polity models, such as 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, the incorporation of Muslim minorities is 
coordinated by the organizational centre of the state, while in liberal polities, such as 
great Britain it rather takes the form of civil negotiations, mostly at the local level (Kaya, 
2009: 195)".     
 
Generally, there exists a perception among part of the European public that foreigners are 
more prone to criminal behavior than are domestic populations (Rogers in Weiner, 1993: 
130).  According to Tsagarousianou, quite often, migrants find themselves in a state of 
aporia, of inability to become visible and audible in largely hostile host societies 
(Tsagarousianou, 2007: 42). After September 11th, 2001, "the loyalty of minority ethnic 
groups living in Western countries is becoming suspect, and their transnational 
connections and relationships are coming under scrutiny (Karim in Karim, 2003: 15)". To 
put it differently, the hostile feelings that exist towards out-groups, as studies of ethno-
centrism show (Triandis in Brislin, 1990: 35), have increased following September 11th. 
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It is important, though, to emphasise that late modern migrants are not isolated in the 
sense that their predecessors were (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 42).  
 
Tsagarousianou claims that:  
"…events such as those of September 2001 in the United States, and the 2004 
Madrid and 2005 London bombings, or the controversy that surrounded the 
murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh have given Islam and European 
Muslims unprecedented and rather unwelcome visibility...they have posed 
questions about the place of Islam in Europe, or the possibility of accommodation 
of Islam in secular societies. What is more, they have given rise to intense and 
broader debates on multiculturalism and its consequences, the feasibility of 
integrating European Muslims into contemporary Europe as well as the social and 
material cost of such an endeavour’ (Tsagarousianou, 2012: 286)." 
 
 An important aspect of my research is the discussion about religion, referring to the 
Palestinian political parties and the Palestinians in the UK, in particular, and not just 
generally to Muslim audiences. Firstly, I will refer to Hamas, the political party that won 
the 2006 Palestinian elections and which is a major actor in the political Islam movement, 
as I said earlier. According to Melucci, it is customary to refer to movements as the 
effects of a particular historical situation (Melucci, 1996: 3). Indeed, Hamas was founded 
at the beginning of the Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) in December 1987, as a social 
movement. Hamas marked the beginning of the political revival of Islamic forces in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip; in the face of Israeli occupation, on the one hand, and the 
national secular forces led by the PLO, on the other. Until that time, the most important 
Islamic movement in the occupied territories, the Muslim Brotherhood, had moved away 
from active resistance to the Israeli occupation. 
 
Hamas was founded as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Gaza Strip. 
Through Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood hoped to play a major role in Palestinian 
politics. Seeking to appeal to wider constituencies, Hamas had to present itself not just as 
a religious alternative to the secular PLO leadership, but also as a national one. As a 
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national movement, the immediate goal of Hamas is the liberation of Palestine from 
Jewish occupation. As an Islamic movement, Hamas wanted this state to be Islamic, 
governed and organised according to Islamic law, Sharia (Litvak, 2000: 2). 
 
"At the time of the establishment of Hamas, a slow process of ‘Palestinisation’ had been 
at work in the movement, shifting its accent from the broader scope of the Islamic nation 
and the community of believers onto the more narrow concerns of Palestinian nationalism 
(Schiff & Ya’ari, 1989)." Hamas’s charter states that ‘the land of Palestine is an Islamic 
trust (waqf) upon all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection’. The solution to 
the Palestine problem rests in the uprooting of the state of Israel and the establishment of 
an Islamic state in its place (Abu-Amr, 1993: 12). According to Hamad, in the view of 
Hamas, the liberation of Palestinian land from Israeli occupation is the most urgent and 
important objective, taking priority over the question of the Islamic state. In other words, 
Hamas continues to see itself primarily as a liberation movement (Hamad, 2006). 
 
My research promotes knowledge of the Internet and Political Islam. The Palestinians use 
the Internet to consume news, already having preliminary knowledge of the political 
orientation of the websites. Before I discuss the link between the internet and political 
Islam, I would like to elaborate on the phrase ‘Political Islam’ in the context of the 
Middle East in general and of Palestine, in particular.  
 
The revival of political Islam in the 1990s is often perceived as a region-wide product of 
the 1979 Iranian revolution. Images of Islam are normally associated with terrorism and 
violence. However, political Islam in the Arab world is much more complex. It is a socio-
religious phenomenon that represents both popular discontent and stable political order 
(Milton-Edwards, 1999: 2). In the political arena of Palestine there is the representation 
of two opposing poles - the religious and the secular. This is a very important issue that 
one should remember, especially since September 11th, an event that marked a shift in 
the relationship between the Arab world and the West. The emergence of political Islam 
in Palestine occurred during a period of considerable upheaval. Although institutional 
Islam offered hope to the Palestinians, it was unable to meet the challenge posed by 
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colonialism in the form of the British mandate, the Zionist intrusion into the country and 
other factors. 
 
Political Islam in Palestine offers an alternative to the political ideal of the secular nation-
state adopted by the nationalist movement. Hamas and other Islamist movements espouse 
an ideal which reflects that of current Islamist movements throughout the Middle East: 
the establishment of an Islamic state. However, each organisation has a different 
programme around how to achieve that goal, reflecting the diversity that characterises 
political Islam in Palestine. According to Milton-Edwards, Hamas is the main player in 
the political Islam movement. Hamas claims to speak as a national movement, but with 
an Islamic-nationalist, rather then secular, nationalist agenda. It aims to reform the 
current political reality represented by the dominance of the modern, secular nation-state 
and secular-nationalist strategies of change. Hamas’s ideology is not premised solely on 
political violence, although political violence has been incorporated as a strategy of the 
organisation (Milton-Edwards, 1999: 184). 
 
According to Mandaville, for the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the West the 
Internet is mainly a forum through which politics within Islam are conducted. In that 
sense, Mandaville emphasises that the Internet is an extremely useful medium for the 
distribution of religious discourse (Mandaville in Karim, 2003: 144). The Political Islam 
movement, which has been discussed earlier in this chapter, would not be as influential as 
it is today without the existence of the WWW. The internet enables marginalised and 
‘extremist’ groups to participate in mainstream media discourse which has traditionally 
enjoyed little in the way of political influence (Marmura, 2008: 255). For example, one 
might think of the increasing impact of political movements, at times of breaking news, 
where the only way that Western audiences and governments receive information is by 
using these movements’ websites, which include text, as well as relevant images.  
 
The link between religion and politics is significantly important when discussing 
Hamas’s communication. Hamas emerged in a context of disillusionment with the 
Palestinian secular political movements. In addition to that, the popular turn to Hamas 
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was motivated by the search for psychological comfort, and endurance which a religious 
ideology normally provides (Syed, 2002: 217). This fact explains the importance that 
Hamas attributes to their websites as an international medium publishing in a variety of 
languages. Most of the languages were chosen to reach an Islamic audience in different 
countries. For instance, using Turkish and Farsi to target audiences in Turkey and Iran. 
Moreover, Hamas has an interest in establishing relations with Islamic states, which 
could benefit the movement. For example, Iran offered Hamas financial aid, following 
the decisions of the U.S. and Israel to isolate the Hamas government through the use of 
financial penalties, in 2006 (BBC News, 22 February, 2006).   
 
The common language of the Cyber Islamic environments was English. There has been 
an expansion of materials in other ‘Muslim’ languages, in minority and majority contexts, 
and these reflect improved accessibility and software developments. However, many 
Muslim constituencies remain poorly served by the Internet. For example, in Pakistan, the 
Internet is relevant to only the country’s élite 5 percent (Bunt in Poole & Richardson, 
2006: 155). 
 
Since Hamas is in power, it is vital for the movement to communicate with an audience 
outside the Palestinian Territories, to raise prominent political issues, to establish moral 
support, and so on. According to an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center report, 
Hamas considers the Internet to be an extremely important tool in its battle for hearts and 
minds:  
 
  ‘The technology enables Hamas to maintain contact with members, and reach   
audience outside Gaza and the West Bank. It uses the Internet to send its    
messages to target audiences in the Palestinian Authority Territories (the    
movement’s first priority), the Arab-Muslim world (second in importance) and   
the West (third in importance). Of the Palestinian organisations, Hamas has the   
most widely developed Internet network, and in that respect is far in advance of   
the PA controlled by Abu Mazen and of the other Palestinian organisations  
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(Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees and    
others) (Intelligence Information Center, 2007). ‘ 
 
Stateless Diaspora and Integration Challenges 
When looking at the question of the Palestinian Diaspora and their integration into British 
society, additional factors should be observed. A very important factor that one should 
look at is that the Palestinians are a stateless Diaspora – their homeland has been 
occupied and dominated by another state (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 148). According to 
Sheffer, the need to keep a Diaspora’s roots and recent history constant and vivid is 
particularly important in the case of stateless Diasporas. As long as a struggle for 
independence is continuing in the homeland of a stateless Diaspora, its members will be 
particularly torn between memories of their homeland, on one hand, and the need to 
comply with the norms of their host country, on the other.  
 
Having said that, the majority of those residing in host countries behave like members of 
state-linked Diaspora - they usually opt for the locally oriented strategy of communalism. 
Among the Palestinians in the diaspora there has been consensus that the nation should 
establish a sovereign state. In practice, however, Palestinians in Europe and elsewhere 
have developed communal Diaspora organisations and have pursued communalist 
policies. Sheffer explains that the communalist strategy aims to achieve a reasonable 
degree of absorption of Diasporans into the host society, but not to achieve full 
integration, which might lead to assimilation, maintaining continuous relations with the 
homeland (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 155). 
 
In his book, The Turbulence of Migration: Globalisation, Deterritorialization and 
Hybridity, Papastergiadis outlines a development which moves from the assimilation and 
integration of migrants into the host society of the nation state towards something more 
complex in today’s metropolitan societies. Speaking primarily of Europe, the Americas 
and Australia, Papastergiadis argues that as some members of migrant communities came 
to prominence "within the cultural and political circles of the dominant society" they 
"began to argue in favour of new models of representing the process of cultural 
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interaction, and to demonstrate the negative consequences of insisting upon the denial of 
the emergent forms of cultural identity" (Papastergiadis, 2000: 3).  
 
According to Hall’s theory of ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, there are at least two 
different ways of thinking about ‘cultural identity’. The first position defines cultural 
identity in terms of one shared culture, hiding inside the ‘many other selves’, which 
people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common. Such a conception of cultural 
identity played a critical role in post-colonial struggles. There is, however, a second, 
related but different view of cultural identity. This second position recognises that, as 
well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of significant 
difference. Cultural identity, in this second sense, comes from somewhere and has 
histories. However, they undergo constant transformation. Hall claims that it is only from 
this second position that one can understand the traumatic character of the colonial 
experience (Hall, 1990: 222). 
 
In the 2002 White Paper on migration, the British government exercised naturalisation 
rules and citizenship oaths and ceremonies. According to Joppke and Morawska, the 
citizenship strategy contradicts a commitment to multiculturalism. In contrast, Kymlicka 
argues that multiculturalism policies may work best when they are combined with a 
visible public commitment to the revaluing of citizenship. According to Kymlicka:  
 
"Multination states cannot survive unless the various national groups have an 
allegiance to the larger political community they cohabit (Kymlicka, 1995:13)." 
  
Continuing Kymlicka’s claim, the ability of Palestinians to obtain British citizenship 
increases their confidence in the host country and, in a way, leads to their familiarity with 
British culture, history and politics. Even if Britain will serve as their physical home, it 
will not, however, replace their imaginary home - Palestine. There is thus no 
contradiction between their commitment to the host country and the preservation of 
Palestinian culture in Britain.  Moreover, having British citizenship helps to keep their 
Palestinian heritage in an organised way. 
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Examining the effect of September 11th, 2001, on Palestinians in the UK, one can see 
that it was not totally negative. The Palestinians do not merely preserve their Palestinian 
identity by interacting with their community in the U.K., but also defend their Palestinian 
identity in the host country. They try, on different levels, to promote the Palestinian cause 
in a variety of ways, such as establishment of Palestinian media organisations, in order to 
mobilise the national media.  
 
The fact that they try to promote their cause in the media is a result of a feeling, common 
among Arabs, that many Western media outlets tend to be partisan and that their coverage 
of Arabs and Muslims, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular, tends to be 
slanted (Zayani in Zayani, 2005: 177). As my participants say also, to some extent, Arab 
media too lacks fair coverage - an argument that is being discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Tsagarousianou claims that a significant aspect emerging from the globalisation debate is 
that of the increasing speed of social activity. The expansion of social activities across 
borders is predicated on the possibility of relatively fast flows and movements of people, 
information, capital and goods (Tsagarousianou, 2007:46). Sheffer argues that the recent 
trend toward cultural pluralism makes it easier for members of Diasporas to maintain 
their identity, and to participate in political enterprises launched by their leaders and 
organisations. The new openness also makes it easier for leaders of homelands to visit 
their people in the Diasporas, encouraging them to maintain contacts with the homeland 
and to recruit their support (Sheffer in Weiner, 1993: 267).   
 
For Schulz, host societies often find themselves to be the containers of nationalist 
sentiments. In terms of politics, host societies may be affected by lobbying, politicisation, 
etc. (Schulz in Shiblak, 2005: 22).  Alterman suggests that the internet has served to 
reintegrate the Arab Diaspora with the Arab world. By utilizing new technology, Arabs 
living abroad can more easily monitor, and can play an increasing role in, regional 
debates and dialogues (Alterman, 1998).  
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This was particularly evident in relation to violence between Israelis and Palestinians in 
2000-2002. All over the Diaspora, there was mobilisation among both Jews and 
Palestinians, involving large scale demonstrations and a quite tense debate that forced 
governments to take into consideration the opinions of Jews and Palestinians who were 
their citizens (Schulz in Shiblak, 2005: 22). During 1987, there was a significant, if 
gradual, increase in calls for action and a process of convergence between various 
newspapers, representing a variety of political factions within the Palestinian movement 
(Alimi, 2007: 71). This is true also in relation to violence between Hamas militants and 
Israel during the 2008/9 war in Gaza. The Palestinian Diaspora mobilised Muslims and 
Arabs of different ethnicities, MPs and other activists, to demonstrate throughout the 
U.K. against Israel’s military action in Gaza.   
 
According to Esman, a review of Diasporas discloses seven classes of activity that 
involve them in international relations, in which initiatives may be taken by the home 
government, the host government, or the Diaspora community. 
 
1. The Diaspora may attempt directly to influence events in the home country. The 
methods they employ may be economic, political or military.  
2. Diasporas may use their influence with their host governments to act on behalf of 
the interests of the home government.  
3. Home governments may attempt to use their Diaspora in pursuit of their own 
goals. The intended benefits may be economic or political. Home governments 
may also attempt to induce their Diasporas to act politically in their support.  
4. The Diaspora may seek protection from the home government when it is 
threatened with mistreatment.  
5. The host country’s government may attempt to use a resident Diaspora 
community in pursuit of its external political or economic goals. 
6. Diaspora communities may attempt to influence international organisations on 
behalf of their homeland. The most conspicuous case has been the success of the 
Palestinians in isolating Israel in the UN and its agencies. The Palestinians have 
successfully mobilised Arab and Muslim governments, as well as, the Soviet bloc. 
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Efforts by the Kurdish, Armenian, Croatian and other Diasporas to invoke UN 
support have failed because they lack the patronage and support of member 
governments. 
7. The home governments may ask the host government to influence, usually to 
restrain, what it perceives to be hostile or embarrassing activities of sections of its 
Diaspora (Esman in Sheffer, 1986: 340-343).    
 
The Palestinians feel an increased sense of their Palestinian identity. Whereas in Gaza 
and the West Bank, being a Palestinian means being stateless with little chance of social 
mobility, in the U.K., Palestinians live in a democratic state where they have access to job 
opportunities and education. Having said this, the trauma of the Palestinians – the nakba -
- is rooted in the nation’s collective memory. Demmers describes the long distance 
interaction of the diaspora groups in the homeland conflicts as they are engaged in a sort 
of “virtual conflict: they live their conflicts through the internet, email, television and 
telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risks or accountability” (Demmers, 2002: 
94).       
 
The Palestinian Diasporic community in the U.K. is not a monolithic community, and this 
is reflected when looking at my participants’ social and economic backgrounds, but is 
rather a mixture of individuals who came to the U.K. for different reasons and hold 
different political views. The factors that unite all of them are their feelings of collective 
trauma, and the fact that they share the same dream: to have a state, a place of belonging. 
As one participant told me:  
 
‘Everywhere we go we are strangers, the others. We do not have a state.’ 
 
Hammer suggests that "there is not one Palestinian family that has been unaffected by the 
experience of living in places other than Palestine. The longing for the absentees and 
communication through old and new means are an integral part of their life experiences 
(Hammer, 2005: 2)." Shiblak distinguishes between two main groups: the smaller, long 
established and mostly integrated communities and the larger, less privileged expatriates, 
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who include the latecomers who have arrived over the past two decades, seeking asylum 
in Europe:   
 
 "The interaction between the two groups is not always a strong one. However, they share 
the traumatic experience of dispersal, the collective memory and myths built up about the 
homeland and the development of a return movement (Shiblak, 2005: 15)".  
 
The Return Question 
The issue of return to the homeland, to Palestine, is a very important one in the lives of 
Palestinians both in and outside the Diaspora. According to Hammer, "For Palestinians in 
the diaspora, the cycle of migration would not be complete without the wish or plan to 
return to Palestine one day. The intensity of the desire to return has much to do with the 
length of time one spends abroad, the degree of integration one has achieved there, and 
whether one has actually settled somewhere. Palestinians who have moved many times 
have had less chance to integrate and have instead developed a strong sense of Palestinian 
identity (Hammer, 2005: 20)". 
 
For Diasporic populations, as for any other people, spheres of belonging begin with the 
intimate and immediate experience in what is called home. The home, being the starting 
point for identity construction and socialisation, is only a node in a spatial scheme that 
expands to a number of spaces according to scale, levels of immediacy and intimacy, as 
well as in relation to imagination and social meanings. Home, however, in the case of the 
diaspora, has a more complex meaning than in the case of other populations. There is a 
home, which equals the domestic and the familial, and there is a symbolic, imagined 
home that might be mythical, occupied, unreachable and/or connected to memories of 
exile and nostalgia (Georgiou, 2006: 6). 
 
The right of return is commonly understood among Palestinians to be enshrined in U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 194, adopted on 11th December, 1948. The resolution 
established a U.N. Conciliation Commission, which was directed to establish contacts 
between Israel and neighbouring Arab states and to deal with the general task of bringing 
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about the final settlement of all of the questions that were outstanding between them; it 
reaffirmed that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, and 
resolved that refugees should be permitted to return to their homes. It was never possible 
to implement the resolution in full. The Israeli approach to the refugee issue proceeds 
from the premise that the solution to the problem rests with the resettlement of the 
refugees among the Arab states. 
 
"While there is almost universal belief among Palestinians in the Palestinians’ right to 
return, there is an ideological barrier around the discussion of what that would mean in 
practical terms (Bowker, 2003: 97; 98; 100)". Both Takkenberg and Khalidi point out that 
there is, moreover, no authoritative Palestinian definition of what constitutes the right of 
return. That right has been ascribed a range of meanings, from the right of all Palestinians 
to return to their former homes and places of origin in Palestine, to the return of some of 
the Palestinians currently in exile to some limited part of Palestine (Takkenberg, 1998: 
244; Khalidi, 1992: 29).  
 
I gather that this pivotal aspect of the discussion of the right to return is different in the 
young and the older generations. The Palestinians of the older generation have good 
memories from Palestine, whereas the younger generation can imagine Palestine as it is 
portrayed by the old generation. In reality, Palestine today is not as attractive as it is 
being described by the elderly. The longing and vivid memories exist within the older 
generation and not in the younger generation. The young Palestinians identified with their 
parents and actually adopted their parents’ personal stories as their own – they talk about 
themselves as refugees who were deported from Palestine. This issue preoccupied them 
and they try to deliver their personal stories while living in the Diaspora. 
 
The obvious question is: what does it mean in reality? Does it mean that all Palestinians 
in the diaspora will eventually live in Palestine? Hammer claims that, "even if a 
Palestinian state were, at some point, allowed a law of return comparable to that of Israel, 
many Palestinians would most likely not return and settle in Palestine. Younger 
Palestinians often emphasise that the discussion of the right of return no longer means 
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that all Palestinians around the world would actually return to Palestine to settle there. 
For them, the real issue revolves around having the right to choose where they want to 
live (Hammer, 2005: 21)". 
 
For many Palestinians, the wish to return is a wish to return to their parents’ and family’s 
cities and villages. Of course, they are aware of the fact that it is impossible, but in the 
context of this discussion, it is important to emphasise that an imagined Palestine, for 
many Palestinians, exists alongside the imagined place from which their family has been 
uprooted. 
 
Diasporic Media 
According to Wood and King, media may intervene in the migration process and in the 
individual and collective experience of migration in three main ways. Firstly, images 
transmitted from the destination countries, or by the global media generally, may be an 
important source of information for potential migrants. Secondly, the host-country media 
constructions of migrants will be critical in influencing the type of reception they are 
accorded, and hence will condition migrants’ eventual experience of inclusion or 
exclusion. Thirdly, media originating from the country of migration, such as films, video 
and satellite television, as well as new global distribution technologies, such as the World 
Wide Web, are playing a dynamic role in the cultural identity and politics of diasporic 
communities. These three types of linkage between media and migration by no means 
exhaust the kinds of interrelationships which exist (Wood & King, 2001: 1-2). 
 
There are three levels of interactional situations produced by the use of communication 
media, according to Thompson: face to-face interaction, mediated interaction, and quasi-
mediated interaction (Thompson, 1995:84). Following this perspective, it is possible to 
identify these levels in the diasporic media and communication processes.  
 
First, contexts of face to-face interaction might include the ethnic or local mass media 
among immigrant communities (newspapers, magazines, and local radio and television 
programs). Secondly, the mediated interaction dimension across the transnational space 
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can take into account transnational media (diasporic radio and television programs, 
diasporic internet web sites, and the use of ICTs, such as cell phones, home-produced 
videos, or teleconferencing). Thirdly, the level of quasi-mediated interactions can 
comprise the global media (satellite communications and interactive television, among 
others) that provide to global audiences, including specific diasporic communities, 
symbolic representations, cultural messages, and discourses. 
 
Drawing from diasporic media studies, it is crucial to address the impact of the global 
digital divide on immigrant communities at the levels of face-to-face, mediated, and 
quasi-mediated interactions. Moreover, the phenomenon of the digital divide entails 
complex issues of symbolic systems, power relations, and normative orders that preclude 
or allow the participation of trans migrants and immigrant communities in the networked 
society (Benitez, 2010: 193-194). 
 
The Palestinian Diaspora and Diasporic media 
The Palestinian Diaspora is part of the Arab and ‘Muslim Diaspora’. The Arab Diaspora 
is not solely made of Palestinians; it encapsulates all Arabs living permanently in 
countries other than their country of origin (Salhi in Salhi & Netton, 2006: 2). My 
research focuses on the new medium - the Internet. The internet has a significant role in 
the life of the Palestinian audience in the U.K. Unlike other media, the Internet combines 
local and global news events with the advantage of immediate updates in real time. The 
Palestinian audience does not merely seek news from ‘home’, but also looks for a global 
perspective. Diasporic cultural consumers often feel alienated from mainstream media 
provision (Tsagarousianou, 2007:132). Some of the Palestinians will, though, consume 
mainstream media in addition to the Palestinian media in order to receive a 
comprehensive picture. Moreover, there are Palestinians who would prefer to use the 
mainstream media rather than the Palestinian and Arab media, for reasons of 
professionalism and fast flow of news. As Schudson explains, even in an era of identity 
network proliferation, societies will not be able to operate without professional 
journalism, because people want ways to make sense of the endless information made 
available to them. The important role of news is not only in ‘information delivery’, but 
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also in ‘interpreting and explaining’. The news media serve to uphold collectively shared 
myths and dominant ideologies (Schudson, 1995:3). 
 
It could also be explained historically: following the Second Gulf War in 1991, CNN 
established itself as the source of information. Contributing to the success of CNN was 
the mushrooming of satellite channels transmitting to a large Arab audience. It was only 
few years later that Arab channels gradually took over the space traditionally occupied by 
Western media (Zayani in Zayani, 2005:29). CNN constructed a new genre of foreign 
news which the masses found exciting. In the process, CNN, and other stations like it, 
stimulated popular interest in international events. This has added a new dimension to the 
jobs of politicians, because foreign issues can sometime spill over into the domestic 
political arena – e.g., Israeli-Palestinian issues significantly influence U.S. domestic 
politics in areas with large Jewish or Arab populations. Having said this, there is a view 
that the media are powerless; or, to put it differently, it has been argued that the media 
have no effect on foreign policy formulation because foreign affairs officials take 
decisions based on information and considerations other than the ‘moral outcries’ 
generated by the media (Louw, 2006: 264-265). 
 
It is important to understand the position of the Palestinian Diaspora in regard to the 
political processes in the host countries, and the influence of Western politics on the 
Palestinians’ needs in their own media. "The United States was the principal agent of 
Western hegemony. At the end of the Cold War, the United States was the world’s only 
global superpower. Israel remained the principal ally of U.S. policymakers, whereas those 
that defied the United States were to be locked in a zero-sum struggle (Murden, 2002: 
44)." From a Middle Eastern perspective, Americans and Israelis are close allies, fighting 
together to safeguard Israel as the only regional power. They do not want to see any other 
powerful country threaten the existence of Israel. It is believed that American media have 
contributed to this by failing to create any balance in their coverage of Middle Eastern 
events (Hashem, 2004: 162)".  
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 The Internet allows the audience to participate, and to receive ‘authoritative’ religious 
fatwa (Mandeville in Karim, 2003: 145). "The Internet enables the use of language and 
phrases of the Arab-Islamic discourse – the media become involved in the everyday 
construction of images of ‘Us’ and ‘Others’, while fixing and rebroadcasting those 
images to members and non-members of a group. This applies especially to the electronic 
Diasporic media (Georgiou in Sarikakis & Thussu, 2006: 136)". 
 
The websites my participants use were not created solely for the Palestinian Diaspora in 
the U.K., but rather for users in Palestine and for a global audience in countries such as 
the U.K., U.S.A., Iran and India. It is important to emphasise that the location where the 
sites are registered and the content decision process and creation are not necessarily 
taking place in the same state. The Palestine-info network is registered in Lebanon 
(Alexa); the contributors can be located at Hamas’s Political Bureau in Damascus, for 
example. The content thus refers to news events in Palestine and news that influences 
Palestine. The distribution and the location where the websites are registered are 
international. All Palestinian Internet Service Provision (ISPs) must also go through an 
Israeli service provider (Hanieh, 1999: 43). 
 
Although people, including Diasporic and migrant communities, have always relied on 
some form of cross-border networking to maintain systems of ties among their various 
members and with the homeland, the speeding up of time-space compressions has had 
profound effects on how these connections are maintained. Indeed, there is a sense that 
migrants are developing 'transcultural' characteristics that confound the old models of 
belonging and loyalty. The examination of the role of media and new technologies in 
enhancing the symbolic unity within national and global contexts has been a popular field 
of study, often building on Anderson's (1991) notion of the nation as an 'imagined 
community'.  
 
The Palestinians represent a different case from the Arab-Islamic Diaspora for the 
following reasons: 
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1.  The Palestinians do not have a state - a territory, a place of belonging.  
2.  In the case of Islamic Diaspora in general, and of Palestinians specifically, the idea of   
     the umma cannot be underestimated - Muslims living in Diaspora, 
    particularly in the West, are of varied and diverse ethnic origins. What links them   
    together, however, is a shared sense of identity within their religion, an idea most  
    clearly located within the concept of the umma. As Vertovec and Peach stress, many   
    Muslim thinkers today highlight the need for Muslims to increase their ‘umma 
   consciousness’, and are developing ‘a more open understanding of the notion of the  
   global community of Muslims’ (Vertovec & Peach, 1997: 41). 
 
Immigrants to the U.K. do not wish to be isolated - they do want to be updated on daily 
life and news events in their home countries. As Matar puts it, "migrants remain loyal to 
their origins (Matar in Sakr, 2007: 121)". Palestinians of the U.K. Diaspora consume 
mainstream media, as being part of the British public sphere, or being exposed to the 
mainstream media. As the events in the Palestinian Authority attract international interest, 
there is extensive coverage of Palestinian issues of concern in the British media, mainly 
in time of crisis. Nevertheless, the role of the local media - and Diasporic media - cannot 
be underestimated. As Maiola and Ward claim, the function of local broadcasters cannot 
be replaced. These are related to the role of such media in providing viewers with local 
news, as well as in representing the social and political diversity of Palestinian culture. 
More importantly, their role in building national identity in the absence of sovereign 
independent statehood is crucial in understanding Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation 
TV’s role in the politics of state building (Maiola and Ward in Sakr, 2007: 116).  
 
Tsagarousianou writes that members of South Asian and Greek Cypriot communities in 
the U.K. stressed the importance of diasporic media and the links they provide with their 
country of origin, or with their respective cultures and politics. According to older 
respondents, this contact is vital because it reduces the sense of distance from their 
country of origin (Tsagarousianou in King and Wood, 2001: 161).   
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Support for this point can be found in Matar’s research and also in Karim’s argument: 
Matar claims that,"in talking about and around news, many respondents voiced concerns 
about themselves and their families and the collective, meaning the Palestinian nation 
(Matar in Sakr, 2007: 125)". Karim argues that "homeland politics form a major topic for 
the media of some Diasporas, especially those consisting largely of first generation 
migrants. Ties to the former country remain strong in these cases and individuals seek out 
the most current information, especially in times of crisis (Karim in Karim, 2003: 3)". "In 
times of crisis, the Internet has the capacity for community building. During a disaster, it 
is a natural human impulse to reach out to others (Schneider & Foot in Howard & Jones, 
2004: 138)".  
 
"The Internet provides spaces where Muslims, who are often marginalised, or are a 
minority group in many Western communities, can go in order to find others ‘like them’. 
It is in this sense that we can speak of the Internet as allowing Muslims to create a new 
form of imagined community, or a re-imagined Islam – its members will never know 
most of their fellow-members. The internet’s communities are imagined in two ways. 
First, they thrive on the ‘meanwhile’, they are forged from the sense that they exist, but 
we rarely directly apprehend them, and we see them only out of the corner of our eye. 
Secondly, they are imagined as parallel, rather than serial, groupings of people, which is 
to say that they are not composed of people who are necessarily connected, even by 
interest, but are rather groupings of people headed in the same direction, for a time 
(Jones, 2002: 17)". According to Mitra:  
 
"The conditions of existence of the diasporic individuals and their need to form 
community cannot be understood in traditional terms where spatial proximity was 
a necessity. It is only when one can move the discussion of community to the 
more abstract level of shared practices and experiences, such as those of language 
and media, that it is possible to begin to understand how a shared system of 
communications such as computer-mediated communication (CMC), with its 
shared language and systems of meaning, can be used to produce communities 
that do not need geographic closeness. This is precisely why the construct of the 
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‘imagined’ community becomes powerful in thinking of the communities being 
formed in the electronic forum. The electronic communities produced by the 
diasporic people are indeed imagined connections that are articulated over the 
medium of the internet, where the only tangible connection with the community is 
through the computer, a tool to image and imagine the group affiliation (Mitra, 
2002: 58)". 
 
The Internet creates a global umma (Mandaville in Karim, 2003: 146), answering to the 
different needs of individuals. I have to restrict my claim, and to emphasise that not all 
Muslims find themselves to be a marginalised group. "Many members of diasporic 
minority groups still struggle for recognition and inclusion, but others have already 
succeeded and established themselves in the mainstream (Georgiou in Georgiou, 2006: 
3)." 
 
"The global circuitry of modern telecommunications contributes to the formation of a 
'digitalized umma' within the Muslim diaspora, which is based on the idea of a more 
homogeneous 'community of sentiment'  shaped by a constant flow of identical signs and 
messages travelling across cyberspace (Appadurai, 1996: 8)."  
 
"The signs and messages form a more heterogeneous and individualized form of umma. 
This kind of interpretation built up by the media, has the potential of turning recipients 
into a virtual intellectual who can challenge the authority of traditional religious scholars 
(Mandaville, 2001:160)". 
 
According to Ahmed, accessing Muslim media facilitates the desire to keep informed 
about fellow Muslims, to feel part of a larger group, and to keep in touch with what is 
happening in the rest of the Muslim world. All of these, together, lead to a greater sense 
of belonging to the global umma (Ahmed in Poole & Richardson, 2006: 171). The 
formation of identity and virtual communities is more significant and challenging than 
the formation of identity and communities in the offline world.  Donath says that identity 
plays a key role in virtual communities. To assess the reliability of information and the 
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trustworthiness of a confidant, identity is essential; and care of one’s own identity, one’s 
reputation is fundamental to the formation of community (Donath in Smith & Kollock, 
1999: 28). 
 
Identity in the cyberspace environment is more obscure if compared to identity in the real 
world. The websites’ contributors can choose either to disclose their identity or to operate 
websites under a different identity. In order to create a community, a trust should thus be 
built. Once this has been achieved, I believe strong ties would be created. In the 
cyberspace environment, users find a place of belonging. This is meaningful for 
Diasporic audiences who cannot physically be a part of their community in their country 
of origin, but they can indeed be part of an active online community which includes 
members who share similar values. 
 
In this respect, I would like to refer to the case of the Islamic diasporic communities in 
Britain, which is relevant to my research. World events, such as the terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington and the war in Iraq, have highlighted the fragile cross-cultural 
relations between white and minority ethnic groups in Britain. Historically, people have 
migrated either to escape trouble or in search of work. Race relations in Britain took a 
turn for the worse as various ethnic populations began to form separate communities in 
order to avoid harassment. The white working-class population saw large communities of 
minority ethnic communities as a threat to their British way of life (Holohan in Pool & 
Richardson, 2006: 14).  
 
This tension influences the media consumption and the media landscape of Muslims in 
Britain, including diasporic communities. The existence of the Muslim press in Britain is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. The demand for media in English grew as this became 
the preferred language for an increasing number of Muslims; especially second-
generation Muslims. As Muslim communities developed a more distinctly religious 
identity, alternatives to mainstream media express this identity. In recent years, British 
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Muslim publications have evolved considerably and have increased in number. Especially 
after the events of September, 2001, the importance of these media, not only as a source 
of information, but also as a channel through which minority communities express their 
views, has increased (Ahmed in Poole and Richardson, 2006: 170). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the main themes of my research: migration and diaspora, 
the Palestinian diaspora, new media, news media, the Arab media, the Arab World and 
the new media, political communication and audiences. Diaspora is a relatively new term 
in migration studies. It refers to individuals who emigrated from their country of origin to 
a new country. However, the members of the diasporic community are not just migrants. 
They form transnational communities (Tsagarousianou, 2007: 3). 
 
The internet serves as an efficient tool for this purpose. The internet has changed 
significantly the news consumption practices of Palestinians. The growth and 
accessibility of online information and communication have provided Palestinians with 
the opportunity to post their opinions, information about their cause, and all types of 
discussion, on the Web and has enabled members of the Diaspora to communicate across 
large distances. The Palestinians in the U.K. have also started to create social groups on 
the web, which is a growing phenomenon. This topic is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
The definition of the Palestinians who live in the Diaspora as migrants is not an obvious 
one. There are researchers who claim that the Palestinians are refugees and not migrants, 
for various reasons, but mainly because the Palestinians were dispersed from their 
‘homes’ in 1948 and, later, in 1967, and since then they are actually refugees who cannot 
return to their place of origin.   
 
This chapter talks about the contribution of the research to existing knowledge. The thesis 
seeks to contribute to the ongoing research into the Palestinian Diaspora by providing a 
focused analysis of an area that has not been investigated to date, the transnational 
existence of the Palestinians in the diaspora (in a Western country, as opposed to an Arab 
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country). Moreover, this is the first research on the Palestinian community in the 
Diaspora that has been conducted by an Israeli researcher. This adds a new dimension, as 
other researchers in the field are Palestinians (i.e., Matar and Aouragh), as discussed in 
Chapter 3.  A very important issue relating to the Palestinian community in the Diaspora 
is the question of Palestinian identity. The Palestinian identity is a strong component of 
Palestinian society in Palestine, as well as in the Diaspora. The Palestinians have a strong 
interest in keeping their culture and traditions, as a result of their collective trauma – the 
nakba.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review –Audiences; New Media                                                          
 
Introduction 
It seems very clear that the Palestinians would look for news websites that would provide 
them with news from Palestine. The question is: is there a Palestinian Diasporic media 
that fits their needs?  As opposed to other diasporic communities, in Palestine there is no 
developed media market. News from Palestine is also in the headlines world-wide, 
especially at times of breaking news. Since the first Intifada began in 1987, the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict has gained international prominence (Downey in Sarikakis & Thussu, 
2006: 151). According to Matar, "news stories about events affecting Palestinians are an 
almost permanent feature of the international media landscape (Matar in Sakr, 2007: 
118)". The Palestinians are also part of the Arab diasporic community and therefore the 
Arab media are another source for news from Palestine. The fact that Israeli- Palestinian 
conflict coverage attracts wide audiences is evident in theory (‘news disjunction’); "when 
events in the developing world are deemed newsworthy, they usually come under the 
‘disaster, corruption and coups’ category (Schirato & Webb, 2006:171)."  
 
The complexity of the Palestinian diasporic media is that the message on the Palestinian 
political news websites does not portray in mainstream language, but rather in emotional 
language. The Palestinians that look at these websites have to analyse the news – they 
cannot receive a comprehensive picture, unless they can ignore the emotional language, 
interpret the news, and look for a variety of news sources. Hashem points out that Arab 
news coverage (of the Iraq war) consisted of a mixture of narratives and images; the 
Arabic language is mostly metaphorical, rich in meanings, and different from the English 
language (which usually separates photography and narration) (Hashem, 2004: 160-161).   
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Instead of looking at the Palestinian audience in the light of the behaviourism approach 
(‘uses and gratifications’), it is better to break away from this approach, but to keep a 
psychological aspect, as Hall suggested. It is thus not only the need of the audience that is 
important, but also how the audience interprets the message. As Hall said, this turned 
researchers’ attention to the mental processes whereby viewers perceive and interpret 
messages. Since the culture-bound concepts by which one makes sense of reality provide 
a horizon for interpreting new messages, the same message does not have exactly the 
same meaning to different individuals (Alasuutari in Alasuutari, 1999: 14). 
 
Referring to media effects, I would say that the Palestinians’ news consumption fits the 
school of thought by stressing the variety of ways in which different audiences make use 
of media output (Williams, 2003: 165). Moreover, the participants are not merely 
receiving news from the media. They are also being updated by family and friends in 
Palestine, as well as creating social networks websites that provide news from Palestine 
that relies on information being provided by the Palestinian community itself. 
 
As Katz and Lazarsfeld argue in their ‘two step model’: the media by themselves are not 
very powerful in influencing people, people are more influenced by members of their 
family, friends, neighbours and fellow workers (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). People do not 
rely exclusively on media for obtaining information and making sense of events. This is 
particularly important in cultures with strong oral traditions, such as the Palestinian one 
(Alimi, 2007: 76). 
  
This does not negate the important role of the media as an agent that provides news, and 
the significant role the Palestinians attribute to news websites, but the ‘two step model’ 
allows us to understand that the media effect on the Palestinian audience is not as simple 
and direct as the ‘hypodermic model’ suggests. The ‘uses and gratifications’ approach is 
a reversal of the ‘hypodermic model’. The focus shifted from what the media do to 
people to what people do with the media. The ‘uses and gratifications’ approach argued 
that the audience brought its own needs and desires to the process of message reception. 
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For my interviewees, the Palestinians, who emigrated to the U.K. from Palestine, are free 
from political and ideological influence. The Palestinian news websites that are actually 
political websites have no direct influence on the audience whatsoever. 
 
The reason for this is that the audience who uses the political news websites reads the 
news selectively. They choose to read the issues that interest them, and they interpret the 
message according to the perception of news that is known to them, using additional 
sources and personal knowledge.  
 
Increasingly, effects theories invested more power in the audience. The active’ audience’ 
tradition located the audience as ‘active participants in the creation of meaning’ (Eldridge 
in Eldridge, 1993:31). The capacity of the audience to produce diverse interpretations of 
what they see, hear and read is evidence of the freedom of the audience to resist the 
media. The political news websites being published by political factions in Palestine are 
trying to influence the audience by using emotional language and by praising their own 
efforts for the Palestinians. However, according to my participants, they are not being 
influenced. To put it differently, even if the media produce a dominant ideology or 
discourse, the audience can resist it (Williams, 2003: 201).  
 
I have, though, to limit my claim, above, that there is no political influence by the 
political websites. It may be that the Palestinians claim that they are not being influenced 
by the content of the political websites is not necessarily true. This is a methodological 
problem which is discussed in the methodology chapter. 
 
The assumptions of the active audience, who use the media for their own purposes and 
can articulate them, are the basic assumptions on which the uses and gratifications 
approach rests. Another assumption of this model, which is relevant to my research, is 
that despite the variations between individuals in their use of the media, it is possible to 
identify some basic patterns in uses and gratifications (Williams, 2003: 177). In this 
context, I would say, media consumption is an individual act. There are individual 
preferences and individuals differ from each other, since they hold different world 
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perceptions and have their own predispositions. Having said this, individuals contribute 
to groups; in the case of my research, the Palestinians, who share the same historical and 
political background that directs their interest in news from Palestine. There are therefore 
patterns in their media usage, despite individual particularities. For discussion of my 
findings, please see the data analysis chapter.  
 
This point is also the weak point of the uses and gratifications approach, which is being 
used by critics such as Elliott (Elliott, 1974). By concentrating on the individual, they 
argue, the approach tends to lose sight of the social dimension. Making sense of media 
content is often done in conversation with friends, family and workmates. Palestinian 
society is a society in which the role of the social group is significantly important. The 
news is an integral part both of their life as individuals and as a group that belongs to the 
same nation. News events are being discussed in the private domain, as well as in public 
domains: cafes, mosques and social gatherings.   
 
The personal contacts of diaspora members have been enabled with relative ease, as a 
result of the widespread use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). 
New personal digital devices of broadband telephony, like Skype (released in 2003) have 
allowed relatively unfettered person-to person communication, free of charge and 
supervision. These two-way communication systems became well suited to respond to the 
need for personal contacts of a more restrained and circumscribed nature, and are thus not 
ideal tools for social networking on a massive scale (Conversi, 2012).  
 
"In the digital age of communication, family ties have not really weakened. The internet, 
mobile telephony and the new generation of smart phones combine written, oral and 
visual forms of expression that closely replicate face-to-face communication. Those who 
are physically absent are, in fact, increasingly present in everyday situations, and a 
continuity of social ties develops in spite of geographical distance (Nedelcu, 
2012:1351)." 
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As a result of dissatisfaction with limited effects theories, the focus has changed and it is 
now on the individual psychology of the audience in a broader social context.  Cultural 
effects theories started with the social context and worked into understanding the media. 
In his study, Cohen claimed that the news ‘may not be successful in telling people what 
to think but it is successful in telling them what to think about.’ The power to push people 
into thinking about certain kinds of issues became known as ‘agenda setting’ (Cohen, 
1963:13). Iyengar and Kinder found evidence to support the claim that ‘television news 
was a powerful determinant of what springs to mind and what is forgotten and ignored.’ 
For Iyengar and Kinder, the power of the media does not rest in persuasion but in 
‘commanding the public’s attention (agenda setting) and defining criteria underlying the 
public’s judgments’ (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987: 117). 
 
New Technologies; New Audiences 
A major factor that legitimises the use of history to question the arguments of the 
information society proponents is the mobilisation of the past by the proponents 
themselves in order to support their position. Black (2003) suggests that each of the main 
socio-economic features of the industrial revolution (i.e., widespread application of 
science and knowledge to production, movement of population) applies as much today, in 
the current ‘information revolution’, specifically: 
 
1. The rise of the ‘knowledge society’, in which both digital innovation and 
‘theoretical knowledge’ (Bell, 1980) prioritise brain over brawn. 
2. The dispersal of population: contrary to the process of industrialisation, the 
emergence of the postmodern, polycentric, informational city. 
3. The rise of post-industrial occupation and sectors, with the majority of the 
workforce migrating to the service sector and, moreover, becoming engaged in 
work that is rich in ‘information skills’. 
4. The emergence of flexible modes of working: the virtual organisation, as an 
example. 
5.  The professionalisation of society: the decline of a traditional working class, and 
the parallel rise of white-collar classes. 
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6.  The expansion of markets through customization and the niche targeting of 
demand. 
7. Extensive capital investment in modern Information Communication 
Technologies; by governments, multi/trans national corporations and large-scale 
research organisations.    
 
The identification of similarities between the core characteristics of the industrial 
revolution and those of the information revolution, albeit that the ways these manifest 
themselves inevitably differ from one age to the other, can be used to support the idea 
that we have entered a radically new age. At the same time, pointing to continuities with 
the past can also serve to undermine the notion of recent revolutionary change (Black, 
2003:28). Nevertheless, the emergence of new technologies has changed the audience use 
of the media. Ros writes: 
 
"One of the new elements differentiating the present migration domain from that 
of other periods in history comes from the possibilities that communication and 
information technologies offer everybody, including immigrants and their 
families, to keep in constant contact through communication and information. 
Migrating in the age of mobile technologies, multimodal communication from 
anywhere to anywhere, SMS interchange, fast email, virtual communities, chats 
and forums, video conferences by telephone and internet, introduces new 
dimensions. Today, immigrants have many more opportunities to live 
interconnected with situations and people in their country of origin’ (Ros, 2010: 
20)." 
 
Whereas, in the past, television channels and newspapers appealed to wide audiences, 
today there are niche groups who choose the news stories that are of interest for them. 
The audience has the possibility to respond to news stories online, and to produce news 
by creating websites for this purpose.  
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As a result of the lower costs of organisation that are made possible by the internet, there 
is greater mobilisation among those outside the boundaries of traditional private and 
public institutions (Marmura, 2008). Hanafi claims that "developments in online 
diasporic forums reflect the increasing detachment of the diaspora from the centre. The 
centre - …Palestinian territories has lost its original, fundamental role as the heart of a 
global community (Georgiou in Sarikakis & Thussu, 2006:13)". In the modern era, the 
nation-state is supposed to be the principal body of affiliation for all those who live 
within its borders. Diasporas complicate this formulation. That those residing in one 
place influence another becomes problematic (Kalra, Kaur & Hutnyk, 2005: 20).  
 
 The new technology has also exposed audiences to international news and international 
media outlets. In talking about undeveloped regions, like Palestine, I would say that this 
change has created a new audience that has been exposed to news events outside 
Palestine, and has revealed how Palestine’s news events are being covered by Arab and 
international media outlets. According to Matar, "it becomes apparent that the availability 
of diverse news media can enable more active and public participation in private and 
public debates (Matar in Sakr, 2007: 129)". Indeed, diasporic community members, take 
part in a series of overlapping and competing public spheres (Marmura, 2008), in the case 
of this research, the British national space and the Palestinian private space. According to 
Mohammadi, "Palestine is among the countries that adopt the modernising approach" (he 
divides Islamic countries into three trends: modernist, mixed and traditionalist)  - "they 
are modernist in terms of the development process yet, at the same time, are keen to keep 
their Arab traditions (Mohammadi in Thussu, 1998: 259)."  
 
For the participants, there is no obvious diasporic media. Other diasporic communities, 
such as the Greeks and Israelis, would read the mainstream news websites of their 
country of origin, in their first language (Tsagarousianou, 2001; Malka & Kama, 2011). 
The Palestinians read multiple websites, not only Palestinian websites, in Arabic, which 
is their first language, but they also use websites in English. In many cases they use 
international and Israeli news websites in English as a first priority.  
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Language can be said to be an important aspect of cultural identity, especially 
in the context of migration. Language can reflect the level of integration into a host 
country as well as the differentiations between native and host cultures. In the process of 
migration, migrants usually develop language skills, with many becoming bilingual. In 
the second and third generations, it may be increasingly difficult for the parents to pass 
on the native language, as life in the host country requires that one masters that country’s 
language. Changes in these language choices can tell something about the negotiation 
between identities (Hammer, 2005: 172). I talk about this issue in depth in the data 
analysis chapter.  
 
I define the Palestinian audience as an active audience. What is an active audience, and 
why do I use this term? The best way to explore this term is to relate it first to the 
‘encoding/decoding’ model proposed by Stuart Hall. Hall’s model offered a way beyond 
the current uses and gratifications approach by insisting that audiences share certain 
frameworks of understanding and interpretation. Reading is not simply the lonely uses 
and gratifications individual; it is shared (Gray in Alasuutari, 1999: 27). 
 
This is indeed the case of the Palestinians in the diaspora. All of the participants have 
similar media usage practices, although they do not use the Palestinian diasporic media as 
a main source. The political events that shaped the Palestinian community influence their 
media consumption. I discuss this issue in the data analysis chapter. The revolution that 
the World Wide Web has created is well known and discussed. Internet use is on the 
increase in recent years and it is being used for various reasons: consumption of news, 
entertainment, information, and so on. The creation of the internet as a new medium does 
not merely define a technological change - the transformation from the traditional 
medium – the newspaper to the new medium – the internet. The internet revolution also 
symbolises a shift relating to the consumers, the audience. 
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The Impact of Technology on the Audience 
The audience that uses the Internet is a diverse audience. Communication through the 
Internet is to a global audience and is not always limited to territorial boundaries but 
rather to interest groups. Although the audience is diverse, there is a common character. 
In opposition to the use of traditional media, the use of the internet requires the user to 
learn the technology. The audience is thus mainly the younger generation and not the 
older generation, who are used to the traditional media. 
 
McQuail writes that there are four main changes that have affected the audience as a 
result of the communication revolution. First, are the new possibilities for delivering 
television and radio broadcasting via cable and satellite. ‘In the past supply had been 
limited by terrestrial transmitters carrying a very few channels (McQuail, 1997:9).’  
  
Moreover, the dominant television networks have an internet division which supports TV 
broadcasting needs. The websites’ users can watch live and recorded broadcasts online, 
communicate with the reporters and with the audience and express their own views. For 
instance, Al Jazeera Television provides its audience with three websites: Al Jazeera 
English, Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera Magazine, as well as the broadcasting of Al 
Jazeera programmes on YouTube. Al Jazeera’s owners, like other dominant television 
networks, understood that in order to be more visible and accessible, they had to invest in 
the new media – the Internet: 
 
 ‘Aljazeera.net is the electronic version of Al Jazeera Satellite Channel. It is part 
of the same organisation…but we are in a different type of media with new 
technologies… when we planned for the website, we specified that our audience 
would be the Arabic-language speakers everywhere in the world (Awad in 
Zayani, 2005: 84).’    
 
A second change has been the rapid development in new ways of recording, storage and 
retrieval of sound and pictures. A third change relates to the increased 
transnationalisation of television flow. The fourth innovation derives from the 
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increasingly interactive capacity use of various media, as a result of computer-based 
systems (McQuail, 1997:9).  
 
As I said earlier, following the development of the new technologies, the ‘audience’ 
concept should be re-observed. Whereas, in the past, the mass audience could not 
influence the content of the mainstream media, the internet provides a partial solution to 
the problem, as it is empowers groups and individuals who wish to deliver their 
messages. "The decrease in cost and professionalism required for developing alternative 
media in local, national and transnational spaces means that minorities can be on the 
production side of media and media representations (Georgiou in Sarikakis & Thussu, 
2006: 136)".  
 
Laguerre claims that there are positive aspects to digitalisation that benefit diasporic 
communities (the ‘empowerment model’). Digitisation empowers marginal peoples in 
many different ways, as the initiative may come either from within or from without. 
"Through computer access and use, one may participate in the political process, the 
internet economy, and civic activities. So empowerment is social, communicational, 
religious, economic, and political (Laguerre, 2010: 55 - 56)." 
 
The internet has significantly changed the news consumption practices of the 
Palestinians, since they are being exposed to unlimited sources of news online, including 
Palestinian news and social websites; the flow of information is rapid and they can find 
news websites that have a space for news about Palestine and Palestinians’ issues of 
concern. The growth and accessibility of online information and communication has 
provided Palestinians with the opportunity to post their opinions, information about their 
cause, and all types of discussion, on the Web, and it has enabled members of the 
diaspora to communicate across large distances. 
 
For David Morley and Kevin Robins, global information flows have started to penetrate 
boundaries without, however, destroying them immediately. Instead, shifts towards the 
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establishment of a ‘new local-global nexus’ have begun. Global, national and local space 
identities do not remain static, but increasingly interact with each other: 
 
 "Global space is a space of flows, an electronic space, a decentred space, a space 
in which frontiers and boundaries have become permeable. Within this global 
arena, economies and cultures are thrown into intense and immediate contact with 
each other … (Morley & Robins, 1995:115)." 
 
In his research, The Middle East and Islam in Western Mass Media: Towards a 
Comprehensive Theory of Foreign Reporting, Hafez emphasises linkages between 
domestic and foreign issues in foreign reporting, they are: 
 
1. International coverage and public agendas: the agenda-setting hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that the mass media can have a great impact on 
public opinion and on the agendas of public debates. As I pointed out earlier 
in the text, in relation to Cohen's claim. The problem, however, remains, that 
the mass media, are highly selective in their foreign reporting, especially 
where countries with a seemingly remote cultural and political relationship to 
the journalist's home base are concerned. 
2. Media interaction with domestic environments: the mass media do not 
represent an integrated and interdependent part of the international system. 
Rather, they uphold strong ties with their local and national environments, 
with domestic politics, élites, audiences and the public. 
3. Interaction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ media issues: while large 
sections of public opinion are generally indifferent to foreign affairs, 
exceptions to the rule are those issues that are of both foreign and domestic 
concern.  
4. Media effects on international conflicts: the mass media can be generally 
considered to have a dual nature: they can either promote peace or deepen 
crises and reinforce conflicts. This generalisation is based on the assumption 
that international relations are not solely driven by national interests, but that 
 89
images and image politics can influence political decision making and public 
opinion. 
5. Media and transcultural communication: culture is based on systems of 
symbols and attached or related meanings. The main task of foreign reporters 
is to interpret or ‘decode’symbols developed in a foreign context, to compare 
them with domestic national or local cultures, and to explain them to their 
audiences (Hafez, 2000: 34-37).         
 
"Especially since 1998, the fiftieth anniversary of the nakba, Palestinian web sites have 
provided much material that is printable. The internet has also enabled Palestinians in the 
diaspora to track events in Palestine and to depend less on international news agencies 
(Hammer, 2005: 7)". Interaction with social networks is an important role of the Internet. 
Whereas in the past individuals could watch the news on television, listen to the news on 
the radio, or be updated by reading newspapers, today they can also create their own 
news channels. In the context of my research, the Palestinians in the U.K. have started to 
create social groups on the web, which is a growing phenomenon.  
 
The diasporic community uses the internet as a tool to obtain news from home by 
interacting with Internet users in Gaza and the West Bank. They provide them with 
updated news. The Internet also allows the audiences to react to news events, i.e., 
promoting appeals on the web, the creation of websites for specific causes. The 
Palestinians in the diaspora attribute to the social networks a significantly important role 
in their life. I give an example. The charity organisation IF, based in London, organised a 
campaign in May 2009, ‘Gaza 100’, a run in East London. The aim of the campaign was 
to raise money for the children in Gaza. To achieve their aim, the campaigners created a 
website: http://www.ifcharity.com/gaza100.html. On the website, the audience can find 
information about the charity campaign, as well as about other campaigns of the charity. 
There is also the possibility to donate online, as well as to become involved by 
volunteering for the charity, to join the mailing list and to become a partner. 
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Before the rapid development of the WWW, theorists indicated the important role of 
social networks, as the impact of the media is mediated through interpersonal 
communication and social networks (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955).  This approach proves 
that the media cannot be the only source of information but, rather, the audience is being 
influenced by social networks. This approach was taken further by researchers during the 
past two decades. Ethnographic reception studies mainly drew on Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model (Hall, 1980: 197-208), drawing attention to how audiences too 
participate in the mediation of culture and political life. The new medium, the Internet, 
for the first time, allows audiences to participate in political, economic and social 
processes, and to influence, through social networks and personal interactions that are 
part of the media, and not a separate, influential factor, as it used to be before the 
development of the WWW. As Urry claims, the internet has created conditions whereby 
states and corporations can no longer monopolise the information made available to the 
public (Urry, 2000).     
 
The Shift from Traditional Medium to New Medium 
The technological development of Arab mass media may be divided into three historical 
phases: the colonial phase, the post-colonial phase, and the 1990s phase. Whereas the 
colonial phase was characterised by externally induced efforts to introduce media 
technologies to serve colonial, political and missionary objectives, the post-colonial 
phase was associated with the dominant paradigm of developmental thinking, which 
envisaged a vital role for the mass media in national transformation. It is at this stage that 
the basic communications infrastructures, like broadcast and publishing facilities, were 
established. It was also a phase marked by rising literacy rates, increasing urbanisation, 
and political institutionalisation.  
 
The second phase was characterised by the proliferation of new media technologies that 
were effective in circumventing strict government controls over information flows in the 
Arab world. The third phase of Arab media technology development began in the early 
1990s in a post-Cold war climate characterised by a global, digitally based information 
explosion and sweeping market-oriented thinking. A key feature of this phase has been 
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the launch of numerous commercial media projects inside and outside the Arab region, 
mainly as part of Saudi Arabia-based media conglomerates (Ayish, 2001: 115-116).  
The shift from state regulation to market-driven policies in the 1990s, within multilateral 
institutions such as the International Telecommunications Union, established a global 
market in information and communication (Sarikakis & Thussu, 2006: 4). With the end of 
the historical monopoly of the state broadcasting organisation resulting from the pirate 
broadcasting, the new liberal economic policies and the proliferation of commercial 
channels at the end of the 1980s, the Arab media landscape has undergone revolutionary 
transformations. In addition to the internet revolution, there are currently more than 400 
Pan-Arab Television channels that broadcast 24 hours a day. These stations offer a 
representation of the multiple dimensions of Arab society. Moreover, they have actively 
sought to make their programmes available to Arab communities all over the world 
through satellite link deals with internet links (Rinnawi, 2012: 1452- 1453). In the 1990s, 
satellite television has emerged as a new medium. The new technology enabled a global 
audience to receive updated news 24 hours a day. Roger Silverstone indicated the 
centrality of television in everyday lives as it ‘has the ability to translate the unfamiliar 
…’ (Silverstone, 1994:181). A similar view is put forward by Ibish and Abunimah:  ‘Al 
Jazeera presents the best trends of openness and democratisation in the Arab world 
(Zayani in Zayani, 2005: 33).’ 
 
According to Rinnawi, the revolution was also evident in terms of content. Al-Jazeera 
and al-A’arabya use the CNN style of news broadcasting, offering live, sensational 
coverage of most of the events that occur in the Arab world, as well as other current 
events, especially those relating to military actions and confrontations between Israel and 
the Palestinians, events in Lebanon, or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Rinnawi, 2012: 
1453).   
 
 Having said this, Sakr points out the limitations that satellite TV entailed. One problem 
was representation in relation to women and TV. Another issue is that "information and 
communication technologies cannot in themselves produce results. It is the way people 
adopt them, develop them and regulate them that determines their impact’, as well as the 
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failure of the new information and communication technologies to facilitate the spread of 
information about human right abuses" (Sakr, 2001:197). 
 
According to Rawan, who wrote about the interaction between traditional communication 
and modern media, the media in Islamic countries and in the less developed world 
function on two levels. On the one hand, the media operate through the latest 
technologies, which mainly address members of the intellectual and urban population. On 
the other hand, there is a separate complex system of mass communication that operates 
along traditional lines. In contrast to modern mass communication, which can only 
flourish in an economically advanced society, the less developed world concentrates on 
developing journalism, which is a necessary building block for improving the mass 
media. 
 
In Islamic countries, the popularity and credibility of modern mass media are restricted 
for the following reasons:  
1.  The high degree of illiteracy.  
2.  The numerous differing languages and dialects spoken by the populations. 
 3. The price of the media tends to limit newspaper circulation and prevent the purchase   
     of television and radio by individuals and families.  
4.  The countries are often geographically extensive with wide stretches of rural land,  
     causing delays in newspaper delivery and great difficulty in the transmission of radio  
     and television signals.  
5.  The tendency of the media to act as mouthpieces of the governments.  
6.  The traditional system of values in place in these countries (Rawan, 2001:177-178). 
 
Satellite television could not bring the change I discussed above. I would like to 
demonstrate my claim by a case study of Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera is a relatively free 
channel. Upon taking power, the Emir of Qatar lifted media censorship. The network 
serves as a pan-Arab opposition. Government reports are not yet without restrictions, 
though. According to Zayani, Al Jazeera is careful not to criticize Qatar. The critics say 
that the network ‘is under the thumb of the Qatari royal family (Zayani, 2005: 10).’ In 
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relation to my research, the coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the second 
Intifada, has given Al Jazeera pan-Arab dimensions, but, not without constraints. As 
Zayani says:  
 
    "Some believe that the effect of the coverage of the Intifada is sometimes lost in the 
very act of reporting as this takes the form of a constant flow of information. Viewers are 
fed a constant stream of news which is often brief and dispersed (Zayani in Zayani, 2005: 
175)".  
 
My informants’ views on Al Jazeera and other satellite networks is that each network has 
its political agenda and thus there is a problem of objectivity. Their claim is evident in 
theory. As Paterson and Sreberny found in their work: "While the nature of news has 
changed, technology and globalisation, the key events being selected as news items: 
journalists’ objectivity is still lacking (Paterson & Srebreny, 2004: 17)". In his research, 
on Saudi Arabia’s International Media Strategy, Boyd argues that there is a long tradition 
of Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, attempting to influence what is written about them 
in the Arab world press. He points to examples of Arab broadcasters outside their country 
of origin, such as the London-based MBC and the Rome-headquartered Orbit, owned by 
members of, or those close to, the Saudi royal family. Boyd’s claim is that the location is 
not accidental, but rather these businesses write from outside the Middle East because 
this ensures them freedom of expression (Boyd, 2001: 56). 
 
Herman and Chomsky say, in their Propaganda Model: ‘A propaganda model focuses on 
this inequality of wealth and power…it traces the routes by which money and power are 
able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent, and allow the government and 
dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1998: 2).’ This argument was also expressed by earliest theorists, like Hall et 
al., for example, who said that the news media reproduce the voices of the powerful via 
routine access and news legitimation (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke & Roberts, 1978: 
255).  
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In the literature on propaganda and communications there are two distinct theoretical 
paradigms. The most familiar approach is that which, from the perspective of 
communications theory, applies a psychological model to the study of propaganda. 
Propaganda is an attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behaviour of 
individuals. Intrinsic to this model is the idea of an active communicator-propagandist 
and a passive, inert receiver. Propaganda entails a process of deliberate manipulation, and 
this manipulation is performed on isolated individuals. What became particularly 
apparent was the role of the new communications media in the process of information 
dissemination and rational decision-making. Whilst the new technologies were 
indispensable for ‘public conversation’ in the twentieth-century nation state, they also 
made possible the manipulation of public debate and the public sphere (Robins & 
Webster, 1999: 132-133; 135). 
 
The solution, the Palestinians say, is to receive information from various sources, 
especially using the Internet. The participants also argue that there are websites that 
report the whole picture, since they are produced by non-Arab producers. I will discuss 
this subject in the data analysis chapter. To conclude, I would quote Zayani’s claim:  
 
 "To treat Arab media as the fourth estate, and to say that TV leads to political 
changes is to look at the issue from a narrow perspective…One should be 
skeptical about the ambitious transformative claims for new media as well as the 
claims about its democratizing potential.(Zayani in Zayani, 2005: 34)." 
 
A clear distinction should be made between satellite TV and the Internet, as their impact 
on the audience is different. There are contradictory views from researchers as to the 
impact of the internet. On one hand, there is the perception of the internet as enhancing 
democracy. The internet exists mostly beyond government control whereas satellite TV 
cannot, as a sole factor, lead to social changes, democratisation and so on, the internet 
enables wider participation of the audience, social networks, and active audience 
(Alterman, 1998). 
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In this context, it is important to remember that whereas internet penetration in Gaza and 
the West bank is relatively low, internet access for Palestinians in the U.K. is no obstacle 
to obtaining information for many Palestinians.  My discussion on the impact of the 
media on the audience will not be completed without talking about a very important 
factor: the influence of the WWW on television viewership. In other words, it is true that 
internet usage is a more flexible medium than television networks, though it is not 
without its limitations, but the emergence of the internet has caused a decline in television 
viewership? 
 
According to Stempell, Hargrove and Bernt, although old media (television and 
newspapers) use has declined, this could not be seen to have been caused by the internet. 
They suggested that watching television news had declined because fewer viewers of 
television news got what they wanted from television news. They considered that the best 
explanation is that those who use the internet as a source of news are clearly information 
seekers (Stempell, Hargrove & Bernt, 2000). Previously, media and communication 
technologies were distinct, governed by their own set of political and economic 
arrangements and they processed information in different places and ways. Today, 
telecommunications, computing technologies and media are being brought together by 
digital technology, which enables an unlimited amount of information to be stored and 
transmitted (Williams, 2003: 227).   
 
On the other hand, in contrast to the views I mentioned above, there are scholars who 
point out the negative effect of the internet. Sparks, for example, claims that the new 
technologies are seen as "destroying the pillars of the fourth estate" (Sparks in Sparks and 
Tulloch, 2000: 4). As he sees it, while there may be more information available, the 
quality of this information, as well as public understanding, is declining. This poses a 
threat to democracy. There is research that stresses that the media are important in 
maintaining democracy, but not as a sole factor. Lippmann, for example, says that 
citizens need to be encouraged to maintain their faith in democratic state institutions 
which represent the best political system available (Lippmann, 1997, xiv). Black resists 
the assumption that the information society will in essence be a ‘knowledge society’. His 
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argument is that it is predicted that the digital information revolution will deliver a social 
revolution that has the potential for unprecedented emancipation and empowerment. This 
vision is based on the recognition of a strictly one-way relationship between knowledge 
and power, with knowledge serving as the determining force. However, claims Black, 
according to Foucault, the way power and knowledge interact is much more complex. For 
Foucault, knowledge is not simply a factor that determines power; it is also a product of 
power itself. Power has the capacity to generate knowledge (Black, 2003: 19).    
 
The optimistic view of the information age proposed that the new media would generate 
six social ‘improvements’: 
 
1. New media were seen to facilitate two-way communication in contradistinction to 
mass communication’s uni-directionality. The interactivity facilitated would 
undermine top-down commandist communication.  
2. An active participatory democracy and citizen control could be built upon this 
interactivity because citizens could now be regularly consulted about their views, 
i.e., instead of being spoken to by the mass media, the new media made it possible 
for citizens to make their voices heard. 
3. New media’s interactive nature provided new communicative spaces where 
people could discover common concerns and discuss possible solutions. It was 
suggested that this would generate an activated civil society and re-invigorate 
democracy. 
4.  The new media were seen to deliver greater diversity of information than ever 
before. This would generate a more democratic society because citizens would be 
less open to manipulation. 
5. The new media offered the means to break up the mass media market into smaller 
niche media markets. In this, there is a possibility for multiple new niche 
identities and localism.  
6. Because new media facilitated interactive communication on a global basis, new 
niche identities would grow as global phenomena. 
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The skeptical view of the likely impacts of the new media on society has different 
reasons. Firstly, although the new media technologies can facilitate interactive two-way 
communication, the mass media show no sign of being displaced. Most people appear to 
prefer to receive information edited and packaged by others, rather than to sort through 
massive amounts of information themselves. Hence, predictions that people would bypass 
traditional news media have not come to pass. Instead, mass audiences remain a core 
feature of contemporary Western society – these audiences still draw most of their 
information from mass media sources (especially television); this information is still 
delivered in top-down fashion and is still produced by media professionals. 
 
Much of this media content results from deliberate manipulation by social élites. What is 
more, professional communication manipulators have turned their attention to new media 
forms, like the internet, because skillful communication manipulators can use two-way 
interactive communication just as effectively as uni-directional communication to steer 
people. Secondly, boosterist logic predicts greater citizen participation in politics because 
new media enable people to connect in new ways. However, as Neuman notes, just 
because the new media make such developments possible does not mean that 
technologies will actually be used in these ways. Thirdly, new media generated an 
explosion in available information and access to a greater diversity of sources. In reality, 
new technologies produce a glut of information, which greatly enhances the difficulties in 
finding appropriate information and evaluating its quality.  
 
Fourthly, it has been argued that the new media create fulcra for new niche identities to 
flourish. In fact, the trend towards people living in large mass cities grows. There appears 
to be no return to communal village nirvanas. Politically, niche media facilitate the 
mobilisation of single-issue groups, to allow spin-doctors to reach more narrowly defined 
audiences with tailor-made messages. Far from heralding a new genre of politics, this has 
simply served to reinforce the American model of pluralist democracy (Louw, 2006: 123-
126). 
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The challenge to promote democratisation, as a result of the emergence of new 
technologies, is evident in the Palestinian Authority, from its establishment until today. 
The establishment of the Palestinian Authority led to the emergence of new technologies 
on the ‘media map’. Having said this, mainly as the result of economic instability, most 
of the media organisations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell under direct or indirect 
Palestinian Authority control, making it impossible for media to effectively organise 
independently. The implementation of censorship law and the self censorship of 
journalists, are another obstacle to a democratic media market (Nossek & Rinnawi, 2003: 
189). 
 
The issue of censorship is a very important issue when talking about the media in non 
democratic sphere. Until the 1990s there was little government-initiated regulation of 
internet access and content. Users belonged to a limited community of academics, 
government and commercial research institutions. From 1990 onwards, as the internet 
began to expand and to play the role of a general public communication system, nation-
state authorities began to take more notice. While, in democratic nation-states, crude 
censorship was thought to belong to the past, this kind of intervention often reappears in 
some form when new technologies challenge existing patterns of control. However, given 
the nature of the internet as a modality of cultural transmission and under conditions of 
reflexive modernisation, the outrage caused by censorship has been particularly acute. 
Another aspect of censorship in relation to the internet is that it has global consequences 
that affect many people (Slevin, 2000: 220-221).  
 
The Palestinian Audience and the New Media 
The fragile political and economic situation in Palestine directly influences the need in 
the communication system that will allow the Palestinians in the diaspora to receive news 
from home. The Palestinians in the U.K. are eager to receive news from Palestine. I have, 
though, to restrict my claim, and to emphasis that not all Palestinians have the same level 
of interest in the situation in Palestine.  
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Firstly, I would like to explain the importance of the internet, relating also to its growing 
usage in the Muslim world. Since 1993, computer networks have grabbed enormous 
public attention. Computer networks, once an obscure set of technologies used by a small 
élite, are now widely used, and the subject of political debate, public interest and popular 
culture (Kollock & Smith in Smith & Kollock, 1999: 3). 
 
The internet’s substantial growth since 1990 has changed the face of international media. 
During the period prior to 1993, there were fewer than 150 web sites. By the end of 1994, 
there were slightly more than 10,000 sites. By 2002, the number has increased to around 
100 million. Direct online interaction between Palestinians had started in the 1990s. Their 
online discussions covered a variety of issues, from an eventual return to the homeland to 
corruption in the Palestinian Authority. What began in the mid-1990s as an élite means of 
communication for Palestinians became an infrastructure used by non-élite masses and by 
grassroots organisations, transcending territorial and government regulations (Aouragh, 
2011: 87). 
 
Internet consumption in the Muslim world has increased significantly.  Between 2000 and 
2007, the internet use growth in the West Bank was 594.3%. In December, 2000, there 
were 35,000 internet users in the West Bank. Today, there are 243,000 users (Alexa). 
However, this data also indicates a problem, most household computers in Palestine are 
concentrated in the West Bank and not in the Gaza Strip. Another problem is that despite 
the growth in internet use, internet access in Palestine is limited, and there are linguistic 
and cultural barriers (Hanieh, 1999: 43).  
 
Sterling identifies the four primary functions of the internet as: discussion groups, long-
distance computing, file transfers and mail (Sterling, 1993: 4). The internet has distinctive 
advantages: easy access, little or no regulation, fast flow of information, spread globally, 
inexpensive development and maintenance, and a multimedia environment. Moreover, 
the internet does not represent a single medium, but rather a collection of modalities. The 
unique quality of the WWW is its qualities: a hypertext medium, the web has the 
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potential to function as a mass medium while simultaneously facilitating inter-identity 
communication and ideological warfare (Marmura, 2008).   
 
The internet helps to mobilize people into action, something that cannot be done through 
the mainstream media (Tsfati and Weimann, 2002: 328). Computer networks allow 
people to create a range of new social spaces in which to meet and interact with one 
another (Kollock & Smith in Smith & Kollock, 1999: 3). The traditional function of the 
state and the mass media in determining the common cultural and political identity no 
longer exists. Grassroots actors attempt to gain control over the mechanisms of the state 
to serve their own interests, regardless of any domestic consensus (Castells, 2004: 358). 
 
Turkle emphasises that the use of computers has changed over time. A decade ago, the 
computer was a second self, a person alone with a machine. Today, the internet links 
millions of people in new spaces that are changing the form of our communities and our 
identities. At one level, the computer is a tool. Beyond this, the computer offers new 
models of mind and it projects our ideas (Turkle, 1995). 
 
Recent empirical studies have broadened the discussion about the democratic forms of 
interaction in diasporic virtual networks (Hanafi, 2005: 596). According to Bunt, the 
internet has the potential as a tool to enhance ‘democracy’ and ‘development’ for Muslim 
societies, in a variety of contexts. Some have suggested that it may enhance the 
‘connectivity’ of the umma, the global Muslim community. The internet may also alter 
‘non-Muslim’ understanding of Islam. 
 
The Arab Human Development Report (2003: 59) reflected on the relatively low levels of 
internet access and availability in Arab countries. Relatively wealthier nations, such as 
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait had higher levels of internet 
penetration - with Yemen, Sudan and Iraq having the lowest. Improvements in internet 
access can vary in different contexts, ranging from the establishment of a telephone line, 
enabling simple dial-up access, through to the establishment of high-speed Broadband 
and ADSL connectivity.  
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Accessibility has allowed marginalised and minority perspectives to network between 
themselves, and with affiliates throughout the world. Clearly, in some cases, the 
technology has permitted those without an interest in ‘democracy’ to transmit their 
perspectives and agendas to a broad audience, including supporters, and to acquire new 
followers (Bunt in Poole & Richardson, 2006: 162).   
 
In relation to the websites my participants use: the participants use a variety of websites, 
but I will refer to Hamas’ media to give a sense of the revolution it has created among the 
Palestinians and the Western audiences. In the case of the Hamas movement, the 
sophisticated network of websites has no linear connection with the development of 
democracy in Gaza and the West Bank. Even though high expectations for improvement 
were built following Hamas’s victory, the political situation in Gaza and the West Bank, 
the poor economic situation, unstable security situation and additional factors, still 
prevent the formation of a Palestinian state that would be based on democratic values. 
Access to information is one of the fundamental things that democratic societies need; in 
Palestine the implementation of democracy online has not yet been reached. 
 
As opposed to Western democratic governments, the Hamas government attributes to its 
websites a different role. Advances in new media, most recently the internet, appear to 
have stimulated much of the debate about citizenship and participation in society. Modern 
democratic governments have developed sophisticated online services for their 
communities, with feedback mechanisms where possible. 
 
Directgov, for example, was the U.K.’s e-government initiative, which launched in 2004 
and sought to offer citizens direct access to public information and services about topics 
ranging from employment, motoring and problems through to problems of disability. An 
important issue relating to this discussion is the level of citizens’.  According to 
Balnaves, Donald and Shoesmith E-governance, at its best, is e-participation and can only 
operate in democratic states. It is the use of technology, such as the internet, to enhance 
citizens’ participation in government decision-making.   
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E-government can operate in a non-democratic state. It refers to the use of media by 
governments to disseminate information in a one-directional, top-down fashion 
(Balnaves, Donald and Shoesmith, 2009). This is the main difference between the Hamas 
government websites and the websites of Western governments. Whereas the first uses 
new technologies to raise awareness of the Hamas agenda and to gain public support, 
Western governments use the advantages of the internet to share governmental decisions 
with the public and encourage their participation. 
 
Nevertheless, also in Western democracies, the process of gaining the participation of the 
audience has not been completed. There are two main reasons for this. First, there is the 
unwillingness, and sometimes apathy, of internet users to take an active role in political 
activities online. Secondly, the governments discussed are not yet ready to negotiate with 
the audience. As Coleman and Gotze point out, in relation to the involvement of citizens 
in policy deliberation:  
 
"Almost all of the cases one finds are frustrated by the same two problems: too 
few people know about them; governments fail to integrate them into the policy 
process or respond to them effectively (Coleman & Gotze, 2001: 36)".  
 
Although, in formal terms, Britain’s minority ethnic populations are fully incorporated 
politically, that is, they have access to political citizenship rights, it has been common to 
argue that their needs have not been fully represented in the political system. One reason 
for this is that the British parliamentary system is dominated by two major parties which 
have not always seen it as vital to their interests to cater too directly to minority ethnic 
constituents. In the latter half of the 1990s there was some waning of the political focus 
on the issue of immigration. Instead, there has been a growing focus on the apparently 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers arriving in Britain from areas of the world 
experiencing natural disasters, or fleeing war, genocide, and religious and ethnic 
persecution. There are other considerations. As long as elections were not determined by 
marginal constituencies in which large, minority, ethnic populations potentially held the 
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balance of power, the relative neglect of issues of concern to minority ethnic voters was 
likely to persist (Mason, 2000: 124 -125).  
 
To contextualise this discussion, I would like to discuss the term democracy. Democracy 
differs in nature and extent from one political movement to another, ranging from the 
adoption of a liberal pluralistic Western model to an Islamic model of participation 
through consultation. However, the two streams converge on the issues of human rights 
and political participation (Moussalli, 2003:123). There are scholars, such as Judith 
Miller, Martin Kramer and Bernard Lewis, who argue that liberal democracy and Islam 
are contradictory terms. Other scholars, such as William Zartman, argue that political 
Islam and democracy are not necessary incompatible (Moussalli, 2003:120; 122).   
    
The argument discussed above is true if we consider the internet network as a factor that 
promotes democracy. Critics would say that the networks will increase the strength of 
existing concentrations of power (Kollock & Smith in Smith & Kollock, 1999: 4). 
Looking at the Palestinian websites’ role in the life of the Palestinian diasporic 
community, I can say that it is true that the Palestinians consider the Palestinian websites 
to be political websites that are categorised according to party affiliation, and not as 
websites that promote pluralistic discourse. Nevertheless, the existence of social 
Palestinian networks online, demonstrates minority activism on the web that has 
implications for democratic dialogue, both internally (within the group) and externally 
(with the rest of society) (Siapera, 2010).  
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Conclusion 
Consumption of news media is a vital component, influencing the Palestinians’ life. This 
has been the case while they were residing in Palestine, and this is the case for the 
Palestinians in the UK. The difference is dual. Firstly, the Palestinians’ geographical 
distance from Palestine, from the actual location where the news events occur. Secondly, 
the extensive use of the internet to overcome the problem of geographical distance. As 
politics dominates the Palestinian discourse, the need for news updates is highly 
important. The participants search for online news from Palestine every day, many of 
them more than once a day. The participants use a variety of Arab, Israeli and 
international websites, in Arabic and in English, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
The following chapter discusses the methodological problems entailed in audience 
research. The problems of the researcher are varied, and relate to the behaviour of the 
audience, mainly in regard to credibility and co-operation. As an Israeli researcher who 
researches the Palestinian community, there is also the challenge caused by the 
interaction between dominant and oppressed groups, on the one hand. On the other hand, 
the non-Palestinian researcher enjoys advantages that a Palestinian researcher would lack, 
as I will discuss in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
My research is audience research that investigates the behaviour of Palestinians in the 
U.K. The aim of the study is to discover the practices of media use for news 
consumption, as my main interest is the opportunities that new technologies have 
provided to Palestinians residing in the Diaspora. The methodology used is through 
individual interviews, because my aim was to look at the individuals’ news consumption 
practices and to find patterns in the participants’ behavior. The field work period was 
from May 2008 to January 2009. Until December, 2008, there was no significant violence 
between the Palestinians and Israel. In December, the Gaza War broke out, or as it is 
being called in the Arab world – the Gaza Massacre. The war ended in January, 2009.  
The war occurred in the last days of the Bush administration in the U.S.A. In January, 
2009, Barak Obama was sworn in as America’s president During the period in which I 
was conducting the interviews, in July, 2008, there was a suicide attack in Jerusalem, but 
my access to the field did not change following the attack, and I continued to conduct the 
interviews the following day. The participants talked about their extensive use of the 
internet to read the news online, and the suicide attack was an important demonstration of 
internet usage at a time of breaking news. In other words, following the suicide attack in 
Jerusalem, I received authentic information from the participants – referring to the time 
they had spent on news searching and websites prioritising considerations.     
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The Researcher as an Explorer 
Researching an audience entailed many difficulties. The problems of the researcher are 
varied, and relate to the behaviour of the audience, mainly in relation to credibility and 
cooperation. Hartley and others have also pointed out that the conception of the word 
‘audience’ separates ‘them’ - the audience -- from ‘us’ – the researchers, in a way that 
belies the reality that all of us are living in a mediated culture (Hartley, 1992). What is 
more, as an Israeli researcher who researches the Palestinian community, there is the 
challenge of interaction between dominant and oppressed groups. This problem leads to 
methodological problems, which are discussed in this chapter, and shows that though 
there is a gap between the Palestinians and the Israelis, there is also cultural proximity 
and there are also problems of hegemonic groups (‘Ashkenazim’) vs. less privileged 
groups (Mizrahim), within Israeli society. 
 
Researching the Palestinian audience in the U.K. entailed difficulties as would the 
research of any other audiences, but, learning from the Palestinian community, these are 
even more pronounced, for internal and external reasons: the Palestinians are immigrants 
from a conflict zone, the collective trauma of 1948, as well as the challenge of living in a 
Western country, especially following September 11th, 2001.  As a researcher, in order to 
understand the media consumption practices of the Palestinian audience, I learned to 
know the Palestinian community in the UK. Amongst other things, I participated in their 
social and political activities on a regular basis. Detailed information on my involvement 
with the Palestinian community is in this chapter.  
 
Inglis’ idea of investigating audiences describes in the best way the process I have 
undertaken: ‘in order to understand audiences we have to recover the thoughts of others 
and think them for ourselves’ (Inglis, 1990). To follow this rule, media research into 
audiences started the studies named ‘uses and gratifications’. Jay Blumler, one of its 
leading practitioners says: ‘this (‘uses and gratifications’) places the emphasis on 
members of the audience actively processing media materials in accordance with their 
own needs (Blumler, 1974).’ 
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The uses and gratifications approach is rather widely used in new media impact studies 
and it rests on several assumptions that underline the active element in media usage 
(Katz, Blumler & Gurewitz, 1974). In this tradition, people are intentional and selective 
in their media usage, evaluating their available media options according to their needs 
and choosing media channels that best gratify their needs, or that best serve a particular 
function (Korgaonkar & Wolin, 1999).  
 
According to Bird, there is neglect of audiences for news research (Bird in Nightingale, 
2011: 489). To explore the questions relating this issue, Bird focus is cultural approaches 
to news audiences. My research can be understood in the light of the cultural theory. For 
many people, discussions about current events are an important part of their daily 
routines, in ways that go beyond textual content. As ethnographically informed 
scholarship on media audiences extends beyond studies of direct engagement with texts 
toward a consideration of broader cultural context, this approach is increasingly being 
framed in terms of media practices – what people do and say around and about media 
(Couldry, 2004; Bird, 2010). 
 
These arguments echo Carey (1975) who advocated a ritual model of communication, 
arguing similarly that much media consumption is less about textual content and more 
about activities surrounding reception: "Culture must first be seen as a set of practices, 
some of which are the habitual activities surrounding news. (Carey, 1975:19)." Most 
scholars now agree that a simple cause-effect relationship between text and response is 
almost impossible to demonstrate, even that media impact our lives in profound ways. 
For example, Philo and Berry (2004) showed that news stories on the Palestinian-israel 
conflict are often read in ways that confirm audience members' existing beliefs, a point 
also made by Liebes (1997).   
 
Conducting this research entailed a significant challenge, since the researcher perceived 
herself to be an ‘outsider’, being an Israeli.  The participants perceived themselves to be 
Palestinians. This is the first research of the Palestinian community in the diaspora that 
has been conducted by an Israeli researcher. To date, mostly Palestinians and scholars 
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with other Arab nationality have published research in this field. Moreover, there is a 
Palestinian boycott of Israeli academics, as leading scholars within Israeli academia, and 
Israeli policy makers put much effort into trying to resolve this problem.  
 
This is a serious deficit within the development of the academic research on Palestinians 
and ‘Palestine’ topics. The existing published research is written by Palestinians who are 
‘insiders’: they belong to the Palestinian community. The meaning of this is challenging 
the norms expected as a result of the political climate in the region. Israeli researchers do 
not research the Palestinian community. The main reasons can be understood from Salem 
and Kaufman’s description of the current situation: 
 
"To date, few Palestinian and Israeli academics have co-operated in research 
projects…over the years an estimated 2 per cent of Israeli academics have 
participated in such ventures…the vast majority of Israeli academics have 
remained indifferent, concentrating on their own careers and research agendas. 
Furthermore, these figures, calculated before the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada 
in October 2000, may have been further reduced by the increasing psychological 
hostility between Palestinians and Israelis due to widespread use of violence by 
both communities, as well as by the physical limitations, such as Israel’s 
checkpoints in the West Bank and the unilateral pullout from Gaza, the separation 
wall and legal statutes restricting contact between the two national groups (Salem 
& Kaufman, 2007:9)". Salem and Kaufman continue, claiming: 
 
"Cooperation is especially difficult in the humanities and social sciences, as in 
these disciplines academic research is more closely connected to the overarching 
political issues than is the case in the natural sciences. In addition, a great deal of 
logistical and political manoeuvering is required to find ways to meet face-to-face 
due to the legal, physical and psychological barriers separating Israelis and 
Palestinians from one another. These obstacles combined with a general 
indifference…make it easier for Palestinian and Israeli academics alike to remain 
isolated in their own communities (Salem & Kaufman, 2007:21)."    
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In this complex situation, it was a personal risk that I decided to take once embarked on 
this research; the risk that I might not be able to get access, the risk of not being able to 
prove my findings as evidence, but that the results would rather be perceived as 
manipulation by participants who have no interest in co-operating with an Israeli 
researcher, and the risk to the safety of me and my immediate family. Having said this, 
my interest in the investigation of the Palestinian community was strong and I also 
believed that I should publish the research to advance knowledge in the field. I was born 
following *’Yom Kippur’ War, a ‘child of winter 1973’. My birth followed the death of 
my uncle, my father’s brother, in the war, aged 21. During the Second World War, my 
mother’s two brothers, who were small children at the time, died when the family fled 
from their home in Warsaw, escaping the Nazis threat. I grew up with the grief 
surrounding these deaths, knowing the effects of the horrors of the Holocaust and the 
painful wars that continue to affect the Israelis, following the establishment of the Israeli 
state when Jewish people had already found a safe haven.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 "On 6th October, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israeli troop concentrations 
in the occupied Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights.  The Arab armies achieved early 
successes with the Egyptian army crossing the Suez Canal and advancing into the Sinai 
(Philo & Berry, 2004: 47)." 
 
 
 110
The period during which I lived in London, was an extraordinary opportunity for me to 
discover the ‘Other’. I did not research a community that I was part of; I was not an 
‘insider’. I did not research what was known and familiar to me as an Israeli researcher, 
but rather I researched the ‘Other’. It is this fact that has driven me to conduct my 
research. I took the role of an explorer who starts a long journey to explore new 
continents. All I knew about the Palestinians and the Arab people was mediated through 
pain and loss. I wanted to prove that there is another way, a way of dialogue and not of 
conflict. I want my children, 5 and 7 year old, to grow up in a better world. My aim is to 
let them learn about the conflict, not through painful memories, as their ancestors had 
experienced. Moreover, I want them to learn that there is a way to promote a dialogue 
between the two sides of the conflict – the Israelis and the Palestinians. As a young girl, 
my family did not deliver this optimistic approach to me. I hope that my children will 
learn the story of the ‘Other’. 
 
Another problem that I had was facing a suspicious attitude from Jewish community 
members. At the time of the field work, I lived in a London suburb where the Jewish 
(British born Jews) and Israeli (Israeli immigrants) community is concentrated. I was part 
of this community and my links with the Palestinian community were seen within the 
Jewish community as a break with the ‘public order.’ Members of the Jewish community 
do not meet with members of the Palestinian community, they live in separate areas and 
there is an atmosphere of hostility between the two communities. In Israel, most Israelis 
know Palestinians through ‘labour work’, and Palestinians have no mobility 
opportunities, especially since the ‘Oslo Agreements’. Having said this, I never was 
apologetic about my research, but rather answered briefly about my aims, if being asked 
by individuals from the Jewish community. As a result of the difficulties I have 
described, there was a general disbelief in my ability to conduct this research at all. 
However for me, this was a challenge. It was not the first time I had worked on 
‘impossible investigations’. I worked as a professional investigative journalist and I used 
to work on investigations with difficulties of access, including coverage of stories of the 
Arab world. In order to explain further the implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
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on the people both sides of the conflict and on the political climate, a discussion about the 
implications of the formation of the state of Israel, would be followed.  
 
Deportation and Migration – The Cases of the Palestinians and Israelis 
May 14, 1948, is the date on which the establishment of the state of Israel was declared. 
This was an event that marked a shift in the life of the Jewish and the Palestinian people 
alike. For the Jewish people it was a festive day, on which a long-lasting dream has been 
fulfilled: the establishment of a nation state for the Jewish people, a place they could call 
‘home’ following the Second World War and the atrocities that the Jewish people 
experienced through the Nazi Holocaust. For the Palestinians, the result of the 
establishment of the state of Israel was devastating. They lost their homes and became 
refugees. Since 1948 there has been unrest in the region and the Palestinians’ main 
aspiration is to have a Palestinian state.  
 
In this context, one can see similarities between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The 
strong desire for a state was part of the Jewish history narrative. The longing for a Jewish 
state was being expressed long before the establishment of the state of Israel, in the 
famous ‘Zionist song’: My heart is in the East, written by Yehuda Halevi: ‘My heart is in 
the east, my body is in the west…’. Halevi describes the deep longing of the Jewish 
people in the diaspora, ‘Galut’ in Hebrew, for the state of Israel. By the 1870s, societies 
known as Chovevei Zion – ‘Lovers of Zion’ – had formed across Russia, which viewed 
mandatory Palestine as a site for national renewal and a refuge from Anti-Semitism 
(Philo & Berry, 2004: 2). The Hebrew word ‘Galut’ expresses suffering and longing. 
Similarly, the Palestinians’ Arabic word for diaspora, ‘ghurba’, has a negative context for 
the Palestinians. For Palestinians, the dream of a nation state is still evident. During 1949, 
Israel negotiated armistice agreements with all Arab states involved in the conflict. 
Jordan moved to annex the West Bank, whilst Egypt moved to occupy the Gaza Strip. 
The name ‘Palestine’ had disappeared from the map, its territory having been absorbed 
into the Israeli and Jordanian states (Philo & Berry, 2004: 23). The current political, 
economic and social situation of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank leads to 
ongoing criticism of Israeli policy that is expressed by many Israeli and international 
 112
figures. Many scholars and other individuals, use the Nazis’ Holocaust to express their 
criticism.  
 
The Holocaust as a Symbol in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
The Holocaust was a defining event in the life of the Jewish people. It was the peak of 
continuous chasing after the Jewish people due to their ethnic origin. ‘The term ‘ethnic’ 
was originally applied to ‘cultural strangers’, ‘Others’ and outsiders; it excluded the 
dominant group’ (Gillespie, 1995: 9). The Holocaust was the murder of the Jewish people 
by the Nazis and the destruction of the life of many other Jews who managed to survive. 
Except for the Jews, anyone not considered ‘Aryan’ (Gypsies, blacks and others) suffered 
in the Holocaust. For many Palestinians, the Israeli government is to be blamed in the 
‘Palestinian Holocaust’, which is as they see it, the same as the ‘Nazis’ Holocaust’.  The 
Palestinian scholar Akleh, for example, says: 
 
"Holocaust is genocidal crime against people based on their ethnicity. This 
genocide could be perpetrated through different means, such as poison gas, guns, 
tanks, air raids, biological warfare, economical siege, starvation, destruction of 
vital natural resources, eviction into desert, and deprivation of basic vital 
materials, among others, to produce the same result: mass deaths. For the last 
sixty years Palestinians have been victims of all these methods in a deliberate 
programmed holocaust. The perpetrators are not Nazis, but those who claim to be 
survivors (and their descendents) of the Nazi-caused holocaust: Zionist Jewish 
Israelis (Akleh, 2010: 103)". 
 
The Palestinian media uses the ’Nazis’ Holocaust’ in its coverage: Sazar and her son 
Yaser immigrated to the U.K. from Gaza. Sazar talks about news events using terms that 
gain consensus in the Arab world: 
 
 ‘Al Aqsa talks more about Palestine. The Holocaust Yaser, the Holocaust when 
was it? We saw the Holocaust on Al Aqsa TV and Radio.’ 
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Later I found out, that the term 'The Holocaust’ was used to describe Israel Defence 
Force activity in Gaza in March, 2008. 3 months prior to the interviews I conducted with 
Sazar and Yaser. Al Aqsa TV, which belongs to Hamas, used the term in their coverage 
of the violence. It became an idiomatic expression. Rallies had taken place in the Arab 
world and in Europe in March, as the demonstrators rallied against the ‘Israel Holocaust 
in Palestine.’ This demonstrated the power the media holds and its ability to mobilise 
social movements and individuals. 
   
Christison & Christison talk about genocide in the Palestinian context: 
 
"…the truth is evident everywhere on the ground where Israel has extended its 
writ: Palestinians are unworthy and inferior to Jews, and in the name of the Jewish 
people, Israel has given itself the right to erase the Palestinian presence in 
Palestine - in other words, to commit genocide by destroying in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group (Christison, 2010:133)." 
 
The Israeli scholar, Halper, blames the Israeli government for the killing of the innocent: 
 
"The problem in the Middle East is not the Palestinian people, not Hamas, not the 
Arabs, not Hezbollah, not the Iranians, and not the entire Muslim world. It’s us, 
the Israelis. …the unnecessary wars, more limited conflicts, and the bloody 
attacks that served mainly to bolster Israel’s position, directly or indirectly, in its 
attempt to extend its control over the entire land west of the Jordan: the systematic 
killing between 1948 and 1956 of 3000–5000 ‘infiltrators’, Palestinian refugees, 
mainly unarmed, who sought mainly to return to their homes, to till their fields, or 
to recover lost property (Halper, 2010: 135 and 141)." 
 
Halper is one of many Israeli academics who speak worldwide against the Israeli policy 
relating to the Palestinians. This is another factor that increases the hostility between the 
Palestinian community and the Israeli community. Many Israeli and Jewish scholars 
claim that the Israelis who speak against the Israeli government policy increase the 
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hostility towards the Israeli side of the conflict. The problem of hatred is not only as a 
result of the ‘Israeli occupation’, but also, since Israel is their nation state, of the Jewish 
people.    
 
In order to complete my argumentation, I have to add that the use of the term ‘the Nazis’ 
Holocaust’ for political purposes is not merely in the Palestinian context. For example, in 
a recent dispute (December 2012), the Jewish Orthodox described themselves as 
prisoners of the Nazi Holocaust, as a result of what they described as a ‘discrimination 
and a violation of their civic rights’. Moreover, this group demonstrated by wearing the 
yellow badge and prisoners’ clothing, that were used in the concentration camps, 
upsetting Holocaust survivors. Following the descriptions of the aims of the research and 
the research environment, there will be a discussion on its research methods.    
 
Research Methods 
My research is a qualitative research. I conducted 52 open-ended, in–depth interviews 
with Palestinians who reside in the U.K. They come from different socio-economic 
backgrounds, and different political positions, as follows:   
 
• Age – range between 20 and 60. 
• Place of Origin – Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan and the U.K. 
• Number of years in the U.K: the range is between 2-30 years. 
• Education – divided between no academic education at all and academic 
education at different levels. 
• Occupation – journalists, political activists, unskilled workers, students, lecturers 
and professional workers. 
• Reasons for leaving their home country: economic, educational and family 
reasons.  
• Political affiliation: Hamas, Fatah and independent. 
 
The participants are divided into three categories: students (21; 11 graduate level students 
and 10 undergraduate level students); professional (17) and unprofessional workers (14). 
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The professional participants hold the following professions: lecturers (4), a teacher, an 
(academic) author, psychologist, engineer, journalists (3), a cardiologist, consultant, 
lawyer, an ambassador, press officer and political councillor. In general, one can say that 
the socio-economic background of the Palestinians who emigrated from Gaza and the 
West Bank to the U.K. is higher than that of the Palestinians who stayed in Palestine. 
However, this statement is not accurate, since there are exceptions. The participants who 
belong to the group of the professionals and left Gaza and the West Bank, have a strong 
socio-economic background. Their financial abilities enabled them to emigrate to the 
U.K., where they found profitable jobs. The socio-economic background of the 
unprofessional workers is not strong (except for that of a few women who emigrated for 
marriage purposes). They have, though, managed to emigrate and they have improved 
their earnings. Some of them support their families in Palestine, others emigrated with 
their families. The group of students is divided into two: students with a strong socio-
economic background, and students with lower socio-economic backgrounds. 
 
To conclude this, I shall point to Bowker’s conclusion, he says that "differentials in 
access to wealth, literacy and higher education, and urban versus village society, and 
uneven access to political influence or power have been constant themes of Palestinian 
political culture at least since the Ottoman period (Bowker, 2003: 42)." 
 
The interviews conducted were semi structured interviews. At the beginning of the field 
work, I chose the method of focus groups interviews. I met with a group of Palestinians 
in Exeter and posed my questions to the group. The dialogue that developed between the 
members of the group did not allow me to receive answers relating to Palestinians’ media 
consumption practices. Rather, it was a general debate about the media market in 
Palestine. The dynamic in groups interviews and the influence of group members on each 
other, would have damaged the validity of the research. Mutual influence also raises 
issues of reliability. In one-to-one interviews it is always an issue as to whether the same 
interviewee would have given the same response on a second occasion. "Group 
discussions twist and turn, so it must be the case that what anyone says is closely 
determined by the state of the group at the moment when they say it (Gomm, 2008:227)". 
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My aim was to learn about individual practices and not about collective ones, I therefore 
decided to interview each member of the group individually, and continued to use this 
method throughout the whole period of my field work. I did not use any of the focus 
group material in the thesis. 
 
The choice to use interviews as a research method, as Kvale says, involves a challenge to 
renew, broaden and enrich the conceptions of knowledge and research in the social 
sciences (Kvale, 1996:10). The consumption of news online is an individual practice. In 
contrast, in Palestine, television is the dominant medium and its consumption is 
collectivist – family members watch television together at home, and television 
viewership is also common in cafés and public places. The research method of individual 
interviews thus fits my research objectives: to learn about individual practices. It is true 
that the internet has contributed to the formation of Palestinian (as well as, Arab and 
other) social networks, but the preferences of the audience in regard to media content, are 
individual preferences. The researcher has to be aware too of the problem of power 
relations that might arise when using the interview research method (Brinkman & Kvale, 
2005:170). To put it differently, the purpose of the interview is to contribute to 
knowledge and this can be achieved by the researcher’s clear understanding of the 
participants’ responses. The open-ended nature of the interview is very important for the 
participants. The interview should not be imposed on the participants, but rather the 
researcher must let them express their feelings. In the dialogue between the researcher 
and the participants, the researcher’s role is to listen to the participants’ responses as he 
verifies that what he has heard correlates with the meaning of the participants. I relate to 
the definition of ‘meaning’ according to the mind-reading approach – ‘what people say is: 
evidence of what people think, feel, experience, how they make sense of and interpret the 
world’ (Gomm, 2008: 9). There is otherwise the risk of using this method:  introducing 
interpretation instead of actual meaning. The construction of meaning and production of 
knowledge would thus lack the scientific nature needed for any research.   
 
The setting of the interviews was the natural environment of the interviewees, except for 
one interview, which I conducted in my home.  Interview places were as follows: 
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working place (17 participants), Palestinian social events and conferences (20 
participants), local restaurants (12 participants) and 2 interviews that took place in the 
participants’ homes. The fact that most of the interviews took place in the familiar setting 
of the household of the informants and around their normal activities could afford the 
researcher fodder for casual observations, an approach that emphasises the social 
character of media appropriation (Silverstone, Hirsh & Morley, 1991). According to 
Harrowing: 
 
 "Qualitative research is usually conducted in a natural setting and analysis is 
inductive, with the researcher paying particular attention to discourse and 
behavior of participants (Harrowing, 2010: 242)". 
 
The location of the interviews has helped me to put the interviews in context. I saw my 
participants in their natural environment, as a result I learnt about the participants’ daily 
life, links with Palestine, political outlook, economic and social status and level of 
integration in the host country, the U.K. I refer here to 2 interviewees in order to support 
my argument: 40 years old. Mahmoud lives in Exeter with his wife and 4 children. They 
emigrated to the U.K. from Gaza as Mahmoud received a scholarship for Ph.D. studies. 
They cannot travel back to Gaza because of the curfew. The family had lived in Exeter 
for 3 years at the time of the interview. Mahmoud works as a lecturer and as a private 
tutor for Arabic, to support his family. He is a religious man. His political affiliation is to 
the Hamas party. His clothing is modest and his appearance is not Westernised. The 
initial meeting with Mahmoud and the interview with him, took place on 6th June, 2008. 
We were sitting in a quiet area at the university, outside the office he shares with a 
colleague. After the completion of the interview, Mahmoud invited me to enter his office. 
The Israeli occupation is a dominant issue in Mahmoud’s life. In his university office 
hang posters against the occupation and a poster for the memorial of Rachel Corry, with 
the title ‘Shaida’ – a martyr (Rachel Corry was an American peace activist who died by 
IDF bulldozer during the second Intifada, in the Gaza Strip). Through being at his office, 
I realised that Palestine’s politics are an issue that dominates his daily life. Indeed, 
Mahmoud is involved in many political activities. This explains Mahmoud’s need for 
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updated news and his practice of reading news online, everyday, on a variety of websites: 
Palestinian, Israeli and U.K. news websites. 
 
Another example that proves the importance of the interview’s actual location, is, the 
interviews I conducted in a Palestinian family restaurant. I arrived at the restaurant on a 
rainy, cold evening. The location was not in a central place, and the restaurant is small. 
Later, Mohammed, the family member who invited me, explained to me that their main 
job is catering for functions and they want to have a bigger restaurant. The family home 
is in the same building as the restaurant: Mohammed, his wife and two children, his 
brother and parents, live on the floor above the restaurant. Maybe this is also the reason 
why having a bigger restaurant is still a dream – if they invest in a new restaurant, they 
will also have to find a new home for the family. Mohammed was late for our meeting. 
He asked the waiter, Ahmed, to host me. Ahmed served me nice Palestinian food. I knew 
that I should not pressure Ahmed to be interviewed, or to introduce me to the family, but 
rather I should eat first, and wait for Mohammed. Indeed, this was the case. Ahmed was 
very generous, but as for talking about my research, he suggested waiting until 
Mohammed came. I spent 3 hours in the restaurant and conducted 4 interviews: with 
Mohammed, his wife, his brother and the waiter. I also met Mohammed and Sam’s 
parents. The interior design of the restaurant is traditionally Palestinian: furniture, 
decorations, ornaments and Gaza pictures. The family lives a traditional way of life – the 
parents and their children live together,  as is common in ‘collectivist cultures’ (Triandis 
in Brislin, 1990: 40), and they actually preserve the way of life of Gaza, as well as, 
keeping the hierarchical family members roles, since ‘collectivists’ emphasise hierarchy 
(Triandis in Brislin, 1990: 41). The women cook, the men manage the business. The 
family sells Palestinian food for a living, mostly for Palestinian functions and customers, 
and actually ‘live and dream’ Gaza through the decoration of their restaurant and house. 
These factors indicate the centrality of Gaza and the life they left behind in their daily life 
in the diaspora. The two brothers obtained their higher education degrees in the U.K. 
They follow international news and use international and U.K. news websites, but 
Palestine’s news is most important for them, as their daily life proves.    
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My research question is: How do Palestinians in the U.K. use the media/a in their daily 
life and to what extent does the internet impact on their news consumption. The 
interviews were semi structured. I asked my participants a set of questions, and I also 
conducted informal talks, to learn about their views and about media in the Arab world in 
general, and in Palestine, in particular.  
 
The Interview Setup 
I started my field work using personal contacts to find the first interviewees. Later, I 
found participants using the snowballing method – receiving contacts from my 
interviewees, I was also looking for new contacts during the whole period of the field 
work. There were cases when my informants introduced me to their friends, and I decided 
not to include them, but to look for new contacts. My aim was to find a group that was 
representative of the Palestinian community. To put it differently, as I explained above, 
the participants include members of the Palestinian community who belong to different 
socio-economic groups: students, professionals and unprofessional workers. I did not 
focus on one group or another, but rather interviewed participants from each group. There 
is also not a big gap between the numbers of participants in each group. I chose not to 
interview more than a few participants who are part of the same group of friends/ 
colleagues/acquaintances. The reason is dual: first, by avoiding doing so, I obtained 
interviews with a wide spectrum of Palestinians, from different backgrounds. Secondly, I 
have avoided the influence of the group on the individual, which helped me to receive 
diverse views.   
 
In order to include a wide spectrum of the Palestinian community, I did not concentrate 
on one location, but rather travelled all over England to conduct the interviews. I also 
conducted interviews with heterogeneous individuals. For example, in the Rusholme area 
of Manchester, there is a concentration of restaurants that are managed by Arab people. I 
met there Palestinian restaurant workers and diners. In Cambridge, I interviewed 
Palestinian students and professionals. The research thus includes participants from 
different economic and social backgrounds.  
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While doing the field work, I went to Palestinian events and in some cases met the same 
people I had already interviewed. I became familiar with community members, and they 
used to see me from time to time at different events. I became not only an observer, but 
also a participant, as I was taking part in activities, for example, leading a discussion on 
the Palestinian media at a gathering of Palestinian organisations. 
  
I also participated in meals at different occasions - a very important thing in Arab culture. 
In addition to the interviews with 52 participants, I discussed my questions with 
Palestinians who were not concluded in the research for a variety of reasons: either they 
were not using the internet at all, they did not want to participate, or because Palestinians 
I talked with could not complete the interview because of lack of time. I also spoke with 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who were visiting the U.K, and who were not 
included in my research, as they do not belong to the Palestinian diasporic community.  
 
Research Questions 
I asked the participants two sets of questions: the first set included personal questions, 
and the second set included questions that refer to the Palestinians’ media consumption 
practices. The duration of each interview was a few hours. I learned to know the 
participants by asking them personal questions.  We also could not avoid political 
discussions. The first set of questions I posed to the participants: full name, place of 
origin, current residency (in the U.K.), number of years in the U.K., reason for leaving 
the place of origin, profession/occupation, age, marital status and political affiliation. My 
aim in asking these questions was dual: first, to build a friendly relationship with the 
participants. Secondly, to understand their media usage habits in a comprehensive way. 
Some researchers argue that developing friendships with the participants is for the benefit 
of the research. Others argue the opposite. I suggest that the researcher should find a 
balance between the two approaches. Andersen, for example, argues that the relationship 
that the interviewer wants to make is a befriending one, on the assumption that people are 
more likely to disclose themselves authentically to friends (Andersen, 1993). In contrast 
to Andersen, Grumet claims that friends may be the last people someone will disclose 
intimacies to (Grumet, 1991:69). In the case of this research, I believe that the personal 
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questions were an important part of the interviews, for me as a researcher, as well as for 
the participants. For me, it was beneficial because I could analyse my data through 
looking for correlations, for example, the link between occupation/profession and the 
language the participants are using to read/watch news. From the participants’ 
perspective it was natural to discuss their personal stories, as this is normal in the Arab 
culture, particularly when talking about the Palestinians in the context of their historic 
narrative. Even more so, they were happy to tell me their personal stories and also felt 
more comfortable in asking me personal questions, which I answered. Rosmer describes a 
similar interviewing experience: "in the interview situation my status as an outsider was 
an advantage, as most interviewees were eager to explain their reality to me (Rosmer, 
2010: 133)." As I said earlier, on one hand, the researcher should not be distanced from 
his interviewees. On the other, the friendly relationship has the goal: of building a good 
‘interview environment’, including the ability of the researcher to approach the 
participants repeatedly if he needs to do so. This does not mean that the researcher and 
the participants have to be friends beyond the context of the interviews. The second set of 
questions was related to the media consumption practices of the participants. I started by 
asking the general question: which medium do you use the most for news consumption? I 
then asked the following specific open questions (the participants answered each question 
in detail):   
  
1. The reasons for using a specific medium as a major medium 
2. Names of  Palestinian and other Arab websites being used for news consumption 
3. Names of Israeli Websites being used for news consumption 
4. Names of international and U.K. news websites being used 
5. TV news channel consumption practices  
6. Newspapers (hardcopies) being read 
7. Frequency of reading/watching News 
8. Level of interest in Palestine and U.K. News 
9. Medium being used at times of breaking news in Palestine/Israel. 
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The structure of ‘progressive focusing’ (Gomm, 2008: 287) - beginning with a broad 
question, followed by specific questions, is often used in qualitative research. This 
research method allows participants to reflect and to engage with the questions. When I 
asked personal questions, I allowed participants to answer the questions they felt 
comfortable with, to disclose the information they wanted to disclose. I did not put 
pressure on them, for example, to disclose their political affiliation. However, the result 
was that the participants co-operated with me and their insight contributed to rich data 
and detailed background information. "The advantages of the interviews are the ability of 
the researcher to find out about the participants’ ideas, thoughts, opinions, attitudes and 
motivations (Berger, 2000: 113)". I recorded 4 interviews, including one with the 
Palestinian Ambassador to the U.K. and one with the Director of the Institute of Islamic 
Political Thought (IIPT). In most cases, however, I wrote down the participants’ 
responses to my questions, as well as relevant details about what was said informally and 
I did not record the interviews. The participants felt comfortable with the method of 
writing, and they felt free to speak to me, as the interviews were not recorded. Berger 
points to recording as one of the interview’s advantages (Berger, 2000: 165). In my 
research, I did not use this advantage (as Berger suggests) to its full extent. Having said 
this, the performance of participants was better when I did not record and they talked 
more openly. The recorded interviews did not yield different information than the 
unrecorded interviews, but the flow of the interviews without a recorder was better.   
 
Individual Interviews 
I conducted 52 interviews with Palestinians who reside in the U.K., who come from 
different socio-economic backgrounds, and different political positions, as follows:   
 
The Palestinians in Exeter 
I started my field work in Exeter. My initial plan was to conduct focus group interviews. 
Almost a year before I started my field work, in July, 2007, I met my first participant at 
the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) conference, at Oxford 
University. I presented at the conference. One of the main reasons I chose to participate 
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in conferences with the theme of Muslims and the media, apart from learning about the 
topic, was to meet Palestinians.   
 
Indeed, I met the first respondent. A 40 year old man who lives in Exeter with his wife 
and 4 children. They emigrated to the U.K. from Gaza, as the family's father received a 
scholarship for PhD studies. They cannot travel back to Gaza because of the curfew. The 
family had lived in Exeter for 3 years at the time of the interview. We spoke a few words 
in Arabic and in Hebrew. The respondent has links with Israel, as he worked in 
construction in Israel, before the first Intifada broke out. The interview was conducted in 
English.  
 
He works as a lecturer at Exeter University and as a private tutor for Arabic, to support 
his family. In Gaza, he worked as a lecturer at the Islamic University. He is a religious 
man whose political affiliation is Hamas party. His clothing is modest and his appearance 
is not Westernized.  
 
I talked to the first respondent about my field work and he said that he would assist me in 
finding participants. Almost a year later, I called him and asked to put me in contact with 
his fellow Palestinians. I received his agreement, but he was worried about the reactions 
of his friends. In the end, he suggested acting as a mediator. He would organise groups, 
the meeting places, the dates and the times. He invited me to meet him at the university in 
Exeter to discuss my research and the interview plan, before I met the other participants.  
 
Professor A.: few days before I met my interviewee at Exeter University, I had a meeting 
with Professor A. I obtained his contact through my friend Fatmah (we studied Arabic 
together for a few years). Fatmah is the Professor's Assistant. I did not include Professor 
A. in my research, because he does not use the internet for news consumption. I did not 
speak with him prior to the interview, because my aim was to learn how he uses the 
media for news at a meeting, and not over the phone, or in an email.  
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Even though I did not include Professor A. in my research, it is interesting to compare 
him and my first respondent in relation to their news consumption practices.  
 
Professor A., 60, belongs to the upper middle class. He has a profitable job and he lives a 
comfortable life. Unlike the first respondent and his Palestinian colleagues, he has no 
restrictions on travel. He has an Israeli passport and an Israeli identity card.  
 
What links the interviewee from Exeter and Professor A. are their historical roots and the 
‘Nakba’ event. They both speak about their family’s displacement with frustration: the 
first interviewee’s family is from Beit Daras, which is a Jewish village today. Professor 
A. talks with nostalgia about his roots: ‘my family had land in Jaffa and in Qesaria…’   
 
The additional interviews conducted in Exeter: 
The second respondent is an intellectual, opinionated woman. She is religious -wears the 
veil, but her appearance is not of a traditional Muslim woman. She is 37, married with 2 
children, aged 12 years and 5 weeks old. Her place of origin is Gaza. She works as a 
lecturer at Exeter University and as a freelance journalist: she is a fixer in Gaza for The 
Guardian newspaper and writes for the Los Angeles Times. She also works for a 
Palestinian human rights organisations in London. 
 
She compares Gaza, a place she describes as ‘hell’, to Israel: ‘paradise’. She talks with 
pathos on the loss of her parents’ house in Han Yunes. She also has a blog where she 
talks about this issue, as well as writing articles about her personal ‘trauma’, for 
international newspapers. Her husband participated in the research, as well. He is a 55 
year old engineer. Both of them are supporters of the Hamas party.  
 
The 48 year old fourth respondent emigrated from Rafah to the U.K. for PhD studies. His 
wife and 8 children stayed in Rafah. The 23 year old fifth respondent left Gaza for 
studies. He belongs to the ‘internet generation’. He reads Al Jazeera Arabic news on his 
mobile and watches Al Jazeera Arabic in the Internet. He does not have access to Satellite 
TV.  
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 The 33 year old sixth respondent, left Gaza for study purposes.  
 
I met respondents seven and eight, a mother (35) and her son (17) on the evening follows 
the meeting with the group, at the same restaurant. The 17 years old son emigrated from 
Gaza to the U.K. for studies, with his mother and 3 siblings. The mother is a housewife. 
She does not speak English well. I conducted the interview with her in Arabic.  
 
The Interviews at the School of Oriental Studies (SOAS) 
At SOAS I expected to find participants, as this school is well known as a home for 
Muslim events and gatherings, a few of which I attended, as described in this chapter.    
The first respondent at SOAS is a 26 year old PhD student at SOAS. He moved from 
Gaza to the U.K., and has lived in London for 5 years. The second respondent was the 
Head of the Palestinian Society at SOAS at the time of the interview, but he is not a 
student. He is very knowledgeable, particularly relating to Middle Eastern topics. He is 
36, married with one child and has lived in the U.K. for 12 years.  
 
Working Class Palestinians in Golders Green 
Golders Green, London, is well known for its flourishing orthodox Jewish community. 
The main street has a variety of kosher bakeries and restaurants. At one of these bakeries 
I met M., who works there. He is 36 years old and has lived in the U.K. for 7 years. He 
did not agree to provide personal information and thus did not disclose his place of 
origin. While we were conducting the interview, drinking coffee in a coffee shop, next to 
the bakery where M. works, he called his friend, who also agreed to participate.  
B. was also discreet as to his identity. He agreed to say that he works with Arab countries 
and his age – 36. Like his friend, he also emigrated for economic reasons.  
 
Leeds – First and Second Generation 
I travelled to Leeds to interview Professor R. and his 21 year old daughter, L. The 
daughter was born in the U.K. and grew up in Leeds. She is a student.  
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The daughter's ties with Palestine, her interaction with the Arabic language and 
Palestinian history, are weaker than those of her father.   
 
Interviews with Political Activists 
I define political activists as individuals who actively participate in political campaigns. I 
interviewed the following political activists: A. (detailed interview in Manchester 
Palestinian Community section), Dr. T. (Islam Expo section), M. (Islam Expo section) 
and R. (The Palestinian Return Centre section).  
 
During my field work, apart from formal interviews, I was also in contact with political 
activists from the following bodies: Zaytoun – a company whose aim is to support 
Palestinian farming, The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions U.K. (ICAHD), 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Interpal, Amos Trust, Palestinian General Delegation to 
the UK, Watford Friends of Salfeet - Palestine, Friends of Sabeel - UK, Friends of Al 
Aqsa – Leicester, SOAS Palestine Society, Stop the War Coalition, Holy Land Trust 
(based in Bethlehem), the chair of Midlands Palestinian Community Association – with 
whom I was in contact, and I was also included on his distribution list – to be  informed 
about Palestinian events in the U.K., and the communications manager of ’iF’ charity, 
whom I was in contact with and through whom I was included on the ’iF’ distribution list.  
 
The fact that I have been in constant contact with Palestinian organizations, mentioned 
above, and received emails regularly, allowed me to know the people who lead the 
Palestinian community in the U.K., as well as to meet the normal Palestinian people who 
are part of the diasporic community. In addition, I could follow the issues on the political 
and social agenda, and be updated on events and conferences daily.   
 
E. is a political activist and student who was born to a Palestinian father and a British 
mother. She was born in Beit Hanina and emigrated to the U.K. for studies. E. acts for the 
Palestinian cause, and speaks at the events of the Israeli Committee against House 
Demolitions, U.K. This group campaigns for Palestinian rights in Gaza and the West 
Bank. 
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E. introduced me to her friends: A woman emigrated from Gaza for studies, and a 26 year 
old man, emigrated from the Al Fara refugee camp, in Jenin District. He is engaged.  
 
Interviews with Journalists – Arab Media Watch and Al-Quds Al- Arabi 
Arab Media Watch is an organisation that was established ‘For Objective British 
Coverage of Arab issues’, as its website states. The respondents were the Chairman (and 
co-founder) of Arab Media Watch, his profession and occupation is journalism, and the 
chairman's mother who works with him at the organisation. They live in the same house. 
 
The young journalist invited me to their home. The house is located in central London. 
Though the location of the house is not in a Muslim dominated area, the interior design is 
traditionally Palestinian: furniture, decorations, ornaments, the coffee set and coffee table 
and pictures of his late father and other family members. ‘We collected the furniture from 
different places around the world, not from one place’, explains his mother. 
 
The son was very friendly and co-operative. In contrast, his mother was not so pleased at 
the beginning of our meeting due to the fact that I am an Israeli. Or maybe, she was 
surprised that I am an Israeli (for the same reasons I came across during my field work: 
why is an Israeli research the Palestinian diaspora?).  However, after a short conversation 
in which we learned a bit about each other, she was happy to help.  
 
The son is 30 years old; he arrived in the U.K. with his parents as a child, at age 4. He 
was brought up in the U.K. His dress code is Westernized. His mother tongue is English. 
He is very confident and intelligent. His life is surrounded by Palestinianess and 
Palestine. His mother is a 66 year old lawyer who talks proudly about the career she 
developed and the international roles she carried out. In 2000, she joined her son as 
Director of the new organisation - Arab Media Watch. She has lived in the U.K. for 26 
years. 
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I went to the office of the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi, in London, to meet the managing 
editor, a 52 year old woman, married with one child, she has lived in London for 20 
years. Her home town is Nablus.  
 
Palestinian General Delegation to the UK 
I met Professor Hassassian, the Palestinian Ambassador to the U.K., in September, 2008, 
at ‘The Disappearance of the Holy Land’ Conference, in London. He carried the audience 
in his speech. I introduced myself and asked to interview him. The meeting was 
scheduled for few days later. The embassy is located in Hammersmith. I was called to 
Professor Hassassian office, which is wide and nice. That being said, the conditions of the 
interview were not ideal. The ambassador was busy, and there were disturbing noises in 
the office. However, I was a guest in his office and he respected this fact, as is the 
accepted behavior in Arab culture. He introduced me to his colleagues, whom I 
interviewed. 
 
Rana is a Press Officer at the Palestinian General Delegation to the UK. She emigrated 
from Ramallah to the U.K. for personal reasons: marriage. She has lived in the U.K. for 5 
years. 
 
Meisoon - Political Councillor at the Palestinian General Delegation to the U.K.; has 
lived in the U.K. for 20 years. She is 42, an independent single woman. She has close 
links with her family in Gaza.  
 
The Palestinian Return Centre 
I arrived at the Palestinians Return Centre in London, for a scheduled meeting with one 
of its main figures. He was not there. The team welcomed me. Following a discussion on 
who should speak with me, it was decided that it would be a woman activist. At our 
meeting, she told me that the decision was made due to the fact that she is a woman. The 
men did not want to be interviewed. We left the office for a coffee shop, across the street. 
The meeting lasted more than two hours. It was important for her to tell me things beyond 
my specific research questions. She talked about Nablus – her home town, her fears as a 
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Palestinian and about her identity. She has resided in the U.K. for 30 years. Her 
profession is Social Psychologist. She works as a Human Rights Campaigner and for the 
Palestinian Return Centre. 
 
Islam Expo 
I met N. at a Palestinian stall in Islam Expo, where she was selling. Her roots are in 
Hebron. She immigrated into the U.K. from Jordan 40 years ago (at the time of the 
interview). She is 47 years old, a housewife, married with children. N. was busy selling 
on the toy stall when I approached her. We agreed that I would return to meet her in her 
lunch break. 36 years old N. place of origin is Jenine. Currently, she lives in Sheffield 
with her husband and 4 children. She has lived in the U.K. 15 years.  
 
S. works as a freelance cameraman. He was busy working in the Alhiwar TV booth at 
Islam Expo, when I met him. He is 33 years old, and has lived in the U.K. for 10 years. 
He emigrated from Tiberia, because his family has resided in the U.K. since the 1970s. 
His marital status is separated.  
 
I approached M. at the booth of the Palestinian charity ‘Interpal’, where she was working. 
She was born in the UK, to a family of immigrants from Gaza. She is a 26 year old 
teacher for children with special needs. M. is religious and wears a veil. 
 
Dr. T is a leader of the Palestinian community. He is well known and the people at Islam 
Expo welcomed him. When I approached him, he was providing signatures at the launch 
of his new book. He also delivered a talk at the event. He is a regular commentator on 
Palestinian issues on mainstream British media news programmes, like BBC Television.  
 
He emigrated from Gaza for economic reasons, and has lived in the U.K. for 16 years. At 
the time of the interview, he was 60 year old. He is the Director of the Institute of Islamic 
Political Thought (IIPT), London, a Political Activist and an Author. 
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The Annual Palestinian Cultural Festival, London 
I left Islam Expo, in the evening, heading to the Annual Palestinian Cultural Festival. I 
met H., Leader of the Community, with whom I had previously been in contact. He 
hosted me – offered me the opportunity to participate at the dinner, and helped me to gain 
access by asking few of the festival participants to speak to me. Once one of the 
participants at the event spoke with me, the others followed suit. I was standing outside 
the main room, in which the event took place, and interviewed 5 participants:   
 
B. immigrated into the U.K. for economic reasons. He works as a legal consultant.  
S. immigrated into the U.K. from Tul Karem for economic reasons; he has lived in the 
U.K. for 9 years. He is a supermarket worker; married with children. 24 years old, S. 
emigrated from East Jerusalem for studies. O., 24, has lived in Exeter for 6 years. He left 
Ramallah for studies. O. is the Head of the Palestinian Society at the University of 
Exeter.  
 
M. attended the event with his 12 year old son. He is a cardiologist and works as a 
consultant for the National Health Service. He immigrated into the U.K. from Tul Karem 
in the ‘80s (he has resided in the U.K. for 28 years), for economic reasons.  
 
Interviews at the Palestinian Restaurant – Maramia 
Maramia is the only Palestinian restaurant and catering company in London (according to 
the family who own the restaurant. I did not find another Palestinian restaurant). I met the 
family providing catering services at different Palestinian events I attended. 
 
The first time I met M., was at the ‘Disappearance of the Holy Land’ Conference, in 
London. He served the food at the conference. He invited me to conduct an interview 
with him at his family restaurant. A month later I met him. 
 
I arrived at the family restaurant on a cold, rainy evening. The location was not in a 
central place, and the restaurant is small. Later, M. explained to me that their main job is 
catering for functions and they want to have a bigger restaurant. The family home is in 
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the same building as the restaurant: M., his wife and two children, his brother and parents 
live on the floor above the restaurant. Maybe this is also the reason why having a bigger 
restaurant is still a dream – if they invest in a new restaurant, they will also have to find a 
new home for the family.  
 
M. is 30 years old, married with two children. He works at the family restaurant and in a 
hotel. When I spoke to M. prior to our interview, to learn more about him, I discovered 
that he is the brother of H. whom I mentioned earlier, in the section, Annual Palestinian 
Cultural Festival, London. M. felt very comfortable to speak with me, after I told him that 
his brother helped me to obtain access to the Annual Palestinian Festival. 
 
A., 23 works as a cook and waiter at the restaurant. He left Gaza for economic reasons: 
‘to support my family in Gaza.’ R. is 25 year old. She is a housewife and helps M.’s 
mother cooking for the restaurant. She left Gaza for marriage, since her husband already 
lived in the U.K. when they met. S. is a 28 year old student. He is a Former U.N. worker 
in Gaza. 
 
The Palestinian Weekend at SOAS 
S. 24, married, left Ramallah and resides in Birmingham. He studies English to gain 
access to higher education. M. immigrated into the U.K. from Hebron; studies IT.  
S. is a 27 year old student. His place of origin is Hebron. N., 23, works as a computer 
supervisor.  
 
The Palestinians in Cambridge 
I interviewed two participants who live in Cambridge. I interviewed the first one in 
Cambridge, and the second one in London, when he was on a visit. P. agreed to be 
interviewed on condition of confidentiality.  He is a professional worker and the fiancé of 
an American colleague of mine, who works as a researcher at Cambridge University.  
M. is a 28 year old PhD student at Cambridge University. 
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Manchester Palestinian Community 
I contacted the Palestine Solidarity Campaign office and asked for Palestinian contacts. A 
few days later, I received an email from A. A. wrote that he is a Palestinian who lives in 
Manchester and he would be happy to meet me on one of his visits to London, during a 
weekend.  He also wrote that he would be happy to provide me with contacts with other 
Palestinians. I was more than happy to receive his email. However, following the 
interview and A.'s willingness to help further, he disappeared.   
 
Our interview took place on July 11, 2008, Friday evening. A. stayed at his Turkish 
friend house in London and asked me if it was fine by me to bring him along. The plan 
was to meet at the train station in the area in which I live and to go to a restaurant.  We 
went inside two restaurants, but the noise did not allow us to conduct an interview.  I had 
to choose between giving up on the interview, or inviting A. and his friend to my house – 
a possibility that I was trying to avoid, because I felt that my participants would not feel 
comfortable to be guests in an Israeli home. My husband and child - almost 2 year old at 
the time, were at home.  We brought food from the restaurant, and I was host to A. and 
his friend. The obstacle was that my husband and I speak Hebrew with our child, and it 
was difficult to avoid it. I let A. approach my kid in Arabic and I did the same, as there 
are a few similar words. The length of the interview was a few hours. He explained to me 
about the Palestinian media and the increased use of Palestinian blogs.  
 
At the end of the interview, A. invited me to Manchester to meet and interview his 
Palestinian friends there. Two months after our meeting in London, I was invited to speak 
at a conference at Manchester University. I called A., he asked me to call him on my 
arrival. He invited me to a gathering of the Palestinian community in Manchester, 
organised by the Stop the War Coalition campaigners. The hall was crowded and the 
participants were preparing for a big rally that was scheduled for the following weekend. 
The speakers talked about the occupation and about the needs of their Palestinian brothers 
in Palestine. There was a collection of donations for this cause. The duration of the 
gathering was 2 hours, during which I was listening and looking around.  When the event 
finished, A. told me that his Palestinian friends did not come to the event.  He added that 
 133
he could try to organise a meeting on the following day. But, I could not reach him over 
the phone and he did not reply to my messages. I decided to leave it as it was. 
 
At the conference at Manchester University, I met Dr. M who works at the university. M. 
is 37 year old. He emigrated from Jenin and had lived in the U.K. for 11 years at the time 
of the interview, with his wife and 3 children.  He invited me to his office using the well-
known Arab hospitality manners. As had happened at previous interviews I conducted, 
the atmosphere at the meeting was good. I felt comfortable because I am familiar with 
the Arab culture. I told him that I can speak his language – Arabic, and I did briefly. He 
told me that he can speak my language – Hebrew, as his father was a Hebrew teacher. He 
spoke with me a few words in Hebrew. I am familiar with his culture and background – 
both of us are from the same region, or to put it in some of my participants’ words: ‘We 
are brothers (Arabs and Jews) after all, descendants of Abraham’s sons….’  
 
However, there is one definite thing that we do not share and this is the language. 
Though, both languages are Semitic and have some similarities, they are totally different. 
I felt uncomfortable to speak to him in Arabic, and especially in Hebrew. The only 
language I felt comfortable to speak is a neutral language - English. I felt that if I spoke in 
Hebrew I would immediately create a distance between us. The language might 
emphasise the occupier- occupied relationships and the dominance of the first over the 
second. 
 
Following our interview, the respondent called friends in Manchester to ask whether they 
could meet me. Since it was the month of Ramadan, he did not manage to find, among 
his friends, Palestinians who agreed to be interviewed. He advised me to try finding 
participants in the Rusholme area and gave me names of a few restaurants in which he 
assumed Palestinians worked. I went to Rusholme in Manchester, which is well known 
as a gathering area for the Muslim community. Besides different Middle Eastern 
restaurants, there are also Muslim book shops and salons. I walked along Rusholme 
Main Street looking for Palestinian workers and diners.  
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I went inside one of the restaurants that I had been told earlier was a Palestinian 
restaurant. The interior design of the restaurant and shops included Palestinian ornaments 
from ‘home’. Folklore music was playing in the background.  The workers offered me 
food and I was sitting and eating for a long time before they started talking to me. As I 
am aware of the Arab culture, I ate my food slowly and the workers waited with patience. 
They could not join me, as is usual, since it was the month of Ramadan and they were 
fasting.  
 
Once I finished eating, one of the workers joined me and I explained about my research. I 
could not include the worker in my research because he does not use the internet, 
likewise the workers in the other restaurants. I interviewed a diner at the restaurant, who 
asked to remain anonymous. He is a single man who left Gaza for studies and lives in 
Manchester.  
 
I went outside the restaurant and the Palestinian restaurant worker was sitting with 
Mahmud, a 60 year old Palestinian merchant from Nablus.   
 
I spoke with Mahmud about the media he uses in Palestine, but I did not include him in 
my research since he does not live in the diaspora. Surprisingly, he talked about his home 
in Nablus with nostalgia, unlike the young Palestinian participants, who did not reflect in 
their memories in such an emotional way as the merchant: 
  
‘There is no substitute to the fresh air in Nablus. I sit in my house in the evening   
with drinks and my family (wife, children, and grandchildren) and this is the real 
joy.’ 
 
Interviews with Young Academics 
I met a young scholar at the University of Westminster, where he is undertaking his PhD 
research. He is 31, emigrated from Gaza to London; is married and has 2 children. 
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I. is a visiting lecturer at City University in London. He emigrated to the U.K. from 
Gaza.  
 
Interviews at the London School of Economics (LSE) 
In September, 2008, I was Chair, at a BRISMES conference at LSE, of the panel: Media 
and Communications in Middle Eastern Culture and Politics. I met 2 of my participants 
at the conference: Anonymous - his family is from Ramallah and Nablus. He was born in 
the U.K. and lives in Kent. He is a 28 year old lawyer and is married. 28 years old, N. 
emigrated from Beit Lehem. She lives in London with her husband and works as a 
Development Worker at a U.K. charity.  
 
Observation 
My field work included participation at major Palestinian events as follows: 
 
1. Islam Expo, Olympia London, July, 2008 - a yearly social event for the Muslim 
community. The event takes place in a big hall that includes many stalls, among 
them stalls for Palestinian food products and Palestinian charities. The visitors to 
Islam Expo are families, as the fair attracts children. Another activity in Islam 
Expo is lectures provided by prominent Muslim academics and Journalists. The 
lectures take place in conference rooms. The participants are professionals, both 
Muslim and non-Muslim. There was also a Media Centre. Islam Expo is a 4 day 
event.  
2. The Annual Palestinian Cultural Festival, London, July, 2008 – this event is not a     
publicized event like Islam Expo. The programme included a talk delivered by the 
Chairman of the Association of the Palestinian Community in the UK, followed by 
dinner and folklore music. Whereas in Islam Expo event, I met Hamas supporters 
according to what they told me at this gathering, I met mainly Palestinians who 
support the Fatah party. The participants were a mixture of the Palestinian 
community: doctors, students, blue collar workers and others. 
3. Stop the War Coalition gathering, Manchester, September, 2008 - following the 
talks delivered by Palestinian and non-Palestinian campaigners, there was a 
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collection of donations for Palestine. The organiser announced a rally for Palestine 
and asked the audience to take part and to contribute to the preparations. 
4. The Disappearance of the Holy Land Conference, London, September 2008 ‘a 
conference addressing the crisis of the diminishing Christian presence in the Holy 
Land’ (the conference leaflet). The conference took place in a church in central 
London. It was organised by the Amos Trust – a non-Muslim charity for Palestine. 
The supporters of the events were different charities and organisations, such as – 
Friends of Sabeel U.K., Gloucestershire. 
5. Organisations for Palestine, event at SOAS, November 2008 –Watford friends of 
Palestine and other bodies gathered to discuss Palestinian problems. At the event, 
attended by senior editors from Palestine, who discussed with the audience the 
mobilisation of the Palestinian media.  
6. Palestinian weekend at the School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),     
      November, 2008, this event was organised by SOAS’s Palestine Society. It   
      included talks, delivered by the Israeli Journalist, Gideon Levy of the newspaper  
     Haaretz, Samia al-Botmeh of Bir Zeit University, and Professor Ilan Pappe, Exeter   
    University.  There were also photo exhibitions, folklore, Palestinian dabke  
    workshops for adults and children and film screening of Chronicles of a Refugee   
     and a fair trade sale. 
7. SOAS Palestine Society talk, December, 2008 – ‘The Israeli Occupation’ by  
Gideon Levy, Haaretz and Karma Nabulsi, Oxford University. 
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By observing Palestinian community events, in Britain, I was able to conduct, and later, 
analyse my interviews in context, by seeing the participants’ actions and their present 
concerns. In addition, I met Palestinians who became participants in the research. From 
the observation, I learned about the following major issues, which are relevant to my 
research questions and aims: Firstly, Palestine problems and Palestinian politics are 
issues that dominate the lives of Palestinians, regardless of their socio-economic status, 
age and gender. Following formal and informal talks with Palestinians, I gathered that the 
interest of the Palestinians in news and in politics is significantly high. In a comparative 
study, Triandis found that in less complex cultures people care very much about religion 
and politics (Triandis in Brislin, 1990: 38). For the Palestinians, news and politics are 
their life – they have left a conflict zone. Their families and friends are still there. For 
them the need for updated news from Palestine is thus crucial. Unlike migrants from 
Western countries, their use of websites is mostly for news and not for entertainment. As 
Lynch claims, in relation to the emergence of the new Arab public sphere: 
 
"The mere emergence of satellite television networks established the technical   
possibility of an Arab public sphere…but only when al-Jazeera refocused the  
satellites away from entertainment and toward politics… toward political argument 
about Arab issues defined by an Arab identity – did it become a public sphere (Lynch, 
2006: 33)." 
 
Secondly, The Palestinian community is a politically active community. Their activity 
includes the collection of donations for Palestine, demonstrations, events in which the 
Palestinians host established media figures and academics (Palestinians and Israelis) and 
social events that aim to raise awareness of Palestinian culture, economic initiatives and 
history. This effort is being exercised by using the internet as a major platform. 
 
Thirdly, the representation of the Palestinians in the media, not merely in the Arab and 
the Palestinian media is very important to them for political reasons. The Palestinians 
would like to disseminate, worldwide, their views about Israeli positioning and the 
current situation of people living in Palestine, by using the media. The news story of the 
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Palestinians is well televised – a film presented at one of the events I attended, for 
example, showed the story of one Palestinian family whose house was repeatedly 
demolished by Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Films like this, and others, have an 
emotional effect on audiences and are being broadcast on different platforms. 
 
Methodological Problems 
I came into the field with the curiosity to learn about the ‘Other’ and to write (document) 
the participants’ experiences in the most authentic way. It was the learner stance I 
adopted, when the interviewees are experts in a phenomenon in terms of their experience 
(Knapik, 2006: 88). I used the method of in-depth interviews (52) as my primary source, 
and documents and additional interviews as secondary sources. The main problem I 
expected, prior to the beginning of the field work, was access to the field. The reason for 
my worries was the fact that I am an Israeli and my informants are Palestinians. I was not 
sure whether they would agree to co-operate with an Israeli researcher, even though I am 
not involved in any political activities and the aim of my research is not to promote any 
political stance. 
 
Throughout the whole period of the field work the issue of my being Israeli was evident. 
In some interviews we talked about it and in others we did not. The participants who 
raised the issue of my Israeli identity were curious about my reasons for choosing to 
research their community. Some of them were interested in my personal background and 
we had personal conversations. As Brinkman and Kvale noted, intimate exchanges 
became widely accepted as the appropriate ideal style of interviewing for research 
(Brinkman and Kvale, 2005). In some cases, I introduced my husband and baby to the 
participants. It helped in two ways: firstly, in building a good atmosphere; secondly, in 
the Arab culture women are not as independent as men. When I interviewed religious 
men, for example, the fact that my husband and baby came with me to the meetings, 
encouraged the participants to speak with me. 
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According to Triandis: 
 
 "When people come into contact with individuals from other cultures, they 
observe differences in dress, customs, behavior patterns, language and more. Most 
people react to such differences ethnocentrically, they use their own ethnic group 
as the standard and judge others favorably if they are like in-group members and 
unfavorably if they are not (Triandis in Brislin, 1990: 34)".  
 
Since I knew in advance that problems of suspicion and hostility might arise, the 
participants and I had informal talks, in which my role was to listen to their feelings, 
arguments, political stance, and so on. We did not have political arguments, though, since 
I was listening without judgment and I did not attempt to change their feeling and views. 
Others saw me as the right person through whom to confront their feelings of loss and 
trauma, as a result of the Palestinians’ dispersal. As Gergen claims, "interviews became a 
site for persons to tell their stories to empathetic listeners (Gergen, 2001: 21)". 
  
Following the informal talks, I took the role of the interviewer and the participants took 
the roles of the interviewees. They co-operated with me fully and answered the questions 
I had prepared in detail. They also elaborated on the Palestinian media market and the 
Palestinians’ news consumption, when I asked for clarifications. To conclude, the point 
of the challenge I had because I am an Israeli, my fear of not being able to have access to 
the field, has turned out to be untrue. I was able to obtain 52 individual interviews, access 
to main Palestinian events and co-operation with my participants. I think that in 
observing the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians, more specifically the 
relationship between me and the participants in my research, one should see more than 
clashes of dominant and non-dominant cultures/oppressed groups or conflicts between 
traditional and modern representations. As an Israeli researcher, I feel that my culture is, 
in a way, close to the Arab culture, though, ‘Israel’ is influenced by Western culture, and, 
on a personal level, as an ‘Ashkenazi’ Israeli, I have been influenced by European culture 
practices.  However, the important point is that ‘Israelis and Palestinians are not cultural 
strangers but share an intimate acquaintance and mutual history that is nonetheless a 
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source of great controversy and mutual grievance’ (Cofman Wittes, 2005: 6). Similarly to 
the Palestinians, non-European Jews who were encouraged to immigrate into Israel after 
its establishment – like Yemenis, Turks, Algerians, Indians, etc., were also constructed as 
others. The culture and identity of Arab-Jews (Mizrahim) has been suppressed by the 
Zionist narrative, similarly to Palestinian identity and culture (Friedman, 2010: 25).    
 
According to Klieman, Israelis and Palestinian Arabs are neither distant nor total 
strangers. Klieman argues that: 
 
 "The two pre-Intifada decades, 1967-87, featured unprecedented cultural 
intermingling, with Israeli consumers regularly marketing in towns like Qalqiliya, 
while Palestinians strolled in the streets of Tel-Aviv… in contrast, recent years 
have witnessed the forced and defensive reconstruction of old psychological walls 
of fear…resulting in … and estrangement in both societies. Still, the fact remains 
that the earlier familiarities cannot be easily or totally eradicated (Klieman in 
Cofman Wittes, 2005: 82)."    
 
The problem remains in my ability to prove to my readers that this was the case and I 
hope that my research will be understood in the light of my approach to the research and 
to the participants.  I did not start my field work with pre assumptions and my aim was to 
learn and to contribute to knowledge. There is also the problem of using qualitative 
research methods, which are not statistically quantifiable in their nature, and the 
researcher has to present the data as ‘evidence’. However, ‘evidence’ is a negotiable 
term. For example, Mautner says, evidence is ‘that which provides a ground for a belief 
or a theory’ (Mautner, 1999: 184). Audi says that evidence is ‘information bearing on the 
truth or falsity of a proposition’ (Audi, 1999: 293). To answer this argument, I claim that 
my research findings are a result of ‘generalisation’ (Miller & Fredericks, 2003: 48) 
relating to repeated media usage practices, cutting across age, gender, occupation and 
socio-economic status. For example, one can look at the category of ‘level of interest in 
Palestine and U.K. news’. I found that most of the participants have more interest in 
Palestine’s news than in U.K. news, regardless of their length of stay in the U.K., age, 
 141
gender, occupation and social-economic status. My conclusion is therefore that, for the 
Palestinians in the diaspora, Palestine’s news is the most interesting news items. In the 
case that the results of the interviews had been different, for example, that only a few 
participants or not many participants, had more interest in Palestine’s news than in U.K. 
news, I obviously could not have arrived at the same conclusion. Or, if many participants 
who belong to the same age group, for example, had said that they had more interest in 
Palestine’s news, I could not write, relying on this data, a conclusion about the 
Palestinian diasporic community members in the U.K. The fact that most of the 
participants expressed the same feelings, regardless of their age, gender, occupation and 
socio-economic status, allowed the conclusions I drew. As a result, I can draw 
conclusions also, beyond media usage practices, on the implications for Palestinian 
national feelings, and say that the Palestinian identity is very important for the 
Palestinians in the diaspora. The link between the integrated and the less integrated 
groups of Palestinians in the diaspora is their traumatic experience of dispersal and their 
collective memory (Shiblak, 2005: 15). Furthermore, the interest in Palestine’s news also 
does not link to the medium being used. Even though young Palestinians mainly use the 
internet for news consumption more than once a day and older participants use mainly 
TV for news consumption, it is equally important for both groups to follow Palestine’s 
news as their first priority. In other words, the internet enables exposure to a variety of 
websites, including news stories and analysis, as well as contact with other users through 
the use of blogs, chat rooms, and so on. In contrast, for TV audiences, it is more difficult 
to find Palestine’s news, since even Arab broadcasters do not dedicate their news 
bulletins only to Palestine’s news. There is, though, a substantial difference between the 
two groups, in their ability to obtain information about Palestine, both groups have more 
interest in Palestine’s news than in the U.K. news. 
 
Another issue to be discussed are my considerations when choosing the language used for 
interviews. The participants and I speak different languages and belong to societies that 
have different ways of life: traditional vs. Westernized.  Nevertheless, I overcame this 
problem by conducting the interviews in English, and not in Arabic or Hebrew (in the 
few cases where the participants could speak Hebrew). Firstly, I would relate to the 
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problem of interviewing in Arabic. If I had conducted my interviews in the participants’ 
first language – Arabic, I believe that the process of coding and evaluating the interviews 
would have been problematic. The reason is that by using the Arabic language, native 
speakers tend to speak in a more emotional way, according to many participants. In other 
words, Arabic language speakers (mainly Muslims), often use religious idioms, that 
create an emotional way of speaking. The Palestinians, including third generation 
Palestinians, use the Arabic language in pray, as well as use metaphors normal in the 
Arab culture. As a non-Palestinian researcher I am also not always familiar with the 
nuances and interpretations of the Arabic language. The use of the English language 
therefore helped me to understand the participants’ answers clearly and I believe that the 
dialogue between us was more rational, thanks to the fact that we communicated in 
English. Few of the participants cannot speak English clearly, or do not know English at 
all. In these cases, I interviewed in Arabic. There is still, though, a problem relating to my 
ability to deliver the interviews’ results to the readers of this research in an authentic way, 
because not all of the readers are Arabic speakers. It is true that the interviews were 
mainly conducted in English, but, there are two challenges: firstly, the names of 
Palestinian and Arab media outlets sometimes have a meaning, and I have translated the 
necessary words. For example, the meaning of the name of the newspaper Al Youm, 
which means ‘today’, would not be the same for Palestinian and non-Palestinian readers. 
Secondly, there are phrases which are widely used in Palestinian and Arab circles, as well 
as being familiar to me as an Israeli, but which are not familiar to all of the non-
Palestinian and non-Israeli readers. The most common example is the phrase ‘nakba’ 
which means the trauma of 1948: the establishment of the state of Israel. Another 
example is the use of the word ‘brothers’. This is a very common phrase in the 
Palestinian as well as in the Israeli culture (said in different languages, but with similar 
meaning). I did my utmost to bring the participants’ answers as they were said by them, 
by writing the authentic Arabic words in my work, and not writing my own 
interpretations of the Arabic words and phrases that were used by the participants. 
 
Secondly, there were a few cases where I could interview in Hebrew, my first language, 
but I did not attempt to do so, rather, we only had a manners conversation (‘small talk’) in 
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Hebrew. I felt very uncomfortable interviewing participants in this language, because, for 
the Palestinians, the Arabic language is one of the symbols of their nation which is very 
important to them, as a stateless diaspora. Interacting in the Hebrew language would have 
culturally reproduced the power relations between the dominant culture and the oppressed 
groups. According to Bukay: 
 
 "Language is critical in importance in Arab culture. The Arabs are motivated by 
admiration for the Arabic language and wide use of witticisms, sayings, fables, 
and allegories, as a filter of high importance for preventing shame, and for 
evading frictions and conflict (Bukay, 2003:38)". 
 
The interview locations were not in Gaza or the West Bank and therefore the experience 
of both sides, was positive.  In this specific situation, we felt equal and the problem of the 
traditional vs. modern societies did not arise, since the interview was neither in the 
context of the actual location/’home’ of the participants, nor in my country of origin: 
Israel.  
 
Another problem that relates more specifically to the content of the interviews is that 
"people often do not tell the truth (Berger, 2000: 192)". Prior to the beginning of the field 
work, I knew that the question of political affiliation and usage of political websites was a 
sensitive issue. For example, the Palestinians do not always want to declare that they are 
affiliated with the Hamas party and consume Hamas’ websites, as the Hamas party is, on 
one hand, a legitimate political power – the party that won the Palestinian legislative 
elections, but, on the other hand, Hamas is classified as a terrorist organisation by a few 
Western governments. I separated the two factors: political affiliation and the usage of 
political websites, in their importance level, and I attributed higher significance to the 
second factor. I decided not to analyse my data according to categorisation of political 
parties, although I did ask my participants which political party they supported, and in 
most cases I received honest answers, due to the fact that I went to separate official 
political events of Hamas and Fatah, and found many of my participants there. Still, there 
were participants that I did not meet at any politically-oriented events, and they hesitated 
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when I asked them about their political affiliations. In these cases, I mostly received the 
answer: ‘independent.’ I did not want to put pressure on the participants who were not 
happy to talk about their political stance, because the focus of my research is media 
consumption.  
 
In relation to the usage of political websites – this is a dominant part of my investigation. 
It was very important for me to discover whether or not my participants used political 
websites. My aim was to learn about the role of the political websites in the life of the 
Palestinian in the diaspora, regardless of the particular political links of the participants. I 
therefore made it clear to the Palestinians I interviewed that it was vital for me to 
understand the phenomenon of Palestinian political websites. By listening and not 
criticising or encouraging political debate, I came to a few important conclusions. I 
discuss them in the Data Analysis chapter, but in few words only: I gathered the political 
websites are considered to be propaganda websites by most participants, both those who 
read them and those who do not read them. The role of the political websites is their 
provision of a ‘sense of home’ and in their provision of local news to the participants. 
 
A methodological problem that I came across, while looking for participants, was 
speaking with people who did not have useful information for my research. For example, 
I tried to conduct interviews in Rusholme Main Street in Manchester with Palestinian 
restaurant owners and workers. I found that none of them use internet for news 
consumption. I did, though, manage to obtain an interview with one diner. Finally, there 
was the problem that people were reluctant to speak to me. On two occasions, I was 
refused an interview. At Fatah’s event, I approached a participant at the event; he asked 
about my identity and refused to speak to me. However, at this event I met a Palestinian 
community leader I knew from previous meetings, and with his help I obtained 5 
interviews at the Fatah gathering. On the second occasion, I went to a ‘Stop the War 
Coalition’ meeting, with the promise of one of my participants to meet me there and 
introduce me to his fellow Palestinians, but, in the end, he decided not to do so. The 
positive thing was the opportunity I had to observe the 2 hour meeting of the ‘Stop the 
War Coalition’. 
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The obstacle caused by being a woman was evident mostly with the religious men I 
interviewed. I started the field work knowing that being Israeli might be an obstacle to 
obtaining access to the field. However, I reassured myself, relying on my previous 
experience working as an investigative journalist. Prior to the beginning of my academic 
research, I worked in the U.K. as a journalist on stories relating to the Muslim community 
in Britain. I learned about the Muslim community, not only the Palestinians. I visited 
mosques and covered stories on Islam. I also took Arabic courses for a few year, and I 
continued to take them during my (PhD) studies. When I started the field work, I already 
had contacts within the Muslim community, I spoke Arabic and I was familiar with the 
political processes of the Muslim community in the U.K. and with the political situation 
in Palestine.  
 
Alongside the challenges of being an Israeli researcher, there are also advantages for an 
Israeli or other non-Palestinian nationality researcher. First, as a researcher who is not 
part of the Palestinian community, I did not have to resolve the problem of detachment 
from that Palestinian community its history, politics and personal family narratives and 
their influences on daily life, as a Palestinian researcher would have to do. Secondly, in 
this kind of a research it might be that a Palestinian researcher would have to take into 
consideration personal aspects. As an Israeli researcher, I was not tied to any personal or 
political influences by official and non official individuals in Gaza and the West Bank. 
To put my argument in Matar’s words: 
 
"This process (fieldwork) becomes complex particularly in situations when the 
distinction between researcher and informant – I and the informants describe 
ourselves as Palestinian – is not clearly defined and where boundaries between the 
two roles are fluid. What added to the complexity of the interviewing process in 
this case was that, given the nature of the political climate at the time of the 
research, respondents were worried about the purpose of the research and had to 
be repeatedly reminded that it had no political agenda (Matar, 2005: 168). " 
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Gradually, I learned that there is a fundamental difference between the work of the 
journalist and the work of the researcher. As a journalist, I had to work according to 
editorial decisions; I had to ‘bring a story’. In contrast, as a researcher I had much more 
time to evaluate my work. As Jubas noticed, the work of the researcher, similarly to the 
journalist’s work, is an attempt to build knowledge by addressing problems or questions. 
The difference is in reference to the central questions of journalism that must all be 
considered by researchers when they determine the subject, topic and process of their 
research projects (Jubas, 2010: 228). It was important for me to investigate and write the 
Palestinian community’s story as an academic researcher. I entered the field with natural 
curiosity. Meeting with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza in this context was 
new for me. I was not familiar with the Palestinian diasporic community’s use of the 
media. I faced many obstacles, starting with finding over 50 participants from different 
areas in the U.K., obtaining their agreement to be interviewed, and dealing with political 
processes that are beyond my control. However, this journey was interesting. I think that 
this was also a new experience for my participants. Both my participants and I arrived at 
the meetings with a basic lack of conviction. Two main factors contributed to the building 
of a ‘neutral’ environment: the fact that the interviews took place in the U.K. and not in 
Gaza or the West Bank, and, in addition, that the language the interviews were conducted 
in was English, and not Arabic or Hebrew. These were moderating factors in the power 
relations between me, the researcher, and the Palestinians, the subject of the research. 
Strong criticism of Israel is also being heard by people who do not belong to either side 
of the conflict. 
 
Overcoming the Research Problems 
As an Israeli researcher, I had to face problems from within (the Jewish community) and 
from without (the Palestinian community), as I mentioned earlier.  
Even more, I had to face the problem of criticism from individuals who are not part of the 
conflict. For example, in many Palestinian conferences and events I attended, British 
supporters of Palestine were not supportive, as they blamed the Israeli government for its 
policy on the Palestinians. I conducted the research as an isolated Israeli researcher – I 
could not share my research methods’ problems with other Israeli researchers, because I 
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was the only one who was researching, or had researched, the Palestinian community. 
During the period of the research I was involved with the Palestinian community and was 
always the only Israeli scholar at events for Palestinians and their supporters. When I 
delivered talks on different platforms, I was the only Israeli speaker among Palestinian 
scholars. It was an uneasy experience – conducting research in a hostile environment 
where the researcher actually represents the informants’ ‘enemy’, one that belongs to the 
other side in the conflict. Having said that, I did not look only at the problems I had to 
face as a result of the conflict but. Rather, I also looked at the commonalities between 
Palestinians and Israelis in the U.K. As Gillespie points out, the commonalities between 
her, as a daughter of Irish catholic immigrants to London and the informants, Punjabi 
Sikhs in London, have helped her to deal with some of the problems inherent in learning 
from and studying a culture different to one’s own, reducing the risk of ‘tribalising’ the 
‘other’ (Gillespie, 1995: 50). 
 
It might be the case, ‘as suggested by Herod (1999), that instead of operating with a 
dualistic approach to insiders versus outsiders, it might be more useful to consider 
‘degrees of outsiderness’ (Rosmer, 2010:132).  As for the Palestinians in the diaspora, 
problems of hostility became significant especially following the 9/11 terror attacks in the 
U.S., because of their Muslim identity. In that sense, the participants and I belong to two 
hostile sides of an ongoing conflict, and each one of us faces criticism and suspicion from 
individuals and groups that are not part of the conflict. Another very important issue is 
that during the period of the field work, both the participants and I were immigrants to the 
UK. Although, I received British citizenship in 2008, this did not change the fact that I 
still felt, firstly, like an Israeli immigrant and only then a British citizen. Being an Israeli 
immigrant, I could reflect on the Palestinian immigrants, as both the participants and I 
emigrated from the same region. Emigration to the U.K. was also a common feature in 
our lives. The Palestinians and the Jews have a common historical narrative: the status of 
the Palestinian refugees is similar to the experience of the Jewish refugees, who described 
themselves as ‘migrant Jews’, mostly before 1948, but, still this description is widely 
used by Jewish people these days. Gillespie’s claims in relation to the ‘South Asian’ 
immigrants in London, demonstrates my argument: 
 148
"The experience of being uprooted, displaced and discriminated against tends to produce 
feelings of insecurity, nostalgia for an idealised past, and a longing for an idealised 
‘homeland’. This often encourages attempts to maintain, strengthen and even re-invent 
cultural traditions which are seen to be under threat or attack. Migration and settlement 
also inevitably lead to an acceleration of the processes of cultural change, processes in 
which the media are implicated (Gillespie, 1995:50)".     
 
The Jewish people, many of them refugees, who established the state of Israel in 1948, 
formed an Israeli society that was a ‘melting pot’. They came from different countries in 
Eastern Europe, but were not only from there.  
 
"Sephardim began immigrating to Israel in increasing numbers from 1949 
onwards, including almost the entire Jewish populations of Libya, Yemen and 
Iraq, as well as displaced Jews from the remaining Arab states (Segev, 1993: 121-
2, 185-6)."  
 
The immigrants had different traditions and cultures, which they wanted to preserve. The 
result was the creation of the ‘new Israeli’, as each group still keeps its own traditions. In 
a similar way, as discussed in this thesis, it is highly important for the Palestinians in the 
diaspora, to preserve their own culture.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the uniqueness of this research by describing the hostile 
research environment in which the Israeli researcher worked. There is a lack of research 
on the Palestinian community by Israeli researchers. The researcher of this study took the 
first step to what she hopes will result in a useful study which will encourage further 
research in this field by non-Palestinian researchers. As this chapter proves, in 
interviewing the other side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as an ‘outsider’ researcher, 
there is a constant process of learning:  in learning the Palestinians’ media consumption 
practices, their political aspirations and through studying a culture and language which 
are different from one’s own.  
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The benefits of qualitative research method for this research are discussed in this chapter. 
My aim was to collect as much information as I could by using open questions. 
Palestinian media consumption does not stand on its own; it is linked to political 
mobilisation, politics and daily life, identity, feelings of belonging, online and offline 
social networks, and more. The research methods I chose helped me to achieve my goal. 
In the data analysis process, I repeatedly read the interview responses and I analysed my 
data on two levels – firstly, I reached general conclusions, such as: ‘the internet is the 
main medium that the Palestinians in the diaspora use’. Secondly, I wrote about the 
reasons that lead the Palestinian audience to have certain preferences. The data was rich 
and when I reread the participants’ responses, I found more categories to which I could 
relate, beyond the main categories on which I had decided prior to the beginning of the 
interviewing. The personal contact between me and the participants was very important. 
By sending questionnaires, for example, I would not receive such data, and maybe I 
would not have been able to obtain an agreement for participation at all. By meeting the 
participants in their natural settings, and by attending many Palestinian events, I had 
control on my contacts with participants and I learned my participants’ challenges in 
media usage and daily life in the diaspora. Another advantage of conducting individual 
interviews is that it will allow me to continue with further research in the future, by using 
the contacts I developed in the period of this research, with the Palestinians in the 
diaspora and in ‘Palestine’. Having said that, as discussed in this chapter, by using the 
individual interview research method, the researcher might risk his work’s results by not 
receiving honest answers to his questions. There is also the problem of using qualitative 
research methods which are less quantifiable in their nature.  However, as I explained, I 
learned to overcome the obstacles. In the next 2 chapters I will provide meaning for the 
data that was collected and a further understanding of the Palestinians in the diaspora, in 
reference to daily news consumption practices, feelings of belonging, and the major 
preoccupations of the Palestinians in the diaspora ( i.e., the ‘return question’). 
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Chapter 4 
Findings - Palestinian and Transnational Arab Media Usage 
 
The Palestinian Media  
Since I started my research, in 2006, there were major developments in the Palestinian 
media market. Online penetration in Palestine Territory has increased. Whereas, in 2009, 
14.4% of the population in Gaza and the West Bank were using the internet, in 2012, the 
percentage has increased to 57.7%.  Encouraged by this development, Palestine News 
Network (PNN) launched, recently (September 2013), six new online radio stations.  
 
In the PNN website it is being said: "The PNN launched six private community radio 
networks that aim to support and develop the media, keeping pace with the technological 
revolution that is taking place in the world 
(http://english.pnn.ps/index.php/national/5607-pnn-launches-six-new-community-radio-
networks-in-palestine). 
The website Almonitor – Palestine Pulse, has reported on this event: "In the early years of 
the Palestinian Authority, one of its biggest goals was to establish sovereignty over 
Palestinian land. This week, six new online radio stations were launched by the 
Bethlehem – based Palestine news network" (http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/palestinians-radio-stations-media.html). 
   
The use in new technologies is on increase, including usage in blogs and applications, 
such as twitter. As a result, usage patterns have changed as well. It is not only Diasporic 
communities who prefer the internet for news consumption, but rather Palestinians who 
live in Gaza and the West Bank find the internet as an efficient news source and a 
medium that enables an exchange of views.  
 
Having said that, the Palestinian media suffer from major problems. I would like to 
provide an overview of the Palestinian media, to provide an understanding of its 
challenges. Before the establishment of the PA in 1994, the Palestinian media under- 
went two distinct phases: from 1967 to 1972, and from 1972 to 1994. During the first 
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period, when armed struggle was the PLO's main strategy of liberation and the role of 
information was marginal, the Palestinian media were weak. At the same time, Al-
QUDS, the most successful Palestinian newspaper, was launched. 
 
In 1972, as a result of the Jordanian debacle as well as of changes in the regional political 
arena, the PLO began to focus more on the occupied territories and the need to mobilize 
the population there. This marked the beginning of the second stage in the experience of 
the Palestinian press under occupation, as the press was deemed a useful tool to reach the 
population. The signing of the Oslo Accord and the establishment of the PA opened a 
new era for the Palestinian media, an era that was characterized both by marked increase 
in the number and kinds of publications, and by new and different forms of control. 
 
"During the first year after the 1993 Oslo Accords, the newly created Palestinian public 
broadcaster operated from an East Jerusalem office belonging to its self-appointed head, 
Radwan Abu Ayyash. Abu Ayyash and his colleagues rejected the title Palestinian 
Broadcasting Authority in favour of 'Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation' (PBC), 
inspired by the BBC (Sakr, 2007: 35)." 
 
"After Arafat's death in 2004, the Palestinian Authority new president, Mahmoud Abbas, 
initiated changes in oversight of the PBC and the Palestinian Satellite Channel. Whereas 
these had previously come under the PLO Executive Committee and PA presidency, they 
were transferred in April 2005 to the Ministry of information (Sakr, 2007: 36)." 
 
In January 2006, Hamas won the legislative elections in Gaza, indicating the end of the 
Palestinian Authority rule there. Clashes between Fatah and Hamas factions led to the 
creation of two authorities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In 2007 all Arab efforts 
to a national unity government failed. Consequently, the tensions had risen to the level of 
an armed conflict during which Hamas took over the Palestinian Authority institutions in 
the Gaza Strip.  
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Sakr points out on the change in the Palestinain media, in 2006: "When the Islamic 
resistance movement, Hamas, was elected to form a Palestinain government in January 
2006, Abbas moved all official media outlets, including PBC, away from the ministry of 
information and affiliated them to his own presidential office (Sakr, 2007:36)." 
 
One of the main challenges of the Palestinian media is censorship. Censorship in the 
Palestinian context is not a set mechanism but a behavioral pattern. Following several 
incidents in which the PA reacted severely, newspapers began to arrange their own 
censorship. As such, self-censorship has become a common phenomenon among 
Palestinian journalists. Besides Israeli restrictions on Palestinian press freedom, new 
methods of control have found their way into newspaper rooms and especially into 
journalists' minds. 
 
Self-censorship has become a common phenomenon as a result of the lack of clear rules, 
with journalists unable to anticipate the position of the PA, particularly on matters 
involving "national unity." In the words of journalist Walid Batrawi:  
 "If the law says that nothing should be published against Palestinian national unity but 
does not define what national unity means, when I begin to write I have to think that 
maybe this sentence might harm the national unity. Ultimately, it leads you to self-
censorship, which is an extremely dangerous thing. The PA does not ask you to submit 
your articles to the censor, but in one way or another, the Palestinian press law restricts 
you (Jamal, 2000: 55)." 
 
Use in Transnational Arab Media and Non-Use in Palestinian Sources – Reasons 
and Implications  
Most participants use Arab media which is not Palestinian. The analysis of the results can 
be observed through a few aspects: the Palestinians are not a distinct diasporic 
community in relation to their media consumption. They share the same interest in news 
events as other Arab diasporic communities in Europe and elsewhere. Both the 
Palestinians and other Arab diasporic communities thus use the same websites to receive 
news from the Arab world, as well as international news. I discovered that Palestinians 
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and Palestine issues are dominant news stories on the agenda of the Arab world as a 
whole. Transnational broadcasters, such as Al Jazeera, cover local news events in Gaza 
and the West Bank, and fulfill the Palestinians’ need for updated news from Palestine. 
Schulz writes that satellite TV has created a new possibility for links with the homeland 
(Schulz, 2003: 182). "The Palestinians in Britain do not have their own diasporic media, 
apart from al-quds newspaper; a London based Arabic language daily (Matar, 2005:22)." 
Most participants feel that there is a space for the Palestinian narrative in Al Jazeera’s 
broadcasts. The common perception among participants, in reference to Al Jazeera, is that 
the news coverage is good and brings the whole story, there is no censorship and Al 
Jazeera ‘leaves a big place for Palestine’. Only a few participants felt differently and said 
that Al Jazeera’s coverage was insufficient, ‘it brings the bigger picture and not only 
Palestine’, and that the network is ‘not independent, like any other media’. Though, as 
discussed earlier, research on Al Jazeera suggests that there is a problem of censorship. 
As being said earlier, the participants aware to the fact that each satellite network has its 
political agenda. Talking about Al Jazeera, they prefer the English version; an interesting 
issue to look at is the use of languages. Referring to Palestinian political websites, most 
participants felt that they were created for propaganda purposes, and the issue of the 
Arabic vs. the English versions of the websites, was not raised. In contrast, the 
participants differentiated between Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera International. Many 
participants perceived Al Jazeera in English to be a better news source than Al Jazeera in 
Arabic. Their preference relates to the cultural influence on the media, as they explain: 
 
‘I trust Al Jazeera English the most. (In the Arab media) people get very 
angry…Arab spokesman on British media cut off before he gets to the point, 
because he talks too long, does not understand the Western media’ (Sharif, July, 
2008, London).   
 
‘Al Jazeera Arabic is more sensational, a good show. Al Jazeera English is better 
than the Arabic, (there is) a debate’ (Professor Ramadi, 2008, Leeds).  
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‘If I do not find on BBC English, I go to Al Jazeera. I rely on English, not Arabic. 
For me, Arabic is highly emotional thing…on the internet I check Arabic 
sometimes, if I need. I read Al Jazeera Arabic about scholar death…’ (Reem, July, 
2008, London).   
 
The interviews analysis has proved that there was a group of participants, who did not 
use Palestinian websites at all. It was important for me to explore this phenomenon, 
since it links to issues beyond usage. To put it differently, I raised the question: is 
there a link between non-use of Palestinian media and weak contacts with Palestine 
and weak nationalist feelings? I found that there was no link between nationalist 
feelings and non-usage of Palestinian media. All the participants have strong 
nationalist feelings, but this group looks for Palestine’s news on channels other than 
the Palestinian media. Al Jazeera is the most popular media outlet among the 
Palestinians who do not use Palestinian media at all, and among the Palestinians who 
use both Palestinian media and other Arab media. However, the purpose of using Al-
Jazeera is different: while the first group uses Al Jazeera to receive local news from 
Gaza and the West Bank, the second group uses Al Jazeera for news from Palestine as 
a marginal source, and also for news from the Arab world in general. The second 
group is divided into 2 sub-groups: the first includes Palestinians who use Palestinian 
political websites and other Arab media sources, and the second group includes 
Palestinians who use non-political Palestinian websites and other Arab media sources. 
I would like to discuss the media consumption practices of each group: 
 
The Palestinian Websites as an Irrelevant News Source 
A quarter of the participants do not use Palestinian websites at all. Most use the Al 
Jazeera websites. On the surface, it seems clear that, as they live in the UK, the 
participants do not necessarily need Palestinian news media for news from Palestine. 
Even though the Palestinians have access to unlimited sources of news online, ideally, 
they would like to use Palestinian media. In non-Palestinian media there is not enough 
space for Palestine’s news, as many of the participants said. The Palestinian media for 
them means a combination of two things: having a sense of home and local news updates.  
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"Satellite television has radically altered transnational mediascapes as it has allowed 
simultaneity and richness in exchange and circulation of the images and texts consumed 
across diasporic populations across the globe. On one hand, satellite television reflects 
the diasporic project of sustaining cultural particularity. On the other, diasporic  
satellite television has managed to develop because of the present climate of  
free communications, the promotion of technological innovation and of  
liberalisation of telecommunications (Georgiou, 2005: 491)". "The computer is used not 
only to contact people in faraway places, but also to interact with neighbours. 
‘Community Empowerment’ may enhance individual empowerment (Laguerre, 2010: 
56)".  
 
The interviews I conducted, though, indicate a real problem that is experienced by the 
Palestinians in the U.K. when using the media. As much as they want to read news on 
Palestinian news websites, they are prevented from using these websites because of the 
existing situation in the Palestinian media.  Hasan explains why he cannot use the 
Palestinian websites as a trustworthy source: 
 
‘I do not believe that the media is independent (relating to the Palestinian political 
websites). There are no journalists; the quality of the news is no good. Problems 
of censorship. That's why we go to other sites. Al Jazeera online - no censorship. 
(Hasan).’ 
 
The role of Al Jazeera, in this case, can be defined as a glocal media – the Palestinian 
audiences use the Qatari network to receive local news from Gaza and the West Bank. 
Instead of globalisation, there is a possibility for glocalization where the global gets its 
meaning from the local, and from the local we reach the global (Castells, 2001). In fact, 
the global is understood as something that assimilates values and mixes elements of a 
global culture within the local. Samir says: 
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  ‘I do not use Palestinian (political) websites. I do not have time to look in Palestinian 
websites. Al Jazeera covers Palestine. We cannot blame the Palestinian websites; they try 
to do their best (Samir).’  
 
A woman who emigrated from Gaza for studies, says:  
 
  'I do not read the Palestinian websites because they have news from their own point of 
view, they aren't neutral. In time of crisis - Maan is the website for local news from Gaza 
and other places in Palestine; then Al Jazeera.’ 
 
60 years old Professor A., does not feel any need to use the Palestinian websites: 
 
  ‘The Palestinian websites are not reliable. I do not use these websites. It’s for the    
   local people.’ 
 
  P., a professional worker explains: 
 
‘I do not read Palestinian websites. It’s the liability issue. Reporters cannot access, 
websites are being removed…it does not fill my need of reading global news.’ 
 
Anonymous: 
 
‘I do not read the Palestinian websites. Hamas and Fatah are lying, everybody 
wants to support his case.’ 
 
Despite the developments in new technologies, the perception of the Palestinian media as 
promoting the party’s interests hasn’t changed. The aim of the political websites is to 
serve the agenda of a specific political party, rather than to provide information of the 
macro political situation. According to Nossek and Rinnawi, it is not only that the 
Palestinian media do not reflect on political processes as they occur, but they are also 
trying to determine an agenda which fits its political ambitions. The most important case 
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was the 1998 closure of the Hamas newspaper al-Risalah (The Message), by the 
Palestinian Authority, due to its constant attacks on the peace process (Nossek & 
Rinnawi, 2003:197). 
 
Having said this, the Israeli media, mainly at times of conflict, advance national goals. To 
put it differently, the victory of each side is not through observation of the factors that 
would help them to achieve their goals but, rather, the victory of each side, is in watching 
the suffering of the other side. The media reflect this tendency.  The media do not 
necessarily operate to promote political achievements and negotiation talks between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. Instead, the broadcasting of destruction and suffering among 
civilians is a major theme in news bulletins.   
 
A recent example (2012) is ‘Operation Pillar of Cloud’ in Gaza. On one hand, the rockets 
that were launched from Gaza into cities in South and Central Israel, created suffering 
amongst the Israeli civilian population. On the other hand, IDF attacks on Gaza, created 
suffering amongst the Palestinian population. The Israeli government made major efforts 
to gain the support of the international community, through the publication of online 
pictures of Israeli casualties. The Palestinian media did the same. To conclude on this 
point, I would say, that the media in general, and the new media, in particular, are the 
only means that allow wide audiences to be exposed to events in the region. This fact 
indicates the centrality of media in agenda setting. Using a critical approach, it might be 
argued that media owners should take a major role in conflict resolution, and not in the 
narrow role of delivering dramatised aspects of conflicts. Conversi argues that although 
cyber communities have provided avenues for peace, prosperity and conflict prevention, 
the evidence indicates that unregulated use of the internet can enable quasi-spontaneous 
outbursts of hate speech via incitement to conflict by virtual peer pressure (Conversi, 
2012). 
 
Research into the media's impact on misperceptions in the West, suggests that ethnic 
conflicts tend to be treated in a generalised and simplified manner. The media are the 
gatekeepers of information for society (a widely held view in communication research). 
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According to many communication scholars, the means by which such information is 
presented – specifically, the terminology used – are perhaps most influential in shaping 
the minds of Western audiences. 
 
In relation to coverage of Islam and ethnic conflicts, there are numerous instances in 
which terminology – specifically, the confusion of religion with ethnicity, is quite 
commonly practiced by the Western media (Wiegand, 2000:245; 246). 
 
I have, though to mention Peace Journalists who do try to be involved in conflict 
resolution through their coverage. They are guided by the following main 
commandments: identify the views and interests of all parties to human conflict,  give 
voice to the oppressed to represent and empower them, seek peaceful solutions to conflict 
problems, the media representation of conflict problems can become part of the problem 
if it exacerbates dualism and hatreds, the media representation of conflict can become 
part of the solution if it employs the creative tensions in any human conflict to seek 
common ground and exercise the professional media ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness 
and respect for human rights and dignity (Tehranian, 2004: 241-242).  
 
Only 2 participants use the website of BBC Arabic, in addition to their use in Al Jazeera. 
2 participants use Al Arabiya – one of them uses both Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera 
websites. The 3 participants, who do not use Al Jazeera online, use Al Hiwar TV (a TV 
station that is located in London and dedicated to the Arabs of the Diaspora), Easy News 
(a news management system that allows news editing on private websites) and Arab Task 
Force. Elizabeth is the only participant who does not use Arab media at all. For local 
news from Palestine she looks at the website of Haaretz.  
 
The fact that the participants do not use the Palestinian media reveals the gloomy 
situation of the Palestinian media market - the Palestinian media, according to the 
participants, lack the resources to become professional. Instead, there are many politically 
driven websites that struggle to exist. There are participants who are aware of the 
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disadvantages of the political websites, but, they do use them in addition to their use of 
transnational media.    
 
Political and Transnational Websites Usage 
As I stressed earlier, the participants use a variety of news sources online. This means, 
that there is extensive use of transnational websites.  
I claim that the Palestinian problem is a dominant news story that is being transmitted on 
news programmes around the world, therefore technology helps the Palestinians to 
interact with global audiences as well as in Western countries, and in Arab countries, and 
to mobilise their support. The Arab audiences in countries other than Palestine are very 
important actors in supporting the Palestinian cause and the Palestinians have to approach 
Arab audiences regularly in order to raise awareness of the situation in Palestine. 
Otherwise, the Palestine problem would have remained a local and not a regional 
problem. One has to remember that in many Arab countries there are no existential 
problems, as there are in Palestine (i.e., running water and power supply). The 
Palestinians thus explain and report on their situation at all times, using new technologies.  
 
The use of transnational news media by Palestinians happens for two reasons: Firstly, for 
the purpose of watching news, and, secondly, as Arab internet users of the discussion on 
politics and religion, there is a growing assertion of the individual as an active speaker 
and decision-maker, and not as a passive recipient of authoritative discourse, which is a 
special pattern of Arabic cyberspace, if compared to worldwide internet use patterns 
(Hofheinz in Sakr, 2007: 75). Even more, the Palestinians are not only active but also 
creative and oppositional. Ayers claims that globalisation has weakened the mobilisation 
potential of states and has created new opportunities for transnational mobilisation and 
the diffusion of protest by social movements (Ayres, 1999: 137). "The proliferation of, 
and easy access to, transnational media, particularly news focused satellite television that 
targets diasporic, as well as national audiences, has not only challenged the dominance of 
the mainstream news media (such as the public service model in Europe), but also 
conventional models about the power of news (Matar, 2005:13)". 
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In talking about the Palestinian diasporic media, I refer to two categories. The first is 
made up of the political websites, and the second is made up of news agencies and other 
Palestinian news websites. It is significantly important to understand why political 
websites should be observed separately. There are three main reasons for this.  
Firstly, though the websites are affiliated to a political party, they are not identified as 
such, unlike the political websites in the UK, for example, where it is very easy to find 
the website of each party and it is clear that the website owner is this or that party. 
Secondly, the political websites’ format is that of news website, the content being 
published also includes Palestine’s news (as opposed to the political websites in the U.K. 
that do not include news). They are thus news sources, but do not follow the journalistic 
code. Thirdly, in recent years there has been a growth in the number of political websites 
and each party has many websites, in a variety of languages. The websites are an 
important tool that serves the decision makers in Palestine. 
  
 م دورة في اختتامناشدة الى الملك عبدﷲ الثاني بن الحسين
إعدام 1002عام بن لادن قتل 
يات اللازمة بيبي دريم تجتمع مع عدد من المدربين والمشرفين لبحث الإمكان
وسف يبدي الدكتور واصل ابو ي
تل بن لادن طالبان تشكك في مقبن لادن كان مشجعا ًلآرسنال وحضر عددا ًمن مبارياتھ
نواب عشرات القتلى والجرحى في انفجار سيارة مفخخة في بغداد
رئيس وزراء مصر حضر متأخرا فجلس 
قلق في مصراتة مع انتھاء مھلة حددھا 
العلاقات مع : وزير جزائريمصطفى الجندي يتھم مبارك بالخيانة العظمٮ
« تحريض خارجي»شرف يتعھد تنفيذ مطالب أھالي قنا والجيش يُحذر من 
طرق جديدة :بالصورصور..ماكياج بألوان التراب 
اليوم إنھاء الانقسام الفلسطيني وتوقيع اتفاق المصالحة بين فتح وحماس في 
مناشدة إلى تستقبل وفد من جمعية الصداقة
  
  
  اختتام دورة في الإسعافات الأولية للنساء في خان يونس
الصحفي الفلسطيني تميز بالأداء والمھنية العالية
: قيادي بالقاعدة اسعار العملات مقابل الشيقلالإسعافات الأولية للنساء في خان يونس
عميل للاحتلال الاسرائيلي في غزة
منتدى الحرية يھنىء بالمصالحة ويدعو الفصائل لعمل جاد ودؤوب
ً ًتفاؤله بنجاح اتفاق المصالحة
‘القاعدة’وواشنطن تعلن استعدادھا للقضاء على بقايا 
من قطر ‘العدائية‘بحرينيون يستنكرون تصريحات وزير خارجية إيران
‘أوباما’معركة بن لادن الأخيرة وأسوأ لحظات .. بالصور
وتصاعد القتال في الجبل الغربي
ُ: مصرليبيا ستتوتر في حال انتصار الثوار
العقدة اللبنانية سخيفة ولم يعد مفھوما ًسبب التأخير
لتسريح شعرك تختارينھا حسب مزاجك
الاغاثة الزراعية تستقبل وفد من جمعية الصداقة الاغاثة الزراعية 
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بحث
 natawlA ainoD
  الرئيسية •
  الأرشيف •
  اضف خبرا •
  عن دنيا الوطن •
  اعلن معنا •
  سلنارا •
  دنيا الرأي •
  دنيا موبايل •
  اخبرنا عن اخطاء •
  النسخة القديمة •
        
  الأخبار 
: حزب فدا
لمھرجان الطفولة
بآخر صفوف الندوة
... القذافي
ً: بريعلى الفتنة
القاھرة
  الرئيس محمود عباس
   4/5/1102
   منوعات
   
  مشھد ساخن جدا ًفي مسبح ستار أكاديمي يستفز المشاھدين
فليرجمني .. اللي ما يحب الشوكولا
   ظر خالص
  روبي على علاقة بجمال مبارك
 بالصور..عيد ميلاد وليد توفيق 
  
  
ً
  
  
: رزان مغربي على غلاف مجلة بملابسھا الداخلية
   !!بحجر
  
  
كيت ميدلتون مش من: عمرو اديب
  
  
: الوحش 
  
 
 hataF fo egaP emoH ehT
 natawlA ainoD – etisbeW
261
ً
   يعتقل خمسة مواطنين من الضفة فجر اليوم
  
  يعتقل خمسة مواطنين من الضفة فجر اليوم
 المزيد ...
 والدولية
  حة الفلسطينية
 تشھد العاصمة المصرية بعد ساعات حفل توقيع المصالحة الفلسطينية،
بمشاركة رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس خالد مشعل، ورئيس السلطة 
في مقر المخابرات العامة المصرية، وبحضور عدد 
 
 الوضع الفلسطيني والمصالحة 
  تلتقي العربي وموسى في القاھرة
، ‘حماس‘ اجتمع وفد قيادي رفيع المستوى من حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
، (5/3)برئاسة رئيس المكتب السياسي للحركة خالد مشعل، مساء الثلاثاء 
ابحث في الموقع
 
 
  البحث التفصيلي
 اختيارات القّراء
  الأكثر قراءةً 
 الاحتلال
 الأكثر تعليقاً       
ة المصالحةيصل القاھرة للتوقيع على ورق مشعل
 الأكثر طباعًة 
  !حيل أسامة بن لادنبعد ر ما
  الأكثر إرسالاً 
 الاحتلال
   
  شوارع قطاع غزة احتفاًء بالمصالحة الوطنية
 
 
 
بحضور عدد كبير من الشخصيات العربية 
تشھد حفل توقيع المصال القاھرة
 محمود عباس، وذلك
.كبير من الشخصيات العربية والدولية
 لبحث مستجدات
 ‘حماس‘ قيادة
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 الجمر القابضون على
 
  الجمر القابضون على
  84فلسطينيي الـ شأن
 تقارير
 مقالات
 وأبحاث دراسات
 فعاليات
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وزير الخارجية المصري الدكتور نبيل العربي، لبحث آخر المستجدات  مع
 الراھنالفلسطيني  فيما يتعلق بالوضع
 
  أحداث في صور
 
 قطاع غزة خرجت في اليوم العالمي للعمال مطالبين بفتح معبر رفح ورفع الحصار عن جنوبصور لمسيرة عمالية 
 غزة
 ** ** **
 
يف القطاع تنظمھا حركة حماس بمشاركة فئة كبيرة من الشباب ونواب من وتنظ صور بدء اضخم حملة لتزين
  التشريعي المجلس
 ** ** **
 
  8002وصل غزة عام  ‘كين أوكيف نيكولز’السابق  صور ناشط السلام الأمريكي
  مع أول سفينة
  للحصار كسر
 ** ** **
 
  أمام جداريات كتبت على الحائط تدعوا لإنھاء الانقسام صور مواطنين بغزة يسيرون من
 ** ** **
 
  صور لاعتصام
  بغزة أمام معبر رفح البري للمطالبة بفتح المعبر وإدخال الدواء ءنظمه أطبا
 ** ** **
 
  داخل السجون الصھيونية أمام مقر الصليب الأحمر صور لاعتصام أھالي الأسرى
  
   
 84فلسطينيي الـ شأن
  تقارير
561 
  مقالات
  وأبحاث دراسات
 فعاليات
ابحث في الموقع
  
 
   البحث التفصيلي
  اختيارات القّراء
 الأكثر قراءةً 
  يعتقل خمسة مواطنين من الضفة فجر اليوم الاحتلال
 الأكثر تعليقاً       
  يصل القاھرة للتوقيع على ورقة المصالحة مشعل
  طباعًة  الأكثر
  !بعد رحيل أسامة بن لادن ما
  الأكثر إرسالاً 
  يعتقل خمسة مواطنين من الضفة فجر اليوم الاحتلال
 المزيد ...
   
  أحداث في صور
 
 قطاع غزة خرجت في اليوم العالمي للعمال مطالبين بفتح معبر رفح ورفع الحصار عن جنوبصور لمسيرة عمالية 
 غزة
 ** ** **
 
وتنظيف القطاع تنظمھا حركة حماس بمشاركة فئة كبيرة من الشباب ونواب من  صور بدء اضخم حملة لتزين
  التشريعي المجلس
 ** ** **
 
  8002وصل غزة عام  ‘كين أوكيف نيكولز’ق الساب صور ناشط السلام الأمريكي
  مع أول سفينة
   للحصار كسر
  ** ** **
 
  أمام جداريات كتبت على الحائط تدعوا لإنھاء الانقسام صور مواطنين بغزة يسيرون من
  ** ** **
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  صور لاعتصام
  بغزة أمام معبر رفح البري للمطالبة بفتح المعبر وإدخال الدواء نظمه أطباء
 ** ** **
  
  داخل السجون الصھيونية أمام مقر الصليب الأحمر صور لاعتصام أھالي الأسرى
  
 
 enitselaP - etisbeW samaH fo egaP emoH ehT
  cibarA/ofnI
 167
To conclude on this point, the Palestinian political websites’ interior issues are prominent 
issues on the websites. The news stories that are being published are actually news stories 
that relate to the political parties, or which serve their interest. In contrast, the non-
political Palestinian websites, such as Maan news, publish news stories which are not 
politically driven and this can be seen very clearly in their headlines and pictures – they 
are not intended to provoke, as is the existing tendency in political websites. For example, 
an article published on the website The Palestinian Information Center, in English, in 
July, 2010: ‘Assad, Oglu demand immediate end to Gaza Siege’. The author of the article 
uses phrases such as ‘Israeli massacre’ (referring to ‘the fanatical government in Israel’).  
 
The audience that consumes the Palestinian political websites, as well as other Arab 
media publications, is a sophisticated audience. The reason is the way they use the news 
websites and the way they talk about them. Mahmoud reads the political websites 
knowing their limitations. Nevertheless, he has an interest in the political discourse of 
each party and therefore he reads their websites. He acknowledges that there is no 
representation of all sides and he solves the problem by reading the Al Jazeera website. 
16 participants use both political and transnational Arab websites. 15 out of the 16 
participants read and watch Al Jazeera online. Most of the members of this group read Al 
Jazeera for local news from ‘home’; the exception are 2 participants: one who uses the 
Arabic network to read international news, and the other who uses it to receive news from 
the Arab world. 
 
For them, the political websites are a vital news source from Palestine. Ghada, who reads 
the websites of Al Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic, and watches Al Arabia news, says: 
 
‘I read the Palestinian websites for two reasons: to read local news and to have a 
sense of home (Ghada, June, 2008, Exeter).’ 
 
Nadine also uses the Palestinian political websites for local news: 
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‘I read Al Quds, Hamas website – Palestine Info (Maan News – not political) and 
Al-Jazeera Arabic and English.’ 
 
Sami, who emigrated to the U.K. from Ramallah, told me that he supports the Fatah 
Party, and he reads the website of Donia Al Watan - ‘Close to Fatah. Most of the news 
about Abbas and the West Bank’ and Al Jazeera Arabic. 
 
All of the participants in this group are affiliated to a political party, Hamas or Fatah, and 
some of them are involved in political activities. Their interest in news from Palestine is 
not only at the macro level, negotiation talks for example, but also at the micro level, 
events in specific locations in Palestine in which participants have a personal interest. 
 
Palestinian Usage in Palestinian and Transnational Websites 
All the participants from this group do not use the Palestinian political websites, because 
they explain that the websites are one sided. The participants use both Palestinian (non-
political) and transnational media to receive updated news from Palestine - the 
Palestinian websites are not the preferred websites. In contrast, the previous group’s first 
preference is for the Palestinian political websites and then the other Arab media sources.  
 
In order to receive local news, the Palestinians from this group read the websites of news 
agencies, mostly Maan News. In addition, they also use the websites of Al Jazeera and 
BBC Arabic (UK media). All the participants use Al Jazeera: 6 read news on Al Jazeera 
Arabic, 4 informants use only the English website, 6 read both Arabic and English. If I 
were to divide this group into 2 broader groups, one can see that 12 participants read 
news in Arabic and 10 participants read news in English. The fact that the 2 groups 
include similar numbers of participants is interesting – it shows that the Arabic language, 
as the first language of the Palestinians, does not dominate their news consumption 
practices. 
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The Use in Palestinian and Arab Media as a Routine 
All of the Palestinians I interviewed, except one, use Palestinian and Arab media news 
websites, or other Palestinian electronic sources, to receive news, as a routine. I have to 
emphasise - not at times of major news events (breaking news). The Palestinian media is 
not the main source of news for the Palestinian diasporic community in the UK, though: 
most of the participants do not use Palestinian websites at all, or they consume 
transnational Arab websites as their first priority, and Palestinian websites. This section 
includes an analysis of the usage of Palestinian and Arab media. Later, I will discuss the 
usage of UK, international and Israeli news media online.  
 
 To demonstrate my arguments, the participants were divided into 6 groups of internet 
users. Before looking at each group separately, a short elaboration of the Palestinian 
audience and the Palestinian media in general, will add to the presentation of my 
findings. The media in the West Bank and Gaza suffer as a result of financial difficulties. 
Many television and radio stations have frozen even the daily news bulletins. According 
to a study being conducted in Palestine, most Palestinians said that the local media do not 
cover local news or social issues well. Their perception is that the journalists lack 
experience, or that stations have a political bias (United States Agency for International 
Development online publication, 2006: 5). According to my participants, the problem of 
professionalism is evident, mostly on the Palestinian political websites. However, one has 
to remember that the media environment in Palestine, as a whole, are being influenced by 
the political climate in Palestine.  
 
The Palestinian Governmental and Private Websites 
Few participants prefer to read news online using Palestinian governmental and private 
websites, which are different from the political websites, but in some cases are affiliated 
to them. I decided to put the governmental and private websites under the same category, 
since these websites are not news websites but they do provide Palestine’s news of the 
day, or include links to Palestine’s news websites. These websites include: websites of 
Palestinian charities in the U.K, the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, and The Palestinian 
Ministry websites, the Palestine Monitor in English, and the Palestinian Return Centre - 
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private websites (Appendix 2). The following section relates to the political website 
whose coverage is considered to be the most problematic if compared to other Palestinian 
news websites, as the participants indicate. 
 
The Response to the Palestinian Political Websites 
In June, 2007, factional fighting between Hamas and Fatah broke out. Hamas militants 
took over the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank split from each other – Gaza 
was run by Hamas and the West Bank was run by Fatah. 
 
Both factions ascribe to the media a very important role. They use the internet to promote 
their political interests. The Hamas movement has a wide infrastructure of websites. 
There are over 20 leading websites in 8 languages: Arabic, English, Russian, Malaysian, 
Urdu, Farsi, Indonesian and French (a discussion about language use, later in this 
chapter). On one hand, these websites are beneficial for the Palestinians in the diaspora, 
since they can receive local news and information relating to the political situation as it is 
being portrayed by the political factions themselves. On the other hand, as most of the 
participants indicate, the Palestinian websites are not professional in terms of journalism, 
language and the ability to provide updated news. 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the political websites of established 
democratic governments and Palestinian political websites – whereas, there is 
transparency relating to the political websites of democratic countries, the Palestinian 
political parties operate websites which are not officially identified with the party. The 
websites do not include the name of the party, for example, but rather the Palestinian 
consumers know according to their content, as I was repeatedly told. Moreover, there are 
niche websites within the political factions, for example, the website ‘alwatanvoice’ that 
is identified with Mohamed Dahlan, of the Fatah party. A participant who does not read 
the Palestinian websites expressed his view, a typical response from participants in 
reference to political websites: 
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‘I do not read the Palestinian websites. They do not have good language and no 
good journalism. There is no formal journalism training. Western English 
speakers will not rely on the information (S., July. 2008, London). ' 
 
The use of Palestinian political websites is low. All the Palestinians I interviewed want to 
receive news from Palestine, but they cannot use the Palestinian political websites for this 
purpose. The reason is that the participants know that the news being published 
represents the faction that owns the site, and does not introduce news story that include 
representation of all sides. The Palestinian factions use their websites as an arena in 
which to conduct their political campaign. The Palestinians who wish to know the bigger 
picture do not use the websites. The Palestinians who have an interest in the faction’s 
activity and in the small details of the political party’s developments, read the websites, 
but the political websites will not be used as their only source and the participants would 
use other news websites to get a better understanding of the situation on the ground. 
Mahmoud uses Arab transnational media in addition to the Palestinian websites, because 
he knows that Arab media provide him with the news events as they unfold, including 
comments on all sides of a story:  
 
‘First, I read Maan News - West Bank. If the information is not enough, in terms 
of negotiations track and resistance track, then I go to Palestine Info and Al Aqsa 
website - if the action is in Gaza. Also Wafa - PLO Website. Al Jazeera Arabic- 
as a summing up. In Palestine Info and Wafa different stories relating to the 
conflict between Hamas and Fatah. That's why I look at Al Jazeera (Mahmoud).’ 
 
I have to say that Mahmoud, and other participants like him, also use Israeli news 
websites and U.K. news websites. Mahmoud says:  
 
 ‘Since I am an English teacher (in Gaza), I look at BBC English, because Al 
Jazeera is not enough (Mahmoud).’ 
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The participants look for objectivity in journalistic coverage. For them it means that a 
news story must be fair and accurate. The Palestinian audience in the U.K. knows the 
problems of the Palestinian media, such as the low salaries of journalists and self-
censorship. The expectations for news from the Palestinian websites are low. However, 
the participants describe them as propaganda websites. As such, they do not attract the 
audience’s attention and they do not fulfil the needs of the diasporic community for 
updated news from Palestine and Israel.  When I talk about ‘objectivity’, it is important to 
emphasise that there is a difference between Palestinian society and British society. In 
Britain, usually, the audience expects private and commercial media outlets not to serve 
as governmental advocates. In contrast, in Palestine, where the implantation of a 
democratic rule hasn’t yet been completed, the media are serving as a tool in the hands of 
political actors. 
 
The question is: what about the Palestinians in the diaspora, the Palestinians who are part 
of a traditional society, but are being exposed to Western ideology and live in a host 
democratic country?  The participants look at the Palestinian political websites, even 
though they read news online using multiple sources in languages other than Arabic 
(mostly English). This can be understood by the explanation of Ellul, who claims that 
individuals need propaganda because it provides that individual with the means to 
recognise their own importance within an otherwise alienating society (Ellul, 1965: 96). 
The participants certainly have adjusted to the flourishing Western media market that has 
been revealed to them through internet use. They consume news media critically and in 
that sense they have adopted Western audience practices, I argue. 
    
The Palestinians point to an objectivity problem, both in the news coverage of the 
Palestinian media, and in Western broadcasters’ news media. On one hand, they explain 
that the political parties’ websites serve political actors. On the other hand, they feel that 
the Western media are biased and favour the Israeli perspective. However, it is not only 
the Palestinians who feel that the media are biased, so do Western audiences, in relation   
to Arab media. This problem exists mainly because we are talking about crisis 
communication. Both the contemporary globally networked Arab and Western media 
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worlds mobilise satellite television channels as ‘weapons of mass communication’. Each 
side conveys its own perspective on conflicts in the Middle-East against the backdrop of 
its own politico-cultural baggage. Both sides use this platform for self-promotion (Hahn, 
in Sakr, 2007: 19).   
 
The internet does not lead to audience activism/resistance only from within, relating to 
the use of the Palestinian websites, but also to audience activism from without – 
resistance to Western ideologies being portrayed in Western media. The appropriation of 
new technology by oppressed communities as part of their everyday resistance made the 
internet an influential tool. Aouragh says that media activists mainly target audiences in 
the United States and Europe because media distortions about the Palestinian – Israeli 
conflict in the West favour Israel (Aouragh, 2008: 110). I agree with the claim that the 
internet serves as an important tool for mobilisation from without, but I disagree with 
Aouragh’s assumption that the Western media are biased and therefore media activism is 
needed. 
 
I suggest that Aouragh’s claim that the Western media are biased is misleading. Let me 
explain why. Since the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the interior political and military 
relationship inside the Palestinian Territories, are being televised, as well as online, the 
power of the pictures determines the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ actors. News bulletins at times 
of breaking news do not include the background story to the conflict, and thus the image 
of the wounded child, or of the terror attack, could eventually influence international 
audiences. The truth is that each side of the conflict, the Palestinians and the Israelis, find 
themselves under scrutiny, and each worries that international broadcasters have damaged 
the reputation of its own people at a time of crisis. As Marmura says: 
 
 "Pro-Palestinian rights activists have long insisted that Western, and particularly 
American, news media coverage of events in the Middle East is unfairly biased in 
a manner favorable to the state of Israel. Exactly the opposite claim has been 
made by Israel’s supporters… (Marmura, 2008: 37)." 
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Moreover, the fact that both governments – the Palestinian and the Israeli- and the people 
of both entities, feel that the Western media are biased, does not mean that they ignore 
the Western media. On the contrary, significant efforts from both sides are being carried 
out in order to win in this war of ‘pictures’ by promoting their cause on international 
broadcasters. Even more, the Palestinians use the internet as a prominent tool to publish 
in-depth articles about the roots of the conflicts in multiple languages, including English, 
in order to win the attention of the international community. According to Marmura, the 
players in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not only interested in sharing information 
with affiliates around the globe, but are also concerned with influencing the beliefs, and 
gaining the sympathies of Western and, specifically, American audiences (Marmura, 
2008).   
 
According to Georgiou, "diasporic media can become symbols of empowerment and can 
potentially mediate a group’s participation in the public sphere of the country where they 
live, in the public sphere of their country of origin, and in transnational public spheres 
that emerge across boundaries. Digitalisation has increased the potentials for the 
development of alternative, small-scale, community media- and so has the competition 
for audiences’ attention (Georgiou, 2006: 13)." 
 
 Let me conclude this point. Even if there is no objectivity in the Western media, as 
Aouragh claims, the Palestinians in the diaspora do not ignore it, but rather use 
international media outlets for news consumption, as well as investing resources to 
influence and participate in the Western media, to a certain extent. What is more, the 
Western media do not always have to be objective. The reason is that in Western societies 
there is no clear definition of objectivity. "Even in Western democracies it is difficult to 
draw a line that shows where objectivity exists and where it does not, bias does not exist.  
All charges of bias are predicated on a belief that an unbiased, objective reality exists 
from which the media is deviating. The problem is in identifying this position. 
Journalists’ criteria to put objectivity into practice are problematic - aren’t there more 
than two sides to any issue? What is fact? Recent theoretical approaches challenge the 
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notion of a ‘knowable reality’, arguing that no representation of reality can be accurate 
and true (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003: 197)". 
 
There are different factors that influence media content: the individual media worker and 
his preferences, organisational structures and routines, their influence on media 
practitioners and their work,  the interaction between media organisations and the wider 
social, political and cultural environment within which they operate (Williams, 2003: 97). 
Even more, not all news is intended to be objective. For example, McQuail identifies 
older versions of news, such as human interest, partisanship and the investigative 
functions of news, which contradict in some way what is expected of objective 
journalism (McQuail, 1992:189-91).  
 
The terminology being used in the news media is influencing tendencies to bias. Fowler’s 
critical linguistics theory suggests that the way language is used to report news is a 
structured process which should reveal the ideologies and values showing 'that discourse 
is always representation from a certain point of view' (Fowler, 1991: 209). Indeed, 
looking at Hamas’ main website - Palestine info in English, as an example, one can see 
that the terminology represents the content producers’ feelings towards the political 
situation in Palestine. i.e., the use of the terms ‘Israeli occupation army’, and ‘Israeli 
occupation forces’, referring to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF): 
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Tue 26 Apr 2011 
 
Israeli occupation forces arrest MP Nayef Rajoub 
[ 01/12/2010 - 10:33 PM ]  
 
 
Rajoub when he was released from an Israeli occupation jail, late June, 2010. 
 
From Khalid Amayreh in Occupied Palestine
The Israeli occupation army on Wednesday, 1 December, arrested Sheikh Nayef Rajoub, 
a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council from his home in the town of Dura, near 
Hebron in the southern West Bank. 
  
Eyewitnesses and family sources said Israeli occupation troops stormed the Legislative 
Council member's home around mid night, before ordering him at gun point to board an 
Israeli military vehicle. 
  
The latest arrest of Rajoub comes as part of the general Israeli policy of hounding Hamas' 
political leaders and keeping its ‘leaders’ in a constant state of anxiety and fear. 
  
Four Islamic members of the Legislative Council have been rearrested and sent for 
‘administrative detention’, or captivity without charge or trial. 
  
Rajoub, a former Religious Affair Minister, was released from Israeli detention on 20 
June, having spent as many as fifty months on largely concocted charges stemming from 
his association with the political wing of the Islamic Liberation movement, Hamas. 
  
 Rajoub has spent a total of ten years in Israeli jails and detention camps. 
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Israel routinely rounds up Islamist activists in the West Bank, mainly as a retribution for 
their rejection of the Israeli occupation.  
  
Rajoub, considered one of the most popular Islamist leaders in the southern West Bank, 
has also been hounded by the Palestinian Authority security agencies. 
  
A few weeks ago, crack PA troops stormed the Grand Mosque in Dura to prevent him 
from delivering a sermon at the Mosque. 
  
The incident was followed by an extensive arrest campaign targeting dozens of Islamic 
supporters, including many members of the Rajoub family.  
  
Some sources close to Nayef Rajoub's family accuse the PA of asking Israel to arrest the 
53-year-old Sheikh. The PA cannot arrest Rajoub because of his parliamentary immunity. 
  
Supporters of Hamas in the West Bank have been subjected to a harsh crackdown by the 
security forces of the PA. Human rights organisations operating in the West Bank have 
also spoken of widespread torture in PA lockups. 
  
Two main reasons are believed to stand behind the severe maltreatment meted out to 
Islamist activists in the West Bank at the hands of the PA: First, reprisal for the Hamas 
military takeover in Gaza in 2007, which ended Fatah's rule there; and, second, the PA 
belief that a sustained persecution of Hamas would grant the Ramallah regime a 
certificate of good conduct from Israel and the United States. 
 
palestine-info.co.uk ..... english@palestine-info.co.uk ..... Copyright palestine-info.co.uk -
© 2011 
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Another factor that emphasises the contest over interpretation is the images being 
transmitted. The interpretations being attributed to the images in the coverage of 
Palestine’s news, is a difficult issue to judge since the pictures being transmitted are 
stronger than any commentary, to put it differently, the ‘image war’ is a dominant factor 
that influences audiences. A very well known example is the shooting of the Palestinian 
boy, Mohammad al- Durra, 48 hours after the outbreak of the second Intifada, in 2000. 
This media event has been interpreted differently, as Palestinians claimed for Israeli 
aggression, while Israelis argued for Palestinian propaganda.    
 
The shooting of the Palestinian boy also demonstrates the utilisation of new media by 
Palestinians. Palestinian cameraman filmed the schoolboy being shot whilst his father 
tried to protect him. This event remained vivid and still occupies Arab and Western 
media organisations. Palestinian right activists attempted to draw public attention to the 
incident by entering an image taken from the footage into an online photo (Marmura, 
2008: 266). According to Khoury-Machool, "an immense surge of photographs and clips 
of the incident was sent, mainly by Palestinian youths, to every possible address on the 
web. The immediacy of reporting through the internet via independent youth ‘journalists’ 
revealed to the Palestinians the hidden potential of new media for the counter hegemony 
of old biases in the mainstream media (Khoury-Machool, 2007: 25)." In her research, on 
European Muslim Audiences, Tsagarousianou stresses that there is widespread 
dissatisfaction and lack of trust towards mainstream media, among minority and Muslim 
audiences. "The overwhelming majority of those who expressed an opinion seem to 
converge in believing that mainstream media are biased in one way or another. This bias 
is perceived in various ways. It is widely believed that broadcasting institutions and the 
press misrepresent Muslims in Europe, often associating them with political radicalism 
and religious fundamentalism (Tsagarousianou, 2012: 287)." 
Hamas Website – Palestine 
Info/English 
26 April 2011 
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The media acted (in the case of al- Durra, as an example) as the de facto public sphere, 
the site of intercommunication and the voice of the people. They humanised and 
personalised the events, and at the same time became the site of meaning and information 
for the community. A particularly striking example of this was the ‘Tiananmen Square’ 
photograph of the protester blocking the path of a tank during the 1989 student protests in 
China. The circulation of that image became an instant icon of the ‘universal’ struggle for 
human rights and democracy (Schirato & Webb, 2006: 170-171). 
  
I claim that participation in the virtual space, in order to receive news and to produce 
news, does not lead to Palestinian influence on the mainstream media. The increased 
offer and the technically advanced choices of the mainstream media, make it more 
difficult for alternative media to compete. However, the Palestinians are involved in 
establishing and expanding their formal and informal domestic and trans-state networks 
using both conventional and more sophisticated means of communication, especially the 
globalised new media (Sheffer in Sheffer, 2003: 27). 
 
Alimi points to the increasing literature that favours a less pessimistic view of media-
movement interaction. Scholars show how movement members can use media attention 
as a resource to attract potential adherents, how the media spotlight validates the 
movement and more (Alimi, 2007: 71). Unlike the case of more traditional mass media, 
news services providing information on the Web must operate within an environment 
where formerly marginalised groups circulate freely, and where their own products must 
compete with alternative sources of news (Marmura, 2008).   
  
Now, I would like to talk about propaganda and to explain the essence of the political 
websites. As an objectivity problem is evident in the Western media, so is governments’ 
PR. After the 9/11 suicide attacks on the U.S., the concept of public diplomacy, meaning 
governmental PR, was reformed. Based on their assumptions about a lack of accurate and 
balanced information about the U.S. and its values of freedom and democracy, political 
institutions in Washington invested huge amounts of money to win the hearts and minds 
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of people living in the Arab and Muslim worlds. One principal medium for this was 
international satellite broadcasting. 
 
I argue that propaganda in the Palestinian media is totally different from the 
governmental PR of Western democracies, in its characteristics and in its dissemination. 
Particularly in times of acute crises, Arab and Western satellite newscasters are disposed 
to open their programmes to governmental PR, apparently considering it a valid 
journalistic source (Hahn in Sakr, 2007: 23). Having said this, unlike state propaganda 
which serves to legitimate the state, in Palestine the ‘propagandas’ (Ellul, 1965) produced 
by a wide range of competing social/political organisations within Palestine.  
 
In contrast to the ability of Western governments to use the national media at times of 
crisis, the complexity of the media structure of Palestine prevents this option; Hamas 
operates its own television station, Al Aqsa TV, and the leadership in Ramallah controls 
Palestine TV. Also, commercial television in Palestine does not exist, and therefore 
financial considerations being taken by Western media broadcasters are not applied in the 
Palestinian context. To contextualise my argument through theory, I would say that 
Herman and Chomsky’s ‘propaganda model’ does not apply to the Palestinian media 
market. Herman and Chomsky, similarly to Murdock and Golding (1974), claimed that 
the propagandist nature of news is related to the fact that it is produced by a concentrated 
industry of several dozen profit making corporations that is dependent on advertising for 
profits and on government officials for its sources (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).   
 
The Palestinian political factions’ propaganda is thus different in nature from Western 
governments’ media use to mobilise political support. Palestinian political websites’ 
content is published by political activists and not by professionals. The implications are 
that the people who run the websites do not follow the journalistic codes: the language is 
emotional, the news is not diverse, there is no foreign news section, for example, and 
there is a lack of updated news at times of breaking news in Palestine and Israel.   
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The traditional media roles are not being implemented on political websites. To put it 
differently, these websites lack informative, analytical, and reporting functions. 
Moreover, it does not answer the ethical codes of accuracy, objectivity and fairness in the 
report. It is true that not only are the Palestinian media being problematic in this sense, 
but the problem of the political websites crosses the boundaries of the expected function 
of media organisations by openly ignoring the audience’s needs. 
 
Only 1 participant from 52 said that he looked for news only on the Palestinian political 
websites of Hamas and Fatah. Mohamad follows the changes on the websites as he has 
use them for many years, since he emigrated to the UK. Unlike the participants who use 
the political websites in addition to other Arab news websites, for 36 year old Mohamad, 
Palestinian websites are the source of information. Like the Palestinians who use the 
political websites in addition to other sources, Mohamad is aware of the fact that the 
websites are not professional, but this does not prevent him using them to read news from 
Palestine. Bahjat is the only participant who uses both political websites and Palestinian 
independent websites.  Pal Press, ‘relates to Fatah’, Palestine info’ to Hamas, Firas Press 
is ‘Independent’ and Maan News and Ramatan (news agencies). 
 
Multiple Languages – Increased Reach 
The transnational Arab media offer the audience websites in a variety of languages. The 
Palestinian media do the same. The use of languages in the Arab diasporic media is 
unique to this group. For example, if we look at the Israeli diasporic media, the websites 
are published in Hebrew and in English. Hamas’s website, Palestine info, provides the 
audience with the option to read its website in 8 languages: Arabic, English, Russian, 
Malaysian, Urdu, Farsi, Indonesian and French. The reasons for this are mainly because 
many Muslims in the diaspora cannot read the Arabic language, and Hamas and other 
Palestinian factions aim is to reach non-Arab audiences. One of the most interesting 
developments in the realm of the internet is its increasing multilingualisation. The 
hegemony of English as a transnational lingua franca persists, but is rapidly diminishing. 
Around two thirds of all internet users are not native speakers of English, but of Chinese, 
Spanish, German and French. According to Hafez, the internet is slowly breaking away 
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from its attachment to Western élites. On the other hand, the internet threatens to 
disintegrate into linguistic sub-communities, which runs counter to the notion that it is 
helping to globalise knowledge (Hafez, 2007: 103, 104-105).       
 
While prior to the WWW, the Palestinian political parties could not reach global 
audiences, today the internet allows Arab and non-Arab audiences to read Palestine’s 
news. As a result, audiences interact and discuss Palestine issues. For example: 
Palestinian Blogs website (http://palblogger.blogspot.com) includes a list of 125 countries 
with a total of 11,382 visitors. 
 
The participants attribute to the use of multiple languages a very important role for the 
Palestinian people. It is not only that they embrace the political parties’ initiatives, but 
they also read news in languages other than Arabic, mostly in English. In general, the 
Palestinians interviewed read the Palestinian and Arab websites in Arabic and the Israeli 
media in English or Arabic translations. However, there are particularities at which it is 
important to look: the penetration of the Al Jazeera international network into the media 
market created a significant change in the Arab media market. For the first time, an Arab 
network providing 24 hours news competed with Western networks, such as CNN.  
 
"Besides being more visual and drawing on their past for their war coverage, Arab media 
imitated the Western modes of representation. For instance, Arab media, like the 
American media, used ‘war rooms’, staffed with retired generals who discussed the war 
(on Iraq) and how it should proceed. Many Arab reporters and producers, like their 
Western counterparts, knew what their listeners and readers wanted to see and read; and 
they gave it to them (Hashem, 2004: 161)."  
 
However, the English version of Al Jazeera does not broadcast only to Western 
audiences. An increasing number of Palestinians look at the English website in addition 
to the Arabic version. Others read only the English version. There are Palestinians who 
do not master the Arabic language, for a variety of different reasons, for instance, the 
Palestinians who were born in the U.K. There are also Palestinians who prefer to use Al 
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Jazeera International because they think it is more professional than the Arabic version, 
or Palestinians that prefer to read news in English because their formal education has 
been obtained in the U.K. The participants’ use of the internet has also facilitated links 
with Palestinians throughout the globe. A growing phenomenon is the formation of social 
links online for the purpose of news dissemination and discussion forums. 
 
The Palestinian Media – The Social Dimension 
As I explained earlier, the Palestinians’ use of media for news is not the passive use of 
watching news. It is also not only active use, where they interpret and choose news. It is, 
rather, news from Palestine which is part of their political and existential daily struggle 
and identity formation. News media also shape the participants’ social contacts.   
 
It would be easy to understand the meaning of news for participants if we were to 
compare the Palestinian audience to Western audiences. For Western audiences in the 
diaspora, the use of news media is trivial. News media operating in a free and competitive 
media market are one of the foundations of any democratic state. In contrast to Western 
audiences, the Palestinians’ place of origin is an entity where access to news online is 
limited and television stations, as well as the print media, in Palestine have been affected 
by the political situation. 
 
Once they emigrated to the U.K., the participants’ news practices have changed 
significantly. They have a strong interest in news from Palestine and a real need to 
receive updated news daily; they would therefore look for news media a few times a day 
on a variety of media broadcasters’ and news websites. They also contact their families 
and friends in Gaza and the West Bank to receive updated news from primary sources (as 
the participants define family’s and friends’ updates), and more detailed information 
about specific news stories that relate to them. 
 
The centrality of news in the lives of Palestinians crosses age, occupation and economic 
status. Most participants look for updated news every day and more than once a day. 
Sam, a 28 year old student, says: 
 184
 
‘The news for me, for the Palestinians, is very important. In Gaza the culture is 
different than the U.K. - people watch news all the time. People are not working 
and they watch news and talk about the news all day. Things happen. In the U.K., 
people watch news only in the morning, before they go to work and in the evening 
when they come home (Sam).’ 
 
P. a professional, said:  
 
‘I follow news every hour. I read news 2 hours a day. I use the Internet on my 
mobile. I read it on the train. I have 3 blogs and I read over than 100 blogs. I 
participate in two levels: first, I comment. Secondly, I write articles. The people 
who use the blogs are from Western Europe, mostly U.K. and the U.S., the Silicon 
Valley.’  
 
Indeed, political programmes are the most important programmes for the Palestinians in 
Palestine in the morning, during the day and in the evening (United States Agency for 
International Development online publication, 2006: 6). 
 
Most of the participants not only search for news, but are also involve in media and 
political activities which aim to provide meaning for news for U.K. and transnational 
audiences. I call it the ‘politicisation of Palestine’s news’.  
 
For example, Mahmoud’s case; the Israeli occupation is a dominant issue in Mahmoud’s 
life, a 40 year old Ph.D. student and a teacher. Following the bombing of the Gaza Strip 
by Israel in January, 2009, Mahmoud organised a demonstration in the city in which he 
lives in the U.K. He has managed to mobilise, for this purpose Arab and non-Arab 
protesters. The coverage of the demonstration by the local media, online, helped 
Mahmoud and his fellow Palestinians to gain the audiences’ attention for their problems 
and concern for their families in Gaza. U.K. politicians commented on the situation 
online, also. This is, of course, only one example of Mahmoud’s political activity. 
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A. is a member of ‘Action Palestine’. He reads news every day for 2 hours, and checks 
news updates at least 3 times a day. He explains: 
 
‘I am very interested in what is happening back home. I read U.K. media because 
I am interested in what the British media has to say. I do not have an interest in 
local news’. 
 
Mahmoud, A., and many other participants, act for the Palestine cause and follow 
Palestine’s news as their first priority in their news selection (not necessarily using 
Palestinian media for this purpose). The discourse about news events among the 
Palestinian community members is dominant – it gathers the participants together and 
constructs their national political aspirations. Moreover, they have developed their own 
terminology for discussing the news media.  
 
I interviewed Sazar, a 35 year old housewife, and her son, Yaser. Sazar talks about news 
events using terms that have become part of the consensus among the Palestinians: 
 
‘Al Aqsa talks more about Palestine. The Holocaust, Yaser, the Holocaust, when 
was it? We saw the Holocaust on Al Aqsa TV and Radio.’ 
 
However, no less important for the participants is the use of news media that have been 
created. Their enormous participation in hundreds of blogs, chat sites and social news 
websites indicates the importance of news in the lives of Palestinians, the importance the 
participants attribute to the news that has been disseminated for contact with the Arab 
circle, as well as, the ability of the Palestinians to use the internet to publish their news 
stories in order to reach audiences beyond the Arab world. Since the mainstream media 
will not dedicate much space to background information, the Palestinians publish their 
own personal accounts. According to Hanieh, the internet lets Palestinians speak for 
themselves in their own voice, without mediation or distortion from outside bodies or 
interests (‘news by newsmakers’). Those involved in newsworthy events can choose what 
to present, rather than passively allowing others to represent and reinterpret developments 
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in Palestine (Hanieh, 1999: 42). This trend helps Arab, as well as, Western Audiences, to 
learn in-depth about news stories from Palestine and the region. 
 
Research conducted by the Glasgow University Group: The Israeli Palestinian conflict: 
TV News and Public Understanding, showed that many people had little understanding of 
the reasons for the Israeli Palestinian conflict and its origins. "It was apparent that this 
lack of understanding was compounded by the news reports which they had watched. A 
key reason for this was that explanations were rarely given about the news and, when 
they were, journalists often spoke obliquely. It was apparent that many people did not 
understand that the Palestinians were subject to military occupation and did not know 
who was ‘occupying’ the occupied territories. The researchers of this study argue that 
there are two main reasons for the lack of better explanations of the history and context of 
events. Firstly, news exists in a very commercial and competitive market and is 
concerned about audience ratings. The second reason relates to the fact that to explain the 
history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which underlies the violence could be very 
controversial (Philo et al, in Thussu & Freedman, 2003: 133; 136)." 
 
Wiegand’s research suggests that Western media coverage of the Islamic world is 
problematic. The researcher, who specialises in Middle Eastern politics, claims that the 
term ‘Islam’ is used frequently in the media. It is rarely defined clearly, allowing for 
misinterpretations of what Islam truly represents. In the West, Islam is most commonly 
seen as a dominant non-Western culture, deemed by many to be inferior, but also 
dangerous. The Islamic world is almost always portrayed strictly in the light of conflicts 
that exist among and between Muslims and other outside groups. However, the 
misperception created by the media is that many of these conflicts are the result of 
religious identity. Yet, many of these conflicts, such as the Israeli - Palestinian conflict 
and the Bosnian –Serbian conflict, which are linked to Islam, are not rooted in Islam as 
many of the media suggest. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians 
aim to protect and fight for territory for their national/ethnic group, not solely to defend 
their religious identity (Islam or Christianity), but also their ethnicity and nationality as 
Palestinians (Wiegand, 2000: 236). 
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Most participants respond to news stories on line. Many are involved, on a private or 
public level, in media activities. For instance, 37 year old G. has a blog where she talks 
about the loss of her parents’ house and her personal trauma. The Palestinian community 
in the U.K. also often arranges events where they discuss the problems of news coverage 
in the region and the news stories of the day. For this purpose, they invite Palestinian and 
Israeli journalists, who provide them with their own personal accounts of conflict 
coverage. Usually, the Palestinians read the journalists’ articles that are discussed, on a 
regular basis. The centrality of news in the Palestinians’ life existed while the participants 
were living in Palestine.  The majority of Palestinians follow the news on a daily basis 
(United States Agency for International Development Online Publication, 2006: 5); and 
news has remained a central factor of their new life in the U.K.  
 
The significant change that participants experienced in their new host country is not in 
their need for news – this need has always been dominant in their life and still is. The fact 
that they left Palestine does not mean that they do not ‘live’ Palestine every day. They 
cannot detach Palestine’s news from their daily experiences. The major change, then, is 
not in their need for news but rather in their reception of news. In this respect, I refer to 
two issues. First, the polarisation between the non-democratic entity from which the 
participants came, and the democratic state they live in today; which means a shift from 
news consumption in a non-free media environment, to participation in a competitive 
media market with the possibility of consuming transnational news 24 hours a day. 
Secondly, the way participants learned to use the advantages of the new technologies, in 
particular, the internet. In Palestine, about 50% of Palestinians had never used the internet 
(United States Agency for International Development Online Publication, 2006: 7); since 
media access in Palestine is limited, the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank discuss 
news and receive information from each other, this hasn’t changed in the U.K. They still 
feel that they need to receive updates from family and friends back home as a major 
source, despite their extensive use of online news media. They did not neglect this source, 
but were empowered by using online transnational news. The internet has replaced the 
traditional social networks and participants use the internet as the new social network that 
has actually been created in order to talk about news and, even more, to mobilise support 
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as a routine, and especially following major news events such as conflict escalation in 
Palestine. 
 
 "Software applications for pcs and portable devices such as 
smartphones…provide information, contribute to the construction of Muslim 
soundscapes, and, more broadly, meaningful, local, everyday personal spaces. 
They also contribute to the construction of Muslim geographies that can transcend 
locality and national borders and increase the element of choice, making possible 
the fashioning of Muslim personal spaces on the basis of individual preference 
(Tsagarousianou, 2012: 292)."     
 
 
Interfacing between the Islamic and Western worlds through expert media and communications 
Unitas Communications, one of the UK’s leading Media Relations and Communications agencies, 
which specialises in Muslim community affairs, offers a free two week trial of its daily news digest of 
all mainstream news relevant to Muslim communities and Islam. 
Please click below for a sample or to join. 
 
Breaking headlines relating to Muslims and Islam in the U.K. and globally 
 
Morning news before 10.30 am each working day 
 
Up-to-date issues to keep you informed about what’s going on at home and abroad 
 
Accessible via Blackberry and iPhone 
 
Click here for a sample copy 
 
Unitas Communications is offering a two-week FREE trial - email 
 
sabilah@unitascommunications.com to register your interest today 
Follow us on Twitter for real-time news updates and insight in relevant issues: www.twitter.com/ 
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unitascomms 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the new medium – the internet has significantly influenced 
the news consumption practices of participants, as well as their social contacts. Being part 
of the Palestinian diasporic community, most of the participants read and watch news 
online. This is a different habit than is usual in Palestine, where most of the residents use 
traditional media for news (although, in recent years, the use of the internet in Palestine 
has increased). 
 
 The participants are active internet users – they respond to news stories online, create 
blogs, and so on. There is extensive use of social network websites that serve to 
disseminate news from Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinians in the U.K. interact 
with Palestinians who reside in Palestine and in the diaspora. The websites enable an easy 
flow of information, as they are not regulated and do not suffer as a result of the political 
situation, for example, closure problems. The frequency of usage is high – most of the 
participants look for news few times a day and they read/watch news in details, as well as 
searching for articles and analysis, not only for the news of the day. 
 
24 year old Sami, whose place of origin is Ramallah, uses the websites every day: 
‘Sometimes 10 minutes, sometimes half an hour, depends on the news. If there is news 
from Ramallah, I look at the responses.’ 
 
A Promotion for Unitas Communications – Daily News Muslim 
Network  
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Chapter 5 
Findings - News from Home and Israeli Media 
 
Introduction 
This chapter includes answers to the main questions of the research. First, an analysis of 
the participants’ preferences relating to their first priority medium. The finding, which 
relates to this question, is that the internet is the major medium that participants use for 
news consumption. The argument of this research is that the internet was revolutionary 
(Aouragh, 2011: 1). It created many changes in the life of the Palestinian communities in 
the diaspora (an issue that is being discussed in this chapter). Secondly, a discussion of  
level of interest in news from the homeland and news from the host country. Thirdly, an 
elaboration of their reasons for using the internet. Fourthly, specific websites/television 
networks/publications that the participants use, looking for the reasons standing behind 
their priorities, will be mentioned. The analysis refers to media consumption practices at 
times of breaking news and as a routine. The main finding is that Israeli media is a 
prominent news source, both at times of breaking news and habitually. More than half of 
the participants use Israeli media as a routine. This chapter also explores the topic of 
identity formation.   
 
My aim is to provide an understanding of the challenge to the Palestinian Diasporic 
audience, while using the media – on one hand, news consumption is vital for the 
Palestinians because Palestine is a conflict zone and Palestinians in the diaspora have 
strong feelings of solidarity with Palestinians in Palestine, on the other hand, problems of 
self censorship, curfews and lack of resources prevent the existence of a stable 
Palestinian media market. This chapter includes a discussion about the media 
consumption practices of Palestinians. The data analysis takes into account different 
variables, such as the number of years in the host country, and gender. Finally, this 
chapter will investigate the changes the WWW has created in the lives of Palestinians in 
the diaspora.  
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Television and Internet Usage 
I asked my participants both general and specific questions. I opened my interviews with 
the general question: which medium is being used the most for news consumption? None 
of the participants use old media as their main medium. The data analysis therefore 
relates to Internet and Television usage. From analysis of the interviews, it is clear that 
the internet is the main medium being used for news consumption.  
 
For the first respondent, the internet is the main source of information: 
 
 ‘The students, including me do not have the money to travel back to Palestine to 
visit. Also, there are restrictions on travel to Gaza, and Palestinians need visa to 
travel in Europe. I have to do my field work in Spain, and not sure I can get a 
visa. That’s the reason (why) the internet is important for the young Palestinians. 
The internet does not cost money and also it’s available. The Palestinians here are 
students. They do not have money; they work many hours (First respondent, 
Exeter University, June 2008).’ 
 
He reads news, online, every day: 
 
‘First, I read Maan News - West Bank. If the information is not enough, in terms 
of negotiations track and resistance track, then I go to Palestine Info and Al Aqsa 
website - if the action is in Gaza. Also Wafa* - PLO Website. Al Jazeera Arabic- 
as a summing up. In Palestine Info and Wafa different stories relating to the 
conflict between Hamas and Fatah. That's why I look at Al Jazeera.’ 
 
He thinks that Hamas websites are more professional than Fatah websites: ‘Hamas uses 
moderate language in its websites, comparing to Fatah. They convey without attacking.’  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* On June 18th, 2009 The Palestinian News Agency Wafa launched a news website in   
   Hebrew. 
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S., 24 year old prefers the Internet on any other medium: 
 
‘I can read any time; I read what I think is relevant and I can check if I do not 
have time.’  
 
S., A 27 year old sees in the new technology an advantage that other media cannot 
provide, and uses the Internet almost every day for news:  
 
‘The Internet… different ideas and views, I can judge.’   
 
This finding indicates the gap between media consumption practices in Palestine and the 
media consumption practices of Palestinians in the U.K. In Palestine, 50% of the 
Palestinians never used the internet, due to lack of language skills and the worsening 
economic situation. Throughout the West Bank and Gaza, television is the primary source 
of information (United States Agency for International Development online publication, 
2006: 5). Though, in recent years there has been growth in internet use in Palestine, it is 
mainly on the West Bank and not in the Gaza Strip, internet access in Palestine is also 
limited, and there are linguistic and cultural barriers (Hanieh, 1999: 43), as discussed in 
the first chapter. In contrast, the participants (in this research) use the internet as their 
primary source for news consumption. Their access to the internet is relatively high and I 
can define them as a global audience. In contrast, in Gaza and the West Bank, or in any 
other Arab country, access to the internet is relatively low and, accordingly, news 
consumption relies mostly on local sources. 
 
Being part of the Diasporic community means, for them, taking part in Palestinian events 
and keeping contacts with other Palestinian Diasporic communities, and with the 
Palestinians in Palestine, using the new technology, e.g., creating blogs and websites for 
this purpose. The Palestinians use the internet as the main medium for news consumption, 
as well as to promote the Palestinians’ cause. The Palestinians’ daily news consumption 
is vital. The reason is that ‘Palestine’ is a conflict zone and many Palestinians have 
family and friends back ‘home’. News consumption is not only important for personal 
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reasons but, rather, the Palestinians in the diaspora wish to receive political updates. As 
discussed in this thesis, the Palestinian community is politicised – individuals and groups 
operate in different arenas to gain international awareness for Palestine’s e problem.  
 
The challenge for the Palestinians is to find the channels from which to receive daily 
news updates, since the Palestinian media lack the resources to become professional 
media. In addition to this, security and political instability in the region are threatening 
the media outlets’ daily functioning; many media organisations have to stop their work 
for a variety of reasons, the access of journalists is limited , there are also problems of 
self censorship. For these reasons, the flow of news from Palestine has been affected.   
 
This problem is mainly evident with the Palestinian political websites that, according to 
the participants in this research, distribute news stories that aim to promote political 
agendas. The Palestinian political websites’ content is being published by political 
activists and not by professionals. The implications are that the people who run the 
websites do not follow the journalistic code: the language is emotional, the news is not 
diverse, there is no foreign news section, for example, and there is a lack of updated news 
at times of breaking news in Palestine and in Israel. 
   
As most of the participants indicate, the Palestinian websites are not professional in terms 
of journalism, language and the ability to provide updated news. A participant who does 
not read the Palestinian websites expressed his view, a typical response from the 
participants relating to the political websites: 
 
'I do not read the Palestinian websites. They do not have good language and no 
good journalism. There is no formal journalism training. Western English 
speakers will not rely on the information (S., July, 2008, London).'  
 
As a result, the Palestinians use a variety of websites in different languages. To put it 
differently, the Palestinian media is not their main source of news. Interestingly enough, 
Israeli media is being used the most habitually and at times of breaking news. The 
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participants perceive the Israeli media to be professional and liberal. There is thus 
extensive use of Israeli news websites. Haaretz’ news website is the most popular Israeli 
news source. The news website is the website of the print newspaper, Haaretz, which is 
the only broadsheet published in Hebrew, in Israel. The participants use the English 
version of this news website. 
 
It is important to emphasise that Israeli audiences and broadcasters use the Arab media in 
order to learn about the Arab voice. Arab news media are a very important feature of 
Israeli television and radio news bulletins and of the Israeli print media. Israeli media 
outlets employ Arabic speaking journalists for the purpose of listening to transnational 
Arab media broadcasters and websites, and Palestinian media, and they report on Arab 
news as they are transmitted. In addition, on many occasions, Israeli television broadcasts 
live news reports from Arab television networks, such as Al Jazeera, Lebanese television, 
and so on. Israeli national television, Channel 1, also broadcasts news in Arabic. 
 
The Reasons for Using the Internet 
The participants that prefer to use the internet over any other medium, for news 
consumption, are not a homogeneous group. As explained earlier, the disadvantages of 
the Palestinians in Palestine relating to their media consumption: lack of resources and 
lack of language skills, do not apply to these participants. In other words, the common 
feature of all the participants is their easy access to the internet, as well as their usage in 
languages other than Arabic for news consumption. What are the differences, then?  
 
First, I would like to relate to the division of Internet users according to gender. 
Palestinian society is a patriarchal society where women, in most cases do not have the 
same personal and professional opportunities as men. There are therefore more 
participants who are men, also, many men emigrated without their families (wives and 
children). As Bowker says: 
  
"Socially and politically, Palestinian society – like most Arab societies – is highly 
stratified and patriarchal. Family and kinship ties are central to Palestinian 
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society, finding expression in the dominant influence of family on the 
socialisation and subsequent control over many aspects of the lives of individuals 
(Bowker, 2003: 42)." 
 
The question I explore is the use in the internet and television by Palestinian women in 
comparison to that of men. The Palestinian women who emigrated to the U.K. are not a 
representative sample of the women in Palestine. Most of the women who live in the 
U.K. have financial means and they are educated, or are students at different levels. They 
lead a different life than most of the women from Gaza and the West Bank, who simply 
cannot emigrate because of financial challenges, as well as the difficulties of obtaining a 
visa. The women I discuss are those who use the internet as their main medium. Later I 
will discuss the media consumption of the participants who watch television news as their 
main source of information. The number of women using the internet is relatively low, 
compared to men, but as opposed to the men’s group, all the women that mainly use the 
internet for updated news are educated and professional, or are students, except for one 
woman, who has no higher education and she is a housewife. In contrast, only a few men, 
who use the internet as their major source, are professionals. Amongst the men, there is 
thus no correlation between education and professionalism and internet usage. In 
addition, the fact that the men who work in non-professional jobs do not have internet 
availability, as professional workers have, does not prevent them from using the internet. 
In other words, even though the men do not use internet at work, it is their main medium 
for news consumption. They thus look for news online outside their working hours – 
either at home or in the library. This fact signifies the increasing influence of the internet 
on Palestinians.  
 
Compared to the men, the women’s work is dominated by the new technology 
environment and they use the internet not only to read news, but also to receive news that 
they select from various sources and many of them have blogs. I asked them why they 
preferred the internet and the main reasons are: availability, selectivity and immediate 
updates. "In a historical context, since the attempt to form a media watch group to combat 
unacceptable images about women on satellite television, groups of women from 
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different countries in the Middle East have taken advantage of easier communication via 
the internet, to share their experiences in this field" (Sakr, 2001: 197). Wajcman’s 
argument strengthens my findings; in her research Feminism Confronts Technology, she 
says that women are constructed, and construct themselves, as ‘other’ to men. In our 
society, ‘technical competence is central to the dominant cultural ideal of masculinity, 
and its absence is a key feature of stereotyped femininity’ (Wajcman, 1991: 159). 
Consequently, women’s reluctance to be technological can be attributed to cultural 
structures which differentiate women from men (Green, 2002: 172). 
   
 The men’s main reasons, for choosing the internet are similar, but they also added that 
the internet is quicker and is a hypermedia (Hanieh, 1999: 43), that allows them to look 
simultaneously at a few websites. Let me quote two men’s’ replies: 24 year old Sami who 
emigrated to the U.K. to learn English: 
 
‘I can search for news, even yesterday’s news, and see everything. I can print, 
look at pictures and take notes. I am using the Internet all the time for emails, so 
it's easy to use the websites. I use Google to find news. I do not need to buy 
newspapers. I receive results from Al Quds, Maan, BBC... I use the Internet at the 
library in the college, I do not have a computer (Sami).’ 
 
Mahmoud, 40 year old, PhD student: 
 
‘The websites are important, you cannot live without it. I have access to 
newspapers, but it's the traditional way.  The students, including me, do not have 
money to travel back to Palestine to visit. Also, there are restrictions on travel to 
Gaza, and Palestinians need a visa to travel in Europe. That's the reason (why) the 
internet is important for the young Palestinians (Mahmoud).’ 
 
In contrast to the Palestinian community in the U.K., most of the Arab diaspora in 
Germany came under the auspices of the German Asylum Law and the Political Asylum 
Law (1980). Most parents belong to the first generation, are unemployed, and, as 
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refugees, live off the welfare assistance they receive from the state authorities. The media 
consumption practices among the two Palestinian Diasporic communities, in Europe, are 
very different. In Germany, most women were consumers of television rather than the 
internet; they did not use the internet. The women usually did not consume German 
media, but relied heavily on Arab Television (Rinnawi, 2012: 1459). In contrast to the 
women in Germany, most of the Palestinian women in the U.K., use the internet as the 
main medium for news consumption; they are notably educated and professional, or they 
are students. Another major difference between the two communities relates to the 
content aspect:  whilst in Germany, Palestinian men prefer news and talk shows, the 
women favour entertainment (Rinnawi, 2012: 1460); in the U.K., both men and women 
use the media mainly for news consumption. 
 
I asked my participants which medium they used most for news consumption. The 
majority said that they use the internet for this purpose. The participants not only read 
news online, but also watch television news on the internet; some of them read news on 
their mobile phones. Only a few watch television for news. 
   
The internet serves as an efficient tool for the reception of news from Palestine, since 
terrestrial and satellite television in the U.K. lack many channels that the Palestinians 
would like to use. For example, it is only the internet that enables them to receive news 
from Palestinians news agencies and, in some cases, the Palestinian political websites. 
Most importantly, Israeli media is a major source of information for the participants, and 
they only have access to them online. Moreover, many of the participants do not have a 
television set at home, or a connection to satellite television. Television is a minor 
medium among the participants.  
 
The main reasons that the participants use the internet as their major medium are: 
availability, selectivity, variety of news websites, and financial considerations. Above all, 
the participants explained to me that the internet symbolises for them a shift from the 
traditional to the modern way of news consumption. The implications for them are not 
only at the technical level, but also at the message level. The internet empowers the 
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Palestinians – the Palestine problem is no longer the problem of a minority in a remote 
area, but is a problem that lies at the heart of the global community. As Ghada says: 
 
‘Palestine is an Islamic issue, not only Palestine; it opens a window to the 
international world. If the first Intifada was covered by the websites, it would 
bring the Palestinians cause. Now you are part not only of a million people in 
Palestine, but part of one billion, a community (Ghada, Exeter, June, 2008).' 
 
R., who lives in the U.K. 30 years, sees the internet as a major source of information, 
saying that the internet has changed her news consumption practices. Whereas in the past 
she read Palestine’s news in the newspaper, today she reads online, she describes the 
journey she has been through: 
 
'All of a sudden, everybody online. My mother (in Nablus) starts speaking on the 
internet. I use mostly the internet. I read Maan News and Electronic Intifada…I 
read The Guardian…Al Jazeera. At times of big news events, I check the internet 
and ITV headlines on Teletext on TV. In the past, I checked Palestine’s news in 
the newspaper.’  
 
Similarly, M. says: 
 
‘The websites are important, you cannot live without it. I have access to 
newspapers, but it's the traditional way.’ 
 
The benefits of the internet for the Palestinians are explained by Aouragh thus: 
 
"It (the internet) could help defy the repression of everyday life in Palestine by 
overcoming the limitations of checkpoints and occupation and thus generate 
feelings of ‘mobility’ and ‘political autonomy’…the great enthusiasm for the 
online possibilities which the internet offers Palestinians reveals essential facts 
about offline limitations...they allude…to the absence of The Independent 
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territory; free access to the very infrastructures necessary for free debate, free 
mobility, and free democratic decision making (Aouragh, 2011: 2)."    
 
Rinnawi’s research, into the Arab diaspora in Europe, indicates that ‘members of this 
virtual community are no longer a marginalised minority, but are members of a majority 
via television and the web, since they are members of a virtual community. These groups 
remain less assimilated into their host societies’ (Rinnawi, 2012: 1456). In making Arabs 
and Muslims in the West less of a minority, the web increases not only their sense of 
identity as Arabs and Muslims, but also their self-confidence (Harb & Bessaiso, 2006; 
Miladi, 2006; Matar, 2006; Rinnawi, 2010; Sedgwick, 1998). 
 
Other researchers, i.e., Ros, point to the benefits of the information society, alongside the 
challenges. Although there are new potentials for information transmutation in migration 
contexts, there is still a lack of information among most migrants. At the level of 
migration policies, the new tools of the information society have not yet been used to 
solve the basic problem of a lack of information, both before and after the arrival in a 
new country (Ros, 2010: 26-7).  
 
The next issue to be discussed is the issue of democracy, with a particular reference to the 
internet. In the late 1990s, the internet began to shed its one-time image of being 
predominantly a medium of communication for highly educated and affluent white males 
living in the metropolitan areas of the industrialised world (Slevin, 2000: 41). Sarikakis 
and Thussu argue that in the initial years of the internet’s expansion, it was hailed as a 
democratising communication tool, with the potential to create a global public sphere. 
However, they claim, in developing countries, the lack of telecommunication 
infrastructure continues to limit access to the internet. Users are also generally male, 
middle class and fluent in English. Internet access divides rich from poor, urban from 
rural, educated from illiterate, men from women, and young from old (Sarikakis & 
Thussu in Sarikakis & Thussu, 2006: 8).    
Looking at my case study, I would say that the internet links groups and does not divide 
them. The use of the internet is available for free in any library in the U.K. or at a low 
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cost in an internet café, for example. The meaning of this is that the socio-economic 
status of an individual is marginal in the relationship being created in cyber space. IT 
undivides what was previously divided. It makes it possible for marginalised people to 
access middle and upper class circuits. For example, as members of virtual communities 
their true lower-class identities are not revealed, something they could not hide in 
physical-interface interaction (Laguerre, 2010:56).  
 
Moreover, individuals and groups can use the internet to reach people worldwide. 
"Anyone can disseminate his messages online without the restrictions of one’s personal 
condition. As has been argued, it is easy and virtually free to broadcast video and audio 
over the web (Hanieh, 1999: 42)." "Through the Internet, the diaspora found a tool with 
which to talk, back and forth, and to see each other via instant messaging, using voice 
chat and web cam; this involved both interactivity between countries and intra-activity 
within a country. Managing internet content can be learned in community centres, or 
from friends (Aouragh, 2011: 76)." In relation to the use of language, even in developing 
areas such as Palestine, the leadership has utilised the fact that Western audiences read 
mostly in English, and they publish their websites in English, as well as in other 
languages, to gain public attention and support.   
  
As a result of the new technologies, there is an increasing number of news websites. Not 
all of them are from professional, journalistic news sources. Some of them are 
manipulative. I can understand why it is difficult to see the benefit of this phenomenon to 
democracy and the critique that discusses the lack of audience participation in the 
political process. Nevertheless, as far as my research is concerned and in the light of my 
interview results, I claim differently. For the members of the diasporic community, the 
revolution of the internet is valuable for the following reasons: firstly, there are limited 
Palestinian television news channels. The internet thus provides this audience with 
updated news 24 hours a day. Among the available websites there are propaganda 
websites, but the Palestinians are aware of this fact and they use a variety of websites. 
The audience use also non-Palestinian websites, for example, there is extensive use of 
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Israeli news sources online, which is very important for the Palestinians and for access to 
this source of information, which could not be achieved without the internet.   
 
In contrast to the perception that the quality of information online is declining (as I 
discussed above), there are scholars who describe websites users as a sophisticated 
audience. Althaus and Tewksbury found that the desirability of control and political 
knowledge were significantly positively correlated with time spent reading newspapers 
and using the web for information seeking, and for watching entertainment television 
programmes (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2000: 31).  
 
These findings are consistent with prior research indicating that politically 
knowledgeable people are attracted more to information rich newspapers, whereas people 
with a lower level of political knowledge prefer television news (Neuman, Just & Crigler, 
1992). For the Palestinian community, the engagement in politics is part of their daily 
life. According to Hammer, "in the self-perceptions of Palestinians in Arab countries as 
well as in Western countries, everything tends to be political, and all groups in society , in 
one way or another, are involved in politics (Hammer, 2005: 171)".    
 
The use of the internet as a new technology is also more dominant in the diaspora than in 
Palestine. It would be too ambitious to say that this new opportunity will lead directly to 
the implantation of democratisation processes among this community, but I do stress that, 
for the Palestinian community, the internet is very important for receiving, sending and 
talking about news with their fellow Palestinians in the diaspora and outside of it. 
 
"The internet has become an alternative source of knowledge about Palestine and 
Palestinians. Media coverage of the first Intifada (1987-1991), in particular, helped young 
Palestinians identify with their fellow Palestinians in Palestine, and generated a new 
sense of pride in being Palestinian. As this media coverage was often unfavourable to the 
Palestinians, Palestinians have learned to read between the lines and have also turned to 
independent sources of information, as is evident from the proliferation of web sites and 
email lists (Hammer, 2005: 220)". 
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As I said, only a small group of participants use television for news consumption. Their 
professional background is different. Few of those who prefer television for news, also 
watch drama channels , the Islam channel and the documentary channel, Alhiwar, which 
‘broadcast documentaries relates to Palestine’ (Maryam). The first age group (17-26) 
includes 4 participants: 2 men, one of them is a restaurant worker and the other is a 
student, and 2 women, a teacher and a student. The second age group includes a man, 
who is a doctoral student, and 2 women who are housewives. The third group includes a 
man who is a consultant.  
 
The group with the biggest number of participants is the fourth group (age group of the 
first generation Palestinians -- 47-66). It includes 4 men, a doctoral student, a 
supermarket worker, cardiologist and a professor. The two women in this group are a 
former lawyer, who works at Arab Media Watch, and a housewife. 
 
The reasons the participants use television as the main source for news are varied: as one 
can see, the proportion of men using the internet as the main medium for news 
consumption is significantly higher than the women using the internet. In contrast, for 
television news, the proportion of men watching television news, as their main medium, 
is higher than that of women, but only slightly.  
   
Another difference that it is interesting to look at relates to the fourth group (47-66): 
while this group is the smallest one among internet users, it is the biggest group among 
the participants who prefer to watch television for news. This finding fits internet 
research theories that suggest that internet is being used mostly by the younger 
generation. By the century’s end, the average age of internet users worldwide was thirty-
five. In the United States, the largest proportion of users were aged between eighteen and 
thirty-four (Slevin, 2000: 42). Rinnawi (2012) made similar findings in his study of the 
Arab diaspora in Europe. Rinnawi’s findings point to significant differences between the 
two generations of the Arab community. While television is considered the main form of 
media for the parents, the internet is the most important medium for the younger 
generation (Rinnawi, 2012: 1458). 
 203
 
The use of the internet by the younger generation is particularly evident in Palestinian 
society. The younger generation of Palestinians has more trust than others (this relates to 
Palestinians of the first generation) in the internet as a source of information because they 
are the primary users and have more familiarity with it (United States Agency for 
International Development Online Publication, 2006: 31). 
 
All the participants in the age group 47-66 who use the internet are professionals. This 
explains the fact that they use the internet for news, because they are being exposed to the 
internet as part of their daily work. The new technology, globalisation and transnational 
media are all phenomena with which they are familiar, and they enjoy the advantages of 
the WWW revolution. Sana, who prefers to use the Internet, says: ‘I want to know 
immediately what happens.’ 
 
The same age group (47-66) of participants, who prefer television news, is not as 
monolithic as that of the internet users. It includes professionals and non-professionals. 
Manal, a housewife, explains that she prefers television because it’s more immediate and 
she does not have time to search for news on the internet.  
 
Mahmoud, a cardiologist, has another reason: ‘I prefer TV because it’s immediate. Also, 
not biased or influenced directly by government.' Mahmoud’s argument seems to be the 
same as Sana’s (the previous quotation), who prefers to use the internet for news, but the 
meaning of their arguments is different. Sana works at a newspaper (news desk). Her 
computer is therefore connected to the internet the whole day.  She has to read news 
updates, as part of her daily work routine, and she can look at any website to receive 
news updates, at any time. In contrast to Sana, Mahmoud is a cardiologist. He hardly uses 
the internet at work (though he uses the computer for work purposes). When he talks 
about the TV as immediate medium, therefore, he means that when he arrives home from 
work he just turns on the television set for news.   
 
35 years old S. preferred medium is television. She watches Al Jazeera news every day: 
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 ‘Al Jazeera leaves big place for Palestine. Live reports from Gaza, Jordan,  
  Syria… it attracts the attention of the whole Arab world.’ 
 
She also watches Drama series on satellite television, for example on Katar TV or the 
Abu Dabi channel. She reads news online sometimes, using the Palestinian websites. 
Though she does not use the internet much, she is certainly aware of the internet 
revolution: 
 
 ‘More websites are coming every day. Debates between Hamas and Fatah, each 
website tries to persuade. You know from the content if it’s Hamas or Fatah. Now 
there is internet access in Gaza, it started about a year and a half ago (2006). ‘ 
 
In the first three age groups (17-46), there is a clear preference for Internet usage for 
Television news. The reasons that most of the young Palestinians choose television as 
their major source of information, are different from the reasons of the first generation 
Palestinians. 23 year old Ahmed, who works at a restaurant, talks about his preferences: 
‘On TV you see and hear everything. Internet - for emails.’ 23 year old Nael says: ‘My 
education is through the internet, so I prefer to watch TV for news.’  Ahmed and Nael’s 
media usage practices are similar to other young participants’ whose preferred medium 
for news is television. This means that they do use the internet, but not for news 
consumption, while the first generation of Palestinians, who prefer to watch news on 
television, do not use the internet at all. 
 
News Websites, Social Networks Online and Political Mobilisation 
Most of the participants use the Internet as their main medium for news consumption. 
They do not use one news website but, rather, they look for information on different 
websites, especially at times of crisis or breaking news in Palestine or Israel. Tyner and 
Kuhlke propose four spatial categorisations of internet communications in the experience 
of diaspora: intradiasporic - this level includes websites and internet usage by immigrants 
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primarily in their local contexts of interaction, interdiasporic, diaspora and homeland, and 
diaspora and host society (Tyner & Kuhlke, 2000:241).  
 
The interviews show that most of the participants use the Israeli media as a major news 
source. They prefer to read the Israeli media on the Palestinian media, especially at times 
of breaking news. Haaretz newspaper is the main Israeli news medium, as the 
participants refer to this website as a source of information which is valuable to them for 
news from Israel and Palestine. This newspaper familiarised them with the Israeli 
perspective, and there are established Arab and Israeli writers whose journalistic work 
participants appreciate (use in Israeli media is being discussed in this chapter). 
 
I suggest that the internet has a dimension that is lacking in the print media and satellite 
channels. The Palestinians interviewed use the advantage of the new medium – the 
internet, on the traditional media: newspapers and television. They read the readers’ 
comments and send comments online, they create websites relating to Palestinian issues 
and communicate via blogs with Palestinians from different countries. As Schulz and 
Hammer say:  
 
"Transnational communication technology facilitates the maintenance of 
relationships throughout the Diaspora as well as the maintenance of a national 
(ist) discourse. Information technology brings Palestinians closer together and 
therefore reduces geographical distance (Schulz & Hammer, 2003:181)."   
 
The websites being used are varied and include Israeli, Palestinian and Arab websites, as 
well as U.K. and International news websites. Before I continue, I would like to explain 
the reasons for this categorisation. I differentiate between the Palestinian websites and 
Arab websites in general, since the Palestinian websites mostly include news from ‘home, 
whereas Arab news websites do not focus on Palestine. I did not include a category of 
Islamic websites for two main reasons: first, because of the political sensitivity of the use 
or non-use of Islamic websites, the participants’ approach to this issue might be 
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misleading. Secondly, I did not find it relevant to this research to explore the negotiable 
terms of extremism, terrorism and the use of the internet by extremist groups. 
  
In relation to international news media - although international news media and U.K. 
news media could come under the same category, for example, the BBC television 
network (the U.K. news source that Palestinians use most) can be defined as an 
international network.  It is important for the purpose of this research to differentiate 
between the two. The main reason is that, for the participants, the BBC is the local 
network of their host country, unlike other international networks, like CNN. The 
Palestinians see in the U.K. broadcasters a significant source of information and most of 
them use it. The consumption of news media provided by international media outlets 
outside the U.K. is lower. Not all U.K. broadcasters are also international, for example, 
Channel 4 News, and therefore cannot be categorised as international media. 
 
 I would like to provide an explanation for each category: 
 
1. The Palestinian Political Websites the websites of the political factions, Hamas 
and Fatah, mostly, such as the Fatah website:  alwatanvoice.com. The websites do 
not include a logo or titles referring to the fact that they represent a specific 
political faction, but rather it is known from the content, according to my 
informants. There are two exceptions: the websites of Hamas’ official TV channel 
- Al Aqsa and Palestine Television, the Palestinian Authority Television station.  
 
2. The Independent Websites – websites that do not align with any political party, 
such as Electronic Intifada. 
 
3. News Agencies- 1. Maan News Agency (Ma'an means 'together' in Arabic). It is 
a Palestinian on-line news agency that publishes news in Arabic, English, and 
Hebrew. Ma'an News Agency’s initiative is funded by the Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 2. The 
website of the Palestine’s news Agency WAFA: the official news agency of the 
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Palestinian Authority. The languages of the publication are Arabic, English and, 
since June, 2009, Hebrew. 
 
4. Israeli News Websites – most of the participants use the English version website 
of the Israeli broadsheet - Haaretz (the land). It is the only broadsheet being 
published in Hebrew, the official language of Israel. There is another broadsheet 
that covers Israeli issues, The Jerusalem Post. It is published only in English. 
Some of the participants use other Israeli news websites:  
 
Ynet – the online version of Israel’s most popular tabloid newspaper -Yediot 
Achronot (‘Recent News’). 
NRG - the portal of Maariv - the second Israeli daily tabloid newspaper. 
Walla – popular Israeli news website, published in Hebrew. The content and 
format are those of a tabloid newspaper.  
NANA – Israeli tabloid news website. 
Other participants are being updated by reading Israeli official and governmental 
websites.  
 
5. Arabic News websites, such as Al Jazeera. Since the recent launch of Al Jazeera 
International, in English, there is a distinction between Palestinians in the U.K. 
who prefer the Arabic website, and those who prefer the English website.  
 
6. UK Websites – the most common one is BBC English and Arabic. Similarly to 
the use of Al Jazeera, some prefer the English version, others prefer the Arabic 
version. I will discuss this point later in this chapter.  
 
7. International Websites – for example, New York Times. There is no extensive use 
of international websites.  
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8. Other websites – websites which are not news websites, but do provide news: 
governmental, research institutes and human rights and charities websites. This 
section refers both to Palestinian and Israeli websites.  
 
9. Social Networks, websites and blogs – websites that are created by Palestinians in 
the diaspora, their aim is to keep contact with the Palestinian community around 
the world and to promote Palestine and the Palestinian cause, for example, 
donation functions. The readers’ response becomes a stand alone medium for 
news consumption. The users are active - they are being updated and learn about 
news events by reading and responding. The Internet becomes a social network.  
For example: Palestineblogs.net and meiroun.blogspot.com. Both blogs enable 
users to create new blogs and they have links to additional blogs. These websites 
and blogs are being accessed by thousands of users.  
 
The questions I asked further were: their level of interest in U.K. and Palestine’s news, 
which websites are being used, the television stations that they watch, the frequency of 
usage  and the medium being used the most, while looking at breaking news and follow 
up news stories in both Palestine and Israel. The next topic is investigation beyond the 
use of the medium: the examination of interest in U.K. and Palestine’s news. 
 
Level of Interest in Palestine and U.K. News 
The interviewees are Palestinians who have resided in the U.K. for different periods of 
time. The question posed to the participants was: do they have more interest in news from 
‘home’, or in news from the host country, the UK? Most of the participants said that news 
from Palestine is their first priority. The interest in Palestine’s news links to two of the 
foundational issues among the Palestinian community. First, there are the feelings of 
solidarity with the people in Palestine and their link with the land. Secondly, there are 
strong feelings of Palestinian identity. The following quotations describe the participants’ 
feelings of solidarity, which lead to a high level of interest in daily news from Palestine:      
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‘I read news 15 minutes every day. I do not have time, but still there is no escape. 
When there is insurgence in Gaza, you cannot focus on your studies. We feel sad, 
and we feel we have to look at it. Sense of solidarity (with) Gaza and the West 
Bank (Mahmoud, Exeter, June, 2008).’  
 
‘I live in London, but I sleep in Nablus. My roots are there, it will not change. It’s 
in my blood. The connection, solidarity is there. It’s my connection to the land, to 
the people (Reem, London, July, 2008). ‘ 
 
‘In crisis I also watch satellite. All of it is a Palestinian land; I do feel for the 
people in Gaza (Naga, London, July, 2008).’ 
 
Both first and second generations of Palestinians feel links to the Palestinian people and 
to the homeland, Palestine. However, there is a difference in the formation of their 
Palestinian identity. Turki argues that the Palestinians belong to two groups: the nakba 
generation and the occupation generation, and the generations to follow (Turki in Schulz, 
1994: 183). The occupation has created generations of Palestinians who are strangers to 
Palestine, who are ignorant of their homeland. Or, in Sayigh’s words: "All they had ever 
known was the camps" (Sayigh, 1979: 166). 
 
According to Mason, the nature of the Palestinians’ dispossession from their homeland 
requires going beyond conventional notions of ‘first’ and ‘second’ migrant generations. 
Mason claims that the experiences of the Palestinians in the diaspora are framed by how 
many generations they have been in exile (Mason, 2007). I agree with Mason’s claim. 
The following is a discussion about the social shifts relating to the identity formation of 
the different generations. The younger participants in this research were brought up in 
Palestine following the occupation. 3 participants in the age range 21-28, were born in the 
U.K. One participant (30) emigrated to the U.K., with his family, as a child. Among the 4 
Palestinians who were either born or brought up in the UK, only one has an interest both 
in U.K. and Palestine’s news. The others have a clear interest in news from Palestine, for 
similar reasons:  28 year old A. who was born in the U.K. says: 
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‘I have more interest in Palestine’s news. There is a crisis in Palestine more than 
the UK.   After the second Intifada I became more interested in politics. I wanted 
to learn more about the conflict and I used the Internet a lot for this.’   
 
26 year old Maryam, who was born in the U.K., also, explains: 
 
 ‘Interested more in Palestine’s news on a daily basis, for two reasons. To keep 
up-to-date with Palestine issues, to see how the Middle East peace process 
progress, and for the contact with the family (Maryam, London, July, 2008).’ 
 
The 3 participants who were born/brought up in the U.K. - Sharif, Maryam and A. have 
more interest in Palestine’s news than in the U.K. news.  They are all professionals and 
hold professional jobs. An important issue to look at and to clarify is that the interest of 
the 3 participants in Palestine’s news and their activity to promote the Palestine cause, 
does not mean that they are not aware of U.K. politics news. On the contrary, their 
interest in Palestine’s news derives not merely from the personal perspective, but rather 
from their abilities to help the Palestinians, as they operate in the U.K. political arena. 
Their interest is in news in depth from Palestine, from their nation’s perspective. For 
example, Maryam is a teacher, who works in her spare time in a charity that raises money 
for Palestine.  Her consumption of Palestine’s news is intertwined with political activism. 
Many of the young Palestinians follow Palestine’s news and are involved in political 
activities for Palestine’s cause. 
 
I would like to discuss the biggest group – the age group 27-36.  Its members clearly 
prefer to consume news about Palestine. Many of the participants of this group are 
students. They create a social movement whose members’ interest is Palestine, not only 
from the personal perspective, but mainly their interest derives from the nation’s 
perspective. They are a leading force to change, and the media is a tool for them, firstly, 
to receive news from Palestine and secondly to influence through their participation, 
using a variety of websites. 
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Palestinian youth have played a key part in the Palestinian national resistance to the 
occupation, since the nakba in 1948, and since 1967, in particular. Resistance amongst 
Palestinian youth existed long before the introduction of the internet and took various 
forms on the ground (Khoury-Machool, 2007: 22). As Khalili claims in his study of 
second-generation Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the Palestinians use of cyber culture 
promotes the development of Palestinian ‘transnational nationalisms’ (Khalili, 2005). The 
young Palestinians forge new and dynamic relationships with their homeland through 
transnational technologies: the internet, email and satellite television. These transnational 
media have played a particularly important role in the development of the relationship of 
the second exilic generation with their homeland. Whereas their parents’ experience of 
Palestine is largely grounded through media such as books and poetry, those in the 
younger generation feel that they are able to have a more ‘virtual’ relationship with the 
homeland (Mason, 2007: 279). 
 
The penetration of new media technologies into the Arab world and their expansion via 
the transnational media have created a confrontation between localisation and tribalism - 
Jihad and globalisation forces – Mcworld (Barber, 1995). The outcome of this 
confrontation, according to Rinnawi (Rinnawi in Rinnawi, 2006), is McArabism: a kind 
of instant nationalism quite different from the traditional Pan-Arabism formulated during 
the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world. The emergence of McArabism is accomplished 
via six main processes:  
 
1. ‘Intensification’:  "In news broadcasts ‘intensification’ refers to the dramatic 
increase in the frequency and the selection of newscasts, which are broadcast 
several times daily (for example, in reference to MBC and Al-Jazeera)."  
2. "Shared stance on Pan-Arab and Islamic issues or crisises like the Palestinian 
Intifada, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraqi crisis with the U.S…."  
3. 'Emotive Footage' – 'sensationalism of the news.' 
4. 'Direct Engagement’:  "refers to the use of modern styles of news and 
broadcasting that allow the audience to understand the news with minimal state 
intervention."  
 212
5. 'Unification of Language’:   whereas the Arab world has traditionally been 
divided by a plurality of dialects, transnational television broadcasts news in 
modern standard Arabic 
6.  "The formation of independent press corps. (Rinnawi in Rinnawi, 2006: 21-23)." 
 
Many young Palestinians in the U.K. are involved in political activities, supporting a 
political movement in Palestine. In 1987, at the time when the first Intifada broke, the 
younger generation, who had grown up with the occupation, had lost patience with the 
diplomatic turns of the P.L.O. and had lost confidence in the willingness of the Arab 
states to assist (Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 71). As Kaase argues: "Students of social 
movements seem to agree that movements strive for some kind of basic societal and/or 
political change (Kasse in Dalton & Kuechler, 1990: 97)." However, the nationalist 
struggle should be seen in the context of the generations’ different links to Palestine, as 
discussed above. There are researchers who define these nationalist feelings as nostalgic 
nationalism. The homeland does not exist, but the image of the homeland is always there 
for the young Palestinians (Schulz & Hammer, 2003: 186). For the generations born in 
exile, the homeland has remained central to ideas of identity, home and belonging, but the 
vast majority has no lived experience of Palestine. For these generations, their 
relationship to the homeland has been passed on through ‘acts of memory’, as Mason’s 
reference to Schulz and Khalidi claim (Mason, 2007: 272). 
 
Despite the place-nostalgia which the Palestinians have fostered, there is also a notion of 
home that is embedded in social relations, rather than in a certain place (Schulz & 
Hammer, 2003: 186). Hammer underlines the prominent role of the family, which 
actually signifies ‘home’ (Hammer, 2001: 244). There is research that claims that 
nationalist efforts, as I described above, would be temporary. According to Turki, when 
achieving the goal of a state building, the essence of ‘Palestinianism’ will fade away. If 
Palestinianism is territorialised, that nationalism may lose its ultimate foci of mobilisation 
(Turki, 1994: 272). 
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The young Palestinians in this group were born in exile (as they were not born in 
Palestine, prior to 1948). Their interest in news from Palestine in linked to their identity 
formation. Schultz stresses that for those born into the first and second exiled generations, 
the basis of their identity never existed, and the dream of returning represents a search for 
identity as much as for a place (Schultz & Hammer, 2003: 184).  They have to negotiate 
the interplay of various elements of their identities (Mason, 2007: 274).  
 
I learned that a very important issue is the influence of historical events, the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, named by the Palestinians as the nakba, on 
the Palestinians’ news consumption practices. According to Matar, "the sequence of 
unplanned media events related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has served to bring into 
the open a deep collective identity crisis over what it means to be Palestinian. This, in 
turn, has been central to Palestinian national consciousness ever since the nakba of 1948 
and the exodus, which has become a significant site for individuals and collective 
memories of the Palestinian people (Matar in Sakr, 2007: 122)".   
 
Linked to the issue of identity is the question of belonging: where is ‘home’. Many 
diaspora Palestinians grow up to imagine Palestine as the place they would feel at home 
and to which they belong. However, many discover that they feel out of place in 
Palestine. In other words, "feelings of belonging are not automatically forthcoming" 
(Slyomovics, 1998: 14). Having said this, all the Palestinians I spoke with define 
themselves firstly as Palestinians, and not as members of the global Arab and Muslim 
community. "Although the Palestinians are scattered and do not have a state, each 
Palestinian has a self-perception that still pictures Palestine as one unified country with a 
language and cultural values, whether or not this is true at present (Hammer, 2005: 3)". 
 
As Khalidi claims, "In an age when many Palestinians of the diaspora community carry 
the passports of various host countries, being Palestinian comes above being American, 
Jordanian or Australian" (Mahmoud in Shiblak, 2005: 99). In the framework of 
Palestinian migration, one has to consider not only migration from and to Palestine, but 
also the various movements of Palestinians from their first countries of refuge and exile 
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to other countries, and movement among countries. Many Palestinians have experience of 
more than one migratory move, thus shaping their sense and longing for a place to call 
home. Hammer points out that four main groups of Palestinians can be distinguished on 
the territory of historical Palestine and in the Diaspora: "Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza, Palestinians in Israel, Palestinians in Arab countries and Palestinians in 
Western countries. They do express unity in their self-declaration as Palestinians, though 
it is, for many of them, a part of their multiple identities. One cannot place Palestinians 
into just one or another of the above mentioned groups. Frequent movement between the 
groups continues to occur (Hammer, 2005: 13-14)". In relation to the Palestinians who 
live in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel, there are contradictory views as to whether these 
Palestinians live in the Diaspora or not. Aouragh’s research (2011), which I mentioned in 
the first Chapter, investigates Palestinians in the diaspora: Jordan and Lebanon and in the 
West Bank and Gaza. As was said in the first chapter, according to Aouragh, in Palestine 
itself, refugees are not exiled, they are not territorial outsiders (Aouragh 2011: 7). 
 
I agree with the claim of a few researchers, who say that the Palestinians in the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, do not live in the diaspora, but rather lead diasporic lives. 
I argue that the Palestinian communities in Palestine and in Israel have been displaced 
from their home on two occasions, firstly in 1948 and, later, in1967, and this is the 
reason, one might say, that they lead a diasporic life. Having said this, they never left 
Palestine and therefore they do not live in the diaspora. They did not have to adjust to life 
in new environments and they did not go through the process of their fellow Palestinians 
who migrated to European countries and the U.S. In other words, they are not migrants 
but, rather, they are refugees.  Their status as refugees has not, in practice, changed since 
their displacement.  
 
The primary interest of the Palestinians in Palestine’s news does not negate the fact that 
they do have an interest in U.K. news and they also follow U.K. media. Sam, a student 
who emigrated from Gaza to London, says: 
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 ‘Gaza news especially interesting, but I am looking for news from all over the 
world. Example, Egypt news - they started new economic plan, credit crunch   
influence on Japan, Iran, America... I update in U.K. politics every day (Sam, 
London, October, 2008).’ 
 
 Mohammed whose first interest is Palestine’s news and then U.K. news says: 
 
  ‘Palestine problem is a worldwide problem, and it's my country, I was born   
there. My sister is there, if there is attack in Gaza of course I would have an 
interest (Mohammed, London, October, 2008).’ 
 
Other participants of the biggest group are unprofessional workers. Unlike the students, 
they do not have an interest in U.K. news which is irrelevant to Palestine.  Anan who 
works as a freelance in computers says: 
 
 ‘I am very interested in what is happening back home. I read U.K. media because 
I am interested in what the British media has to say…I do not have an interest in 
local news (Anan, London, July, 2008).' 
 
33 old years Samir claims: 
 
 ‘Palestine’s news is very important. It’s my land. I am not interested in Beckham. 
(David)  and Politics is a game. They (the media) say to the people what to want 
to know. There is no place for Palestinian news in U.K. media (Samir, London, 
July, 2008).' 
 
There are similarities and differences between the age group 47-66 and the age group, 27-
36, which I discussed above. The majority of participants of the age group 47-66, have 
resided in the U.K. more then 20 years. They emigrated to the U.K. for economic reasons. 
Most of them studied in the U.K. and stayed for work. They have professional jobs: 
doctors, lawyers and so on. Only one participant from this group is a housewife. 
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The age group 27-36 includes 1 Palestinian who was born in the U.K., 4 participants that 
have lived in the U.K. more than 10 years and 15 participants who have lived in the U.K. 
less then 10 years. Most of the participants from this group are students (at different 
levels) and unprofessional workers. There is a genuine interest in news from Palestine In 
both groups - the participants who have lived in the U.K. more than 20 years and the 
participants who have lived in the U.K. for shorter periods of time.  
 
There is no link between the length of stay in the U.K. and the level of interest in 
Palestine’s news. Shiblak’s research strengthens my findings. He distinguishes between 
two main groups: the smaller, long established and mostly integrated communities, and 
the larger, less privileged expatriates. Shiblak claims that the link between the groups is 
their traumatic experience of dispersal and collective memory (Shiblak in Shiblak, 2005: 
15).  
 
There are, though, differences between the two groups in their news consumption 
practices. The Palestinians who have lived in the diaspora for more than 20 years and 
more have the element of nostalgia in their consumption of Palestine’s news. The 
Palestinians of the nakba generation who have lived for many years in the U.K., and still 
have the need to follow news from ’home’. It is important to emphasise, though, that 
there was a shift in their identity formation: in the early years of their exile, they firmly 
believed that they would return to Palestine and they refused to create permanent roots in 
their host countries. As discussed in the first chapter, the 'return question' is one of the 
major preoccupations of the Palestinians in and outside the diaspora.  As the years 
progressed, however, and the possibility of returning to Palestine became more distant, 
Palestinians had to face the predicament of maintaining their Palestinian identity until 
their return, whilst at the same time trying to live as well as possible in exile (Mason, 
2007: 273).       
 
Mahmoud who emigrated from Tul Karem to the U.K. 28 years ago (at the time of the 
interview) says: 
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 ‘News from home is more interesting for me. Still, after all these years 
(Mahmoud, London, July, 2008)’ 
 
Mahmoud works as a consultant for the NHS and he raises his children in the U.K. His 
memories from Palestine are vivid and he has a sense of nostalgia. Mahmoud uses the 
websites of Palestine Monitor in English, and the Palestinian Return Centre, to receive 
updates from Palestine. Unlike him, the younger generation of Palestinians who have 
lived in the U.K. for a shorter period than Mahmoud, would also use the website of Al 
Jazeera Arabic, and other websites. They will not look for news only on Palestinian 
websites, as they do not share the same experience as the first generation. The first 
generation has close ties with Palestine. The younger generation emigrated to seek a 
better life and they are open minded about receiving information, not merely from 
Palestinian sources, but also from sources such as AL Jazeera, a transnational television 
station that has correspondents on the ground, of which the young Palestinians are aware.. 
The first generation, who lived in Palestine before the first Intifada broke, experienced a 
different life and therefore the nostalgia is a dominant component that influences their 
news consumption in the diaspora. It is important to emphasise, though, that at times of 
breaking news, Mahmoud also uses Al Jazeera International. 
 
52 year old Sana, who has lived in the U.K. for 20 years, says that her major interest is in 
Palestine’s news: 
 
 ‘UK News is different from Palestine’s news. In Palestine things happen. It does 
not interest me what's going on between Brown and his ministers. I am more   
interested in the economic situation.’ 
 
Similarly to Mahmoud, Sana uses Al Jazeera for breaking news and not habitually.   
 
Now I would like to refer to the age group 27-36. Almost all the participants, except one, 
have lived in the U.K. for less than 10 years and have more interest in Palestine’s news 
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than in U.K. news. This does not negate the fact that they have an interest in U.K. news, 
mainly at the micro level. 
 
28 year old Manar, who lives in Cambridge, explains: 
 
 ‘I try to balance, but I have more interest in Palestine and Israel, in the macro   
level. I try to be more involved in the local level, in Cambridge.’ 
 
36 years old M. looks for news from home more than international news: 
 
 ‘I have more interest in Palestine’s news. Since I moved to England, my   
Palestinian identity has increased. I feel equal…I feel that I live under occupation. 
What interest me are Fatah and Hamas governments (M., London, July, 2008). ’ 
 
35 year old R. reads U.K. news for personal purposes and she also does not have an 
interest in the macro level of U.K. news: 
 
   ‘I have more interest in Palestine’s news then in U.K. News. I am not a British     
citizen, I am a Palestinian, what's happens in the U.K. is not my interest. I read     
general news in the UK, for job purpose (R, London, October, 2008).’ 
 
 
Reporting from Gaza and the West Bank involves difficulties of access, and many media 
corporations do not report from the ground, but rather from areas which are outside 
Palestine. The participants prefer to read and watch news coverage from journalists who 
report from within. They mentioned, for example, an Israeli journalist who works for 
Haaretz newspaper and who lives in the Palestinian territories, and therefore they trust 
her reports. 
 
Only 5 participants have more interest in U.K. news than in Palestine’s news. This group 
is not homogenous, since the participants have different levels of interest in U.K. news. 
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The main interest in U.K. news expressed by the Palestinians in this group crosses age – 
there are 3 students (23-26) and 2 women (46-47). The students have lived in England for 
only a few years, whereas the women have lived in England over 30 years.  
 
Reem has lived in the diaspora for 30 years and raises her children in London. She has an 
interest in U.K. news first, at the `micro level, and then in Palestine’s news, at the micro 
and macro levels. I asked for her personal account: 
 
‘Their day to day problems are not my problems; my mind cannot concentrate on this. 
It is a lot more immediate to me if the underground is not working today. I do care, if 
they have no electricity I sympathise, but I cannot experience it like them (Reem, 
London, July, 2008).’ 
 
In contrast to Reem, Jamil, a 26 year old student who has lived in the U.K. less than 10 
years, has more interest in U.K. news at the macro level. Similarly to Reem, he follows 
Palestine’s news: 
 
‘I concentrate more on what happens in the UK, political events. It would effect 
my studies, if I won't follow. I follow the headlines of the local news in Nablus, 
where I used to live. When I lived in Palestine I followed world news.’ 
 
The comparison between Reem and Jamil indicates the centrality of Palestine’s news in 
the lives of Palestinians, regardless of the number of years in the diaspora. The interest in 
U.K. news also does not relate to the number of years outside Palestine, but there is no 
consensus on U.K. news, as it relates to Palestine’s news. If I use the example mentioned 
above, although Reem has lived in the U.K. for many years, she does not have any 
interest in U.K. politics, unlike Jamil, who has lived in the U.K. for only a short period of 
time. The third group, participants who have no preference, includes 2 sub groups: 
Palestinians who have a strong interest in news – Palestine and U.K. news equally, and 
Palestinians who have a declining interest in news.  
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Dr. Al Hamad belongs to the first group: 
 
 ‘I have an interest both in U.K. and Palestine’s news. I have an interest in the 
social, political and economic dimensions of Palestinian life. Anything that   
relates to politics. I have an interest in U.K. news, everything, because it's   
envelopes our life (Dr. Al. Hamad, Manchester, September, 2008).’ 
  
Sami, 24, says: 
 
 ‘I have the same level of interest. Palestine is my country; I have to follow the 
news. But U.K. news is important too, because I live here. I am interested in what 
is happening here and in economics and politics news (Sami, London, November, 
2008).’ 
 
Professor Hassassian, the Palestinian Ambassador to the U.K.: 
 
‘Palestine and U.K. news is all interacted. This is my job as an ambassador, to 
monitor the politics of the host country and Palestine. I am constantly interviewed 
on major events. I have to understand the political realities of both countries 
(Professor Hassassian, London, September, 2008).’ 
 
 
Balir belongs to the group of Palestinians whose interest in news has declined: 
 
‘(Relating to U.K. news) I am a Labour party supporter. But after Blair gone, 
news does not interest me. (Relating to Palestine’s news) I feel the Gazan need in 
electricity, fuel and so on, as a human. But I am tired from worrying (Balir).’ 
 
However, the younger generation want to be updated on the political, social and 
economic situation in Palestine, not because of nostalgia, as in the first generation of 
Palestinians. The younger generation is attentive to the news in Palestine and to the news 
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in the host country. They have an interest in U.K. politics and economics. The reasons 
that the younger generation’s participants, who have an interest merely in Palestine’s 
news, are practical:  they have family relatives in Palestine, for instance. Now I would 
like to shift from the discussion on the medium to a discussion of the message. To put it 
differently, what is the approach of the participants to the news stories in the Israeli, 
Arab, UK, international and Palestinian media, at times of breaking news and as routine? 
 
The Use of Media at Times of Breaking News 
An interesting aspect that is being investigated is the use of media to receive updated 
news at times when there are big news events in Palestine and in Israel. I define ‘big 
news events’ as: negotiation talks at local, regional and international levels, elections in 
Israel and in Palestine, and large scale violence in Palestine and Israel.  I asked my 
participants which media they would prefer to use in this case. The participants use news 
websites and watch news on television as their main medium, at time of big news events. 
All of them said that they look at different news sources. Receiving information is 
important for them because they have family and friends in Palestine. 
 
In the process of interviewing, in July, 2008, there were 2 terror attacks in Jerusalem. My 
access to the field did not change following the attacks, though, and I continued to 
conduct the interviews the following day. The participants talked about their extensive 
use of the internet to read the news online and to read about the suicide attacks, which 
were an important demonstration of internet usage at times of breaking news. In other 
words, following the breaking news in Jerusalem, I received authentic information from 
the participants – which related to the time spent on news searching and websites 
prioritising considerations. Bashar says:    
 
 ‘At time[s] of crisis, like the suicide attack that was yesterday (a suicide attack 
that was carried out in Jerusalem by a Palestinian man), I read for 8 hours all the 
websites (Bashar, July, 2008).’ 
 
31 year old I.: 
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‘In time of crisis in Gaza, I would read all the websites and would come to my 
own conclusion.’ 
 
Steve explains the reason for using Israeli media following the event: 
 
‘I watch Info live – Israeli broadcast, if there is a big event, like the Jewish killing 
of 8 children in Jerusalem (Steve, July, 2008).’ 
 
The managing editor of Al-Quds Al-Arabi, in London, a 52 year old, says: 
 
At times of breaking news: ‘I depend on my correspondents. For immediate news, I read 
Al Jazeera and Al Masdar - news from the Israeli media. I would also watch the 
Palestinian TV.’ 
 
As for updated information at times of crisis, back home, M. says: 
 
‘I receive information on what is happening in Palestine from charities in the 
U.K., the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, and Palestinian Forum in Britain. 
Palestinian charities also inform on the situation on the land to support them. 
They send leaflets. Live appeal, for example, at the time of the Gaza siege. Things 
that need immediate attendance (M., London, July, 2008)'. 
 
The viewership of British and international news channels and the use of British and 
international news websites is low:  only 8 participants said that they look for information 
using international media. The majority use Israeli and Arab media at times of breaking 
news. The frequency of major news events in Palestine is high. In talking about big news 
events, there are mainly conflicts that break, as well as the escalation of conflicts; which 
means that the Palestinians in the diaspora would need to follow the events for a long 
time. The participants would therefore4 look for detailed information on many news 
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websites, as they search for updates about their home towns and relatives, and about the 
general situation on the ground.  
 
The problem of bias is evident in conflict coverage (a topic that will be discussed in this 
chapter). In extensive coverage in different media outlets, the Palestinians in the diaspora 
look for information that would be relevant and valuable for them. 
The following discussion explores the Palestinians’ preferences and the reasons for 
choosing news media. Firstly: a discussion of the use of a major news source, the Israeli 
media, both at times of breaking news and habitually.  
 
The Consumers of Israeli Media and Major News Events 
The results of the interviews indicate that at times of breaking news events, almost half of 
the participants use Israeli media, or translations of Hebrew news from Arab broadcasters 
or websites. Most of them use Israeli media as the only source, or as a major source of 
information, at time of high interest news in Palestine and Israel. The main reasons the 
Israeli media is the preferred choice, can be summed up through a few of the participants’ 
quotes.  These were similar to the other participants’ reasons for using Israeli media:  
 
’I watch all the news channels (at times of crisis). I also read Haaretz (because 
Haaretz) is more liberal, more balanced, you read there news that you will never 
read in the British media (Sharif, July 2008, London).' 
 
‘First, I would read the Israeli media, because it's updated quicker (Anan, July, 
2008, London).' 
 
‘I read Haaretz for local news in the West Bank. Haaretz is more liberal than the 
Jerusalem Post. Western media sometimes has no details. You need to go to the real 
source (P., July, 2008, Cambridge).'  
 
      ‘I read Haaretz - more news for me. I do not read only news, but also articles. I read  
       the readers’ comments and respond and chat with people. I like to know the views of   
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       the people, ‘specially, the Israelis.’ Also, reads Jerusalem Post once in a couple of   
       weeks (A Woman).' 
 
‘When there is a crisis, I use Haaretz the most. When I lived in Ramallah this   
       is also what I used (Anonymous).' 
 
Most of the participants read the Israeli Haaretz’ news website to receive updated news 
from the conflict zone. According to Viser, the Palestinians prefer to read the reports of 
Amira Hass, a reporter for Haaretz who lives in Gaza and is immersed in the Palestinian 
culture (Viser, 2003: 118). The prominent role of the Israeli media in the lives of the 
participants can be attributed to the shift that occurred in the Israeli media in the 2nd 
Intifada (2000-2005). Whereas in the Intifada of the 1980s, in which far fewer Israelis 
were killed, the media mobilised for the effort. In the weeks following its eruption, the 
human face of the Palestinians gradually disappeared from the screen, and their voice was 
no longer heard. In contrast, in the 2nd Intifada in which there were eleven times more 
Israeli casualties, the human faces of the Palestinians were often seen in the press and on 
screen. Israeli journalists, in both the electronic and the printed press, conducted 
interviews with political leaders, ordinary people and even terrorists (In this context, the 
term 'terrorists' refers to individuals or groups who were involved in attacks on civilians 
to achieve political ends). 
 
According to Liebes and Kampf, the new way of reporting war is part of the present 
worldwide media environment. The tendency to expand the representation of Palestinians 
includes even interviews with terrorists. This trend characterises the new journalistic 
practices in the global media environment, of which Israel is a part. In addition to 
changes in the global media environment, there were also local changes in Israeli society. 
The political changes during the 1990s (the Oslo Agreements) were paralleled by a major 
change in Israel’s media environment. Two additional nationwide, commercial channels 
were added to the one public channel that had covered the 1st Intifada. In the 2nd, Israelis 
could also navigate among international news channels on cable and satellite. The gradual 
process, in which television became the main supplier of news, has had an influence on 
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the growing competition between old and new media organisations (Liebes & Kampf, 
2009: 438). Is it only at times of crisis or of important political developments, that the 
Israeli media play a key role in the life of the diasporic Palestinian community? 
 
The Consumers of Israeli Media as Routine 
One of the important findings of the research indicates that more than half of the 
participants use Israeli media as routine. I asked my informants whether they use Israeli 
media and if they do what their reasons are, and which Israeli website/newspaper/TV or 
radio station they use in order to consume news. The Israeli news website of the 
newspaper, Haaretz, is the main Israeli news source. This shows that the participants 
have an interest in in depth news and analysis, and not merely in news stories. The 
following selected quotes explain their reasons: 
 
‘Haaretz in English. I like it because it's intellectual, centralist and liberal 
(Professor Hassassian).' 
 
Haaretz, more news for me. I do not read only news, but also articles. I read the 
readers' comments and respond and chat with people. I like to know the views of 
the people, specially, the Israelis. I read Jerusalem Post once in a couple of weeks 
(Enas).’ 
 
Haaretz in English. I read Haaretz to know about events happening in Israel and 
about bilateral issues, such as the negotiation between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis (Bahjat).' 
 
Haaretz is being read by a small percentage of the population in Israel – it is considered 
to be the newspaper that is being read by intellectuals and decision makers. The 
broadsheet newspaper provides in-depth analysis of news stories, including articles. In 
contrast, the newspaper with the highest readership in Israel is the tabloid newspaper 
Yedioth Achronot which, alongside news stories, includes entertainment sections and 
sections of stories which are not news. According to a survey, conducted in Israel, 
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relating to media consumption practices, the characteristics of Haaretz readers are as 
follows: the newspaper is popular mainly among adults – from age 45 to over 65; the 
readers have an academic education; their income is higher than the average income, and 
most of the readers are secular (TGI survey, 2002). 
 
The profile of the participants who read Haaretz is the same as the profile of the Israeli 
readers of Haaretz: academic, professionals, students and individuals who hold high level 
positions. Similarly, the participants who read the Israeli tabloids have the same profile as 
the Israelis who and the tabloid newspapers, I would quote 24 year old Sami who reside 
in the U.K. for read the tabloids: mostly unskilled workers.  
 
‘I read Maariv and Yedioth Achronot. I do not read Haaretz, It's more academic, 
for professors, it has a special culture. I prefer to read about political issues in 
Maariv and Yedioth Achronot. I prefer Yedioth Achronot because I read it every 
day for 3 years in Palestine, when I learned Hebrew (Sami).’ 
 
Apart from the Haaretz newspaper, the participants who read Israeli media use the 
websites of Yedioth Achronot, and the website of the second tabloid in his statement: – 
Maariv, IDF website, info live – Israeli broadcast and farfesh.com: a ‘Jewish website in 
Arabic, from Palestine’ (Samir, July, 2008). Not all the Palestinians who consume Israeli 
media use a specific news source. Among the participants who use the Haaretz website, 
there are a few participants who, in addition, use other Israeli news websites, such as the 
website of the tabloid newspaper Yedioth Achronot. Many Palestinian websites publish 
translations of Israeli news articles and the Palestinian audience can be exposed to 
different publications. Sana reads in Arabic Israeli articles that have been translated from 
Hebrew. She says: 
 
‘Al Masdar News Agency - translates from Hebrew to Arabic - Haaretz, Yedioth  
  Achronot, Maariv, Israel Ayom.  The news is being sent to me by email. Also,   
  I read in Maan and Al Watan - Yedioth Achronot (Israeli media articles and comments).’ 
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The results indicate that Palestinians and Israelis share the same public sphere that relates 
to their news media consumption. The interest of the Palestinians in Israeli sources of 
news derives from the fact that they are influenced by the political situation, economic 
stability and the security situation in Israel. Formally, the economic relationships between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority are defined in a document that was drafted as the 
‘Paris Agreement’ (‘Oslo 2’, 1995).  The document relates to the following issues: 
Transfer of Taxes from Israel to the Palestinian Authority, Industrial Areas and 
Investments, Commerce and Merchants and Employment in Israel. During crisis, such as 
the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) in 2000, the guidelines of this 
document had to be changed, according to the situation on the ground. Balir’s explanation 
for his preference, demonstrates the mutual influence: 
 
‘In time of big events in Israel that relates to Palestine - Haaretz and Yediot 
Achronot. I read in Haaretz the economic section, because Palestinian economic 
relates to Israel. There is no independent economic (Balir).’ 
 
Arab news media are a very important feature in Israeli television and radio news 
bulletins and Israeli print media. Israeli media outlets employ Arabic speaking journalists 
for the purpose of listening to transnational Arab media broadcasters and websites, and to 
Palestinian media and reporting on Arab news as they are transmitted. In addition, on 
many occasions, Israeli television broadcasts live news reports from Arab television 
networks, such as Al Jazeera, Lebanese television, and so on. Israeli national television, 
Channel 1, also broadcasts news in Arabic. The Israeli Broadcast Authority (IBA) law of 
1965 obliged both radio and television broadcasters to show a prescribed amount of their 
broadcasts in Arabic. Television broadcasts in Arabic were thus produced as soon as 
Israeli television aired its first programmes (Friedman, 2010: 48).    
 
On the practical level, there is mutual influence from both sides, as a result of the 
economic, security and political situation. In times of crisis these delicate relationships 
are undermined. However, the changes are rapid, and not just in times of crisis. There are 
changes in Israeli government policy, changes in the political situation inside Palestine, 
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changes in the international arena, and so on and so forth. For example, until the outbreak 
of the first Intifada (December, 1987), Palestinians formed the major labour force in 
Israel. In January, 1988, the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) discussed for the first time 
the issue of bringing in labour migrants as a substitute for Palestinians from Gaza and the 
West Bank. Today, the Israeli government and citizens face a serious problem, as most of 
the labour work in Israel relies on illegal migrants from African countries.  
 
As a result of frequent changes, for the Palestinians who live in the diaspora, Israeli 
media have an important role. Whereas the Palestinian media cannot answer the demand 
of the participants for professional updated news, Israeli media can. The participants use 
the Israeli media as a major source for news from Palestine and Israel – for them, Israeli 
media is not the media of the Other, it is an estimated source of news from the region 
which provides them also with the local news that they are so eager to receive, while 
residing in the diaspora. Another dimension that is being provided by the Israeli media is 
the fulfillment of the need of the Diasporic community to understand the Israelis’ views. 
Living in Palestine, they were exposed to Israeli media, as part of their daily lives. In the 
U.K., they would use Israeli media to fill the gap created when they left Palestine. In this 
context, it is appropriate to explain the difference between the first generation and the 
second generation. The Palestinians of the first generation had economic and social links 
with Israel. They consumed Israeli media – a practice that still exists among many of the 
first generation Palestinians.  
 
In contrast, the second generation who were born in the conflict situation following the 
first Intifada (1987) do not speak the Hebrew language and their connection to Israel is 
weak. This generation grew up with the occupation and their frustration led to the 
outbreak of the Intifada (Schulz & Hammer, 2003: 71). However, many of the young 
Palestinians who live in the U.K. use Israeli news websites, including the websites of the 
leading Israeli newspapers, as a major source of information. Since some will not read the 
Palestinian political websites at all, and others will not read the Palestinian websites as 
the only source of updated news, they have to read additional news websites.  
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I will look at the example of Haaretz newspaper online in order to demonstrate my 
arguments. The online version includes a Defence section. Under this section, there are 
the following links: Israel News, Hamas, Iran, Gaza, IDF, Palestinians, Gaza Strip, Peace 
Process, and others. Another sub section in the Defence section is ‘Read and React’ – the 
items relating to Palestine’s issues and readers can respond online. For instance, on 
November 15, 2008, an article was published in the section on the West Bank, it was 
entitled: ‘Israel infuriated by U.K. plan to label West Bank produce’, it received an 
impressive 743 responses. I cannot give the figure for the Palestinians in the U.K. who 
read this article, but I can say that the participants in my research find the section on the 
West Bank, as well as other sections and news articles, in the Haaretz newspaper relevant 
to them. If I put it in one of the participants’ words:  
 
‘There is a space for us, the Palestinians, in Haaretz.' 
 
The Palestinians in the diaspora use the Israeli media because they want to understand the 
other side of the conflict. The only way for them to do this is through the media – using 
Israeli news websites. On the practical level, they read Israeli news stories online 
because, as they said to me, the Israeli media is updated more quickly than the Palestinian 
media. The Palestinians who read Israeli news websites are familiar with the Israeli 
media and they appreciate the journalists’ coverage. In other words, the Palestinian media 
operates under limitations that prevent it from being professional media. In contrast, the 
Israeli media have the resources and conditions to function professionally.   
 
Since the Palestinian news websites are aligned to political factions, the language used is 
also emotional language, the Palestinians have to read the news from Palestine with 
scrutiny. One of the news channels the participants use, is Israeli news websites. Reading 
the Israeli media, they receive detailed information about the political events in Palestine 
and in Israel. On one hand, Israel represents the country responsible for the trauma of the 
‘nakba’, which is rooted in Palestinian collective memory and daily life. On the other 
hand, the Israeli media is very important because it has the tools the Palestinian media 
lack – resources, trained journalists, and there is no self-censorship by journalists. As a 
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result, the Palestinians use the Israeli media, but their interpretation might be different 
from other audiences who read the Israeli media. In referring to media effects, as 
discussed in the first chapter, I would say that the Palestinians’ news consumption fits 
with the school of thought that stresses the variety of ways in which different audiences 
make use of media output (Williams, 2003: 165). 
 
The public spheres of the Palestinians and the Israelis do not refer merely to news media, 
but, rather, also to cultural influences. The Arabic television division of IBA, around the 
1970s and the early 1980s, produced a rich variety of programmes in Arabic, including 
documentaries, comedies, factual programmes and drama. The ‘Arab film’ slot on Friday 
afternoons was especially popular when an Egyptian film – often a melodrama or musical 
– was shown* (Friedman, 2010: 48).     
 
The new technology also exposes audiences to international news and international media 
outlets. In talking about undeveloped regions, like Palestine, I would say that this change 
has created a new audience that has been exposed to news events outside Palestine, as 
well as revealing how Palestine’s news events are being covered by Arab and 
international media outlets. Moreover, the internet provides considerable information that 
is unavailable internally. On more than one occasion, local media neglected to report on 
key events occurring in Palestine. These events were reported on the internet, for 
instance, a 1998 hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in Jneid prison under the 
Palestinian Authority (Hanieh, 1999: 42). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*On a personal note, I remember, as a girl, watching these Arab films, which were     
   part of my Friday afternoon ritual.   
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International Media Consumption and Breaking News 
Most of the participants, who look for international news, use the internet. The others 
watch television news. The main source for those who use international and British media 
are British media and not international media in general. This finding indicates the 
important role that the participants attribute to the media in the host country – the U.K. 
Nael, who uses only British media for updates on Palestinian and Israeli major news 
events, says: 
 
‘I use BBC 1 and BBC 4, on TV there are live reports and updates, constantly, 
interactive (Nael).’ 
 
She prefers to watch news online:  
 
 ‘I watch the TV News in the Internet, using my laptop. I do not have a connection 
to    satellite TV’. 
 
She uses Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic websites, as well as the Palestinian websites. In 
addition, G. reads international websites: 
 
 ‘I follow more International media. I read The Guardian online the most, because 
I work for The Guardian and also it's a left newspaper. I also read the Independent 
online because it's a left newspaper. I read Washington Post which is number 1 in 
the world. I read Los Angeles Times, and receive news alerts for Palestine issues.’ 
 
 
The informants who read international media also read Israeli media as a major source, 
but only a few of them consume Palestinian and Arab media at times of big news events 
in Palestine and Israel. In other words, Palestinian and Arab media are not the source of 
information when big news events unfold. Elizabeth says:  
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‘If something happens and I want to know more, first I would read Haaretz, then 
BBC. (Elizabeth).’ 
 
Half of the participants who use international and British media, at times of big news 
events, also use Israeli media – the website of the newspaper Haaretz, and one participant 
uses the website of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Odai explains the reason he reads 
Haaretz when big news events occur (Odai also habitually reads the Haaretz news 
website in English):  
 
‘In time of crisis, BBC English and Al Jazeera. When there is an Israeli event, I 
read Haaretz to learn about the other side of the story. The emphasis is different, 
better understanding (Odai).’ 
 
A repeated claim of the Palestinian participants is that there is not enough space in the 
mainstream (not Israeli) media for Palestinian issues. This is true mainly at routine times 
and not at times when breaking news events in Palestine unfold.  
 
The media usage practices of all of the participants who use international media, except 
one, do not change at times of big news events: they habitually use the internet as the 
main medium for news, as well as for breaking news updates. The exceptional is Dr. Al 
Hamad, who uses the internet and TV regularly: TV- ‘to watch news’ and Internet – ‘to 
learn more’. When he uses the media to receive updated news relating to big events, he 
reads news online.  
 
The Consumers of Arab Media and High Interest News Events 
I would like to explore the use of Arab media of all the participants, not merely those 
who use international and British media, at times of major political events or significant 
violence. The findings are that a third of the participants use only Arab media (including 
Palestinian media) at times when there are big news events in Palestine and Israel. An 
interesting aspect of the consumers of Arab media at times of breaking news is that their 
media consumption changes when they read news at timed of crisis. For example, Hasan, 
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from Rafah, says that, as a routine he does not read the Palestinian political websites 
because he believes the quality of news is not good. He therefore reads Al Jazeera, where 
he says there is no censorship. In contrast, when he looks for news of major events, he 
says:  
 
‘I will read in deep the Palestinian websites in time of crisis (Hasan).’  
 
The participants who belong to this group either read news on the Palestinian websites in 
addition to Al Jazeera usage, or read only Palestinian websites. The website of the news 
agency Maan News is read extensively. 
 
Conclusion 
‘The websites are important, you cannot live without it. I have access to newspapers, but 
it's the traditional way.   The students, including me, do not have money to travel back to 
Palestine to visit. Also, there are restrictions on travel to Gaza, and Palestinians need visa 
to travel in Europe. That's the reason (why) the Internet is important for the young 
Palestinians (Mahmoud, June, 2008, Exeter).’ 
 
‘I use Facebook for contact with the Palestinian community. I have friends from Jordan, 
Palestine. Alhiwar TV is mainly Palestinians. We do support the events in Palestine. We 
put in YouTube the 60 years of the Nakba. Approach Palestinians from around the world. 
I use also blogs and chat rooms (Samir, July, 2008, London).’ 
 
‘In this coming period, we want mass action, organised and coordinated in every place. 
This is a chance to raise our voices in front of the world and say that we want our rights 
(President Mahmoud Abbas, Haaretz.com, July 27, 2011).’ 
This statement of Palestinian President Abbas, prior to his initiative to seek UN 
recognition of a Palestinian state, in September, 2011, clearly reflects the feelings of the 
Palestinian people. At present, the right to return and the establishment of a Palestinian 
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state are the main issues influencing Palestinian society. The 'return question' is one of 
the major preoccupations of the Palestinians in and outside the diaspora.   
 
Without the use of new technologies, the appeal of the Palestinian people would not reach 
global audiences. Their eagerness to disseminate the Palestinian cause and mobilise 
political support is being enabled as a result of the extensive use by Palestinians of 
hundreds of chats, blogs and news websites, as they use the online environment as an 
arena through which to achieve political ends in the offline environment. Prior to the 
WWW revolution, political mobilisation was limited, since Palestinians could not reach 
global audiences. According to Aouragh, the internet was revolutionary: 
 
"It (the internet) could help defy the repression of everyday life in Palestine by 
overcoming the limitations of checkpoints and occupation and thus generate 
feelings of ‘mobility’ and ‘political autonomy’…the great enthusiasm for the 
online possibilities which the internet offers Palestinians reveals essential facts 
about offline limitations...they allude…to the absence of The Independent 
territory; free access to the very infrastructures necessary for free debate, free 
mobility, and free democratic decision making (Aouragh, 2011: 2)."     
 
For Palestinians in the diaspora, the new technologies symbolise a revolution, in relation 
to their media consumption practices as well as to their abilities to mobilise the media for 
political purposes. I argue that the internet is the new medium that has created enormous 
change in the Palestinian diasporic audience’s media consumption and daily lives. Most 
participants use the Internet as their main medium for news consumption. Following the 
interviews I conducted with Palestinians in the UK, I gathered that their interest in news 
and in politics is highly significant. News and politics are dominant factors in their daily 
life – they left a conflict zone. Their families and friends are still there. Thus, for the 
Palestinians the need for updated news from ‘Palestine’ (to avoid complex writing, I use 
the word ‘Palestine’ referring to Gaza and the West Bank, though there is no Palestinian 
state) is crucial. The need in new technologies is especially important for the second 
generation of Palestinians.   
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The interviews show that most participants use the Israeli media as a major news source. 
They prefer to read the Israeli media on the Palestinian media, especially at times of 
breaking news. 
 
Another issue that this chapter deals with is the level of participants’ interest in Palestine 
vs. U.K. news. Most participants said that news from Palestine was their first priority. 
The interest in Palestine’s news links to two foundational issues among the Palestinian 
community. Firstly, there are feelings of solidarity with people in Palestine and their links 
with the land. Secondly, there are strong feelings of Palestinian identity. I discovered that 
there is no link between the length of stay in the U.K. and the level of interest in 
Palestine’s news. Most participants have more interest in Palestine’s news.  
 
The main reasons given by participants for their use of the internet as their major medium 
are: availability, selectivity, the variety of news websites and financial considerations. In 
addition to these, participants explained to me that, for them, the internet symbolises a 
shift from the traditional to a modern way of news consumption. The implications for 
them are not only at the technical level, but also at the message level. The internet 
empowers the Palestinians – The Palestine problem is no longer the problem of a 
minority in a remote area, but it is a problem that lies at the heart of the global 
community. 
 
Israeli Media 
One of the important findings of the research indicates that more than half the 
participants use Israeli media habitually. The results of the interviews indicate that at 
times of breaking news events in Palestine and in Israel, almost half of the participants 
use Israeli media or translations of Hebrew news from Arab broadcasters or websites; 
most of them use Israeli media as their only source, or as a major source of information. I 
asked my informants whether they used Israeli media and if they did what their reasons 
were, and which Israeli website/newspaper/TV or radio station they used in order to 
consume news. The Israeli news website of the newspaper Haaretz is the main Israeli 
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news source. This shows that the participants have an interest in in-depth news and 
analysis and not merely in news stories. Haaretz newspaper is the main Israeli news 
medium, as the participants refer to this website as source of information which is 
valuable to them for news from Israel and Palestine. This newspaper familiarises them 
with the Israeli perspective, and there are established Arab and Israeli writers whose 
journalistic work is appreciated by participants. According to the participants, the Israeli 
media is professional and provides updates more quickly. 
 
The Palestinian websites are not the major source of news. The website of the newspaper 
Haaretz is the preferred Israeli news medium. The participants explain that the newspaper 
is liberal and includes news and analysis from the ground, as opposed to many other news 
outlets that report from outside the Palestinian territories. The use of Israeli media, as the 
major news media, is evident mostly at times of crisis. It is important to remember that 
the Israelis have been exposed to Palestinian media and cultural influences, as discussed 
in this chapter. Israeli media outlets also use information obtained from Arab 
broadcasters and broadcast Arab programmes in their news bulletins. To conclude this 
chapter, there is no doubt that the power of the internet is on the increase.  
 
The challenge I have, as a researcher, is to discuss the results of the extensive use of new 
technologies to promote social change. To put it differently, in order to achieve major 
change, a few conditions have to be fulfilled. In general, it is a challenge to relate the 
success of the revolutions in the Arab world to new media. In particular, it is difficult in 
the Palestinian case, since no significant results have been achieved thus far.  The next 
chapter is the conclusion chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in this thesis, the significance of this research is in two main issues. First, in 
the researcher’s identity, as an outsider who belongs to a nation which is in conflict with 
the subject of the research – the Palestinian people (this will be discussed separately in 
this chapter). Secondly, the significance is in the research topic and findings. There is a 
shortage of studies on the Palestinian diaspora; especially in relation to the Palestinian 
transnational community. Recently, Arab states in the Middle East have taken part in 
uprisings against dictatorial regimes, aiming to create revolutions. Investigating the role 
of the new technologies in advancing mass protests is relevant to current political 
developments. In the light of these changes, it is important to explore the Palestinians, 
who are part of the Arab world, their transnational existence and the influence of new 
media on their lives. In contrast to other Arab communities, such as, the Syrian and the 
Egyptian ones, the Palestinians operate in a non-state space. This fact makes this research 
more interesting, in particular, as a study of the Palestinian diaspora’s role in relation to 
Palestinian state building, their right to return aspirations, and their utilisation of the new 
media for these purposes. It is important, for the benefit of the discussion, to 
contextualise the term ‘stateless diaspora’ in the light of recent political developments in 
the region. ‘Palestine’ is still not recognised as a state and there is also no territorial 
continuity in the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Since the ‘Oslo 
Accords’ (September, 1993), few of the conditions for state building that have been 
fulfilled. There is a Palestinian interim self-government authority and elections were held. 
‘Palestine’ is not yet a state but the Palestinian authority has autonomy to govern its 
people. The conflict with Israel is a major obstacle to the full implantation of the process 
and to the resumption of the peace talks that might lead the way. The Palestinian 
diaspora’s case demonstrates that, due to conflict, a stateless diaspora have a genuine 
interest in news, mostly in news from the homeland. 
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The Palestinian Diaspora and Conflict - Generated Diasporas 
Recently, the interest in investigating Diasporas has shifted to another level, and 
‘Diaspora role in conflict and conflict resolution’ has become a research focus. This topic 
has become especially important following the Cold War and more recently, after 9/11 
(Baser & Swain, 2009:45). The Palestinians in Europe take an active role in raising 
awareness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first generation Palestinians had 
working contact with the Israelis, whereas the second generation Palestinians were born 
into a conflict situation. The issues common to both generations, though, are their interest 
and involvement in Palestine politics, and their affiliation to Palestinian political parties. 
The choice to support a political party symbolises the Palestinian diaspora’s political 
activism – members of the community choose the party they would like to support 
according to its political agenda. This agenda discusses the most significant issues for the 
Palestinians; it includes ways to tackle questions on the future of the peace process, the 
future of a Palestinian state, and so on. 
 
I would draw on two examples: Dr. T., a 60 year old academic and political activist, and 
S., a 26 year old journalist and political activist. Dr. T. emigrated to the U.K. from Gaza. 
He is affiliated to the Hamas party and is in contact with Hamas people in Gaza. T. is a 
commentator on Palestinian issues in mainstream British media news programmes, like 
BBC Television. S. supports the Fatah party. He works as a journalist in an organisation 
whose aim is to promote ‘’Objective British Coverage of Arab issues’. S. works with 
mainstream British media broadcasters. These examples prove that political activism is a 
major theme in Palestinian society. It is being carried out by both young and older 
Palestinians, by different parties’ supporters, and by different means. The politicising 
essence is a common feature among the Palestinian diaspora. The connection to the 
Palestine conflict has roots in Palestinian memory. R., a 42 year old psychologist, says: 
 
‘I live in London, but I sleep in Nablus. My roots are there, it will not change. It’s 
in my blood. The connection, solidarity, is there. It’s my connection to the land, to 
the people (R., London, July, 2008). ‘ 
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The centrality of news in the lives of Palestinians crosses age, occupation and economic 
status. Most of them look for updated news every day, and more than once a day. This 
interest in news links to their strong national feelings and to the political involvement of 
the Palestinian community. Lyons put emphasis on the fact that conflict-generated 
Diasporas usually develop networks based on their ethnic identity and they work to keep 
nationalist hopes alive, although they are abroad (Lyons, 2004: 14). The Palestinian 
community in the diaspora is politicised – there is a major effort by individuals and 
groups to achieve political goals for the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank.  
 
According to Mavroudi, homeland-orientated or diasporic politics can be seen as the 
merging of collective imaginings of belonging ‘there’, to the daily realities of living and 
being politicised ‘here’, within political spaces (Mavroudi, 2008:59). Palestinians in the 
diaspora do not feel the conflict through their daily experiences since they are engaged in 
a sort of ‘virtual conflict’ (Demmers, 2002:94), there are feelings of solidarity with the 
people in ‘Palestine’, and commonality due to the link with the ‘Palestinian soil’. This 
does not mean that all Palestinians in the diaspora will eventually return to ‘Palestine’.  
According to Baser and Swain, the notion of a ‘secure homeland’, a place to which to 
return, in time, plays a very important role in diaspora behavior (Baser & Swain, 2009: 
49). 
 
The link with the people and with the land is very strong, and there are strong feelings of 
Palestinian identity. This being said, returning home will not always happen. The 
Palestinians in the diaspora thus take an active role in conflict resolution attempts. The 
mechanism that helps them most is the media, mainly the new media. Many news 
websites have been created for this purpose, and they also participate in the main media 
news programmes of their host country. In other words, the Palestinians who live in 
diasporic spaces do not detach themselves from the conflict, but rather they try to ‘raise 
international awareness, thereby increasing pressures for political change in the home 
state’ (Adamson, 2002:156). These efforts are carried out in a definite way by most of the 
Palestinians, regardless of the period of time they have spent in the diaspora, or of their 
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age, occupation and economic status. Drawing on research on Palestinians in Sydney, 
Cox and Connell, have pointed out that a political agenda is very important to 
Palestinians in the diaspora; ‘Palestinians in the diaspora are…primarily a political 
construction’ (Cox & Connell, 2003: 334). 
 
For conflict- generated Diasporas, the need for news consumption is significantly more 
important than the need for news consumption in non-conflict generated Diasporas. The 
media, in particular the new media, help the immigrants who emigrated from conflict 
areas to habitually follow news events and, most importantly, at times of major news 
events and breaking news. For Palestinians in the diaspora, having information about 
Palestine’s news events is vital. This is mainly because many of them have relatives and 
friends back home and developments in a conflict zone are rapid.  
 
It is important to emphasis that although the Palestinians’ interest is firstly in news from 
‘home’, the Palestinian audience searches for international news and news from the host 
country as well. The Palestinians would search for news updates from their region, using 
the host country and international media outlets, as well. The evidence is that the internet 
is the major medium used by the Palestinian diaspora. The research did not relate only to 
the media that Palestinians consume, but also revealed what Palestinians do to receive 
information. To put it differently, the need for news consumption is being answered not 
only by using existing media, but also by creating media infrastructures such as news and 
social websites for the purpose of news consumption. 
 
The main reason for developing alternative news sources is that the Palestinians perceive 
the Palestinian media to be non professional media. Some Palestinians would use the 
Palestinian media, but with the understanding that they would have to look for additional 
news sources in order to receive a comprehensive picture of news events. G., who reads 
the websites of Al Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic, and watches Al-Arabia news, says: 
 
‘I read the Palestinian websites for two reasons: to read local news and to have a 
sense of home (G.).’ 
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The Palestinian immigrants live far from their homeland, though the geographical 
distance has not caused political indifference among the diaspora. A way to overcome the 
distance from the conflict region is the new media. The new media enable consumption 
of news, news production, and links with diasporic communities around the globe. They 
have joined the Palestinians in their diasporic spaces with relatives, friends and the 
Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank. The new media deliver vivid pictures and 
sound from ‘Palestine’ to London, Paris and Rome.  
 
New Media – The New Arab Public Sphere 
When I entered ‘Regent’s Park Mosque’, the biggest mosque in London, in December, 
2008, following the outbreak of ‘Gaza War’, the confusion and eagerness for information 
controlled the worshippers who attended the mosque that day. Rumours about the 
casualties and about the essence of this event were spreading among the people. This is 
not a rare event. Palestine is a conflict zone and escalation in the region is almost routine. 
For the Palestinians in the diaspora, the internet provides a practical solution to this 
problem: firstly, they read multiple news websites about events and receive different 
aspects of it, for example: local – about their home towns, and global – the Western 
governments’ responses. Secondly, by using the new technologies, the Palestinians can 
contact family members and friends in Palestine. Thirdly, the utilisation of the new media 
for the promotion of the Palestinian cause, the dissemination of pictures and texts on line, 
provides their own explanation of events. Fourthly, the creation of news websites by 
Palestinians, who publish the ‘new’, bypasses the mainstream media’s editorial 
considerations and their lack of space for Palestinian news stories. I would say that this is 
only the beginning of a revolution that is being undertaken by Arab audiences – 
audiences who have a story to tell the world, but who cannot do it because of dictatorial 
regimes. This revolution’s meaning is dual: actions and their results. The new power that 
new technologies provide to the young Palestinians – the ability to speak in their own 
words and to create news websites, does not leave them merely in the online arena but, 
rather, their voice is also being heard and is penetrating the offline arena. The U.K. 
Palestinians’ preferred medium for news consumption is the internet. Palestinians use 
multiple content sources, but mainly Israeli media. 
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Israeli Media - Major News Source for the Palestinian Diaspora 
The Palestinian and the Israeli nations have lived in the same region for many years and 
there is a mutual influence on news events in Israel and in ‘Palestine’.  The two nations 
are in a conflict situation and many attempts by political powers to resolve this conflict 
have, thus far, failed. There is hostility and separation between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians and there is also a lack of dialogue. One component of the life of both 
nations is common: the need for the media of the Other. For the Palestinians this is 
clearly the case, as evidence from this research proves. As for the Israelis, they use Arab 
media to a smaller extent, but it is important for both Israeli media professionals and 
Israeli audiences. The Palestinian media’s lack of resources prevents Palestinians who 
live in Diasporic spaces using it as a major source. However, the participants use Israeli 
media as their main news source. It seems that the usage of Israeli media by Palestinian 
audiences contradicts the essence of the contact between the two communities. In other 
words, it is expected that Palestinians would prefer to interact with Palestinian journalists, 
rather than with Israeli journalists, in regard to news from the homeland. One of the 
major findings of this research shows that Israeli media are not being perceived by 
Palestinian audiences as hostile, biased, mobilised or manipulative media. The opposite is 
true. The Palestinians perceive the Israeli media to be professional and liberal. The 
participants prefer to read articles by journalists like Amira Hass of Haaretz, who reports 
from the ground.  What is more, Palestinian groups in the U.K. invite Israeli journalists to 
talk in front of Palestinian audiences. As I said earlier, the participants use the Israeli 
media as their major news source - they use the Haaretz news website as their first port of 
call. The Palestinians’ habitual use of Harretz newspaper is high, and is even higher at 
times of breaking news. Even when major news events in Gaza and the West Bank break, 
their use of Palestinian websites is low. 
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Haaretz is a left wing broadsheet, published in Hebrew and English. There is space for 
the Palestinian narrative in this newspaper. This does mean that the news content refers to 
Palestine in-depth; there are also personal (Palestinian) story sections and Palestinian 
columnists who contribute.  
 
Research into the Israeli diaspora proves that Israeli immigrants prefer to read tabloid 
news websites and not the broadsheet Haaretz. Research that discussed the issue, as an 
example, is research on the media sustaining the identity of Israeli immigrants to the 
U.S.A, (Malka & Kama, 2011). In looking at the findings, there are few major differences 
between Israeli and Palestinian immigrants, in relation to their news consumption 
practices. Firstly, the major news website consumed by Israelis is Ynet, the news website 
of the Israeli popular tabloid newspaper Yediot Achronot (which translates as Recent 
News). For Israelis, the media are important for entertainment consumption, as well as for 
news consumption. ‘Culture consumption, mainly entertainment, is a sentimental, 
nostalgic ceremony that has a role as a connector between the immigrants and the 
homeland and in preserving the Israeli identity’ (Malka & Kama, 2011:15). 
 
Secondly, the extent of Israeli media consumption increases as their time in the host land 
increases. The initial period in the diaspora is characterised by detachment from the 
homeland. This case is clearly different than the Palestinians practices who do not detach 
from the homeland at all times. This strengthens the notion of the centrality of news 
content in the lives of the Palestinian diaspora. Haaretz newspaper does not include 
entertainment content in the way that entertainment sections are published in the main 
Israeli tabloid newspapers – Ynet, NRG and Walla. The Palestinians have a clear interest 
in news. It is an interesting issue to look at, since the Israelis are the other side of the 
conflict, how does this equate with Israeli immigrants’ consumption practices? Although 
this question has not been approached in this research, I will refer to it shortly. Not all 
cultural artifacts that appeal to the Israelis appeal to the Palestinians – for example, many 
Israelis follow the Israeli Big Brother programme, the Palestinians will not. Another point 
is that although they are both sides of the conflict, the influence of the conflict on daily 
life is much more evident in the Palestinian sphere than in the Israeli one.  
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By reading Israeli media the Palestinians do not use their first language – Arabic. The 
Arabic language is the only component in the Palestinians life in the Diaspora that is 
being marginalised for the benefit of consumption of professional news. The other core 
issues are dominant: interest in Palestine politics, evolution of national sentiments, 
concerns about the formation of a Palestinian state and political activity for Palestine. To 
put it differently, even though the Arabic language is a very important feature in 
Palestinian nationalism, in prioritising according to their needs, the Palestinians in the 
diaspora transformed their practices – from local to global media consumers, using Israeli 
media mainly in the English language.  
 
Multiplicity of Languages – A Bridge to Diasporic Links 
The Palestinian political actor’s aim is to reach Arab and Western audiences. Not all Arab 
communities speak and understand the Arabic language. For this reason, the Palestinian 
political parties’ websites are published in many languages, including Hebrew. The 
question one might ask is: is the news content of the Arabic version similar to the news 
content of the other language versions? Comparison of the different websites indicates 
that there are no major differences between the two versions. 
 
The difference is evident, according to participants, in broadcasts of the Arabic 
transnational television station Al Jazeera, and in the broadcast of BBC Arabic. In other 
words, there is a difference between Al Jazeera English and Arabic, and between BBC 
English and Arabic. The difference is in the culture of talk, rather than in the content. 
According to participants, the broadcasting in English is rational, whereas the 
broadcasting in Arabic is more emotional. For example, in the Arabic language 
broadcasts, interviewees in news programmes tend to speak loudly and to express their 
emotions, according to the research participants. Bukay stresses that in all forms of 
interpersonal communications, there are several phenomena: exaggeration in describing 
events (mubalaghah), personal boasting about one’s deeds (mufakharah), and the 
repeated stressing of words (tawqid) that are part of Arab culture. This contrasts with 
Western conventional speech habits, which have a tendency to under-emphasis and 
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understatement (Bukay, 2003: 39). As discussed earlier, the use in religious idioms and 
cultural metaphors is extensive, mainly among Muslim Palestinians.  
 
The use of multiple languages contributes to an increase in news consumption in 
languages other than Arabic, mainly English. The use of the English language is in order 
to use international news websites, but not only that. Arab news websites’ English 
versions, such as BBC Arabic in English and Al-Jazeera in English, are very popular 
websites among the Palestinians. Some explain their choice as resulting from the 
professionalism of the English versions; others talk about a personal educational 
background in the English language.  
 
This emphasis is the undoubted change that Palestinians made: the transformation from 
local news consumption in ‘Palestine,’ to global news consumption in the diaspora. The 
transformation is exercised also in the empowerment of the Palestinians: news from 
Palestine is being read by global audiences, in many languages. Palestine’s news thus 
becomes part of global news agendas. To put it in Mavroudi’s words:  
 
"A focus on stateless Palestinians pays testimony to the role that the state and 
citizenship also play in formal political participation, but also the ways in which 
non-citizens feel politically empowered outside the realm of formal state 
politics…(Mavroudi, 2008: 61)."  
 
The next discussion topic is a comparison between the Palestinian diaspora and other 
diasporic communities in Europe. 
 
Palestinian Diaspora vs. Other Ethnic Minorities' Diasporas in Europe    
The European space has attracted immigrant communities for many years. The reasons 
for leaving the homeland are mostly to escape harsh conditions, to look for secure living 
conditions, and economic ease. Immigration from Turkey to European countries is an 
interesting example to consider. Turkey became involved in the post-Second World War 
European labour migration process when it signed a bilateral agreement on labour 
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recruitment with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961, and later with additional 
European countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, considerable refugee movements emerged. 
The main countries granting asylum to refugees from Turkey were Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom.  
 
The Turkish migrants in Europe represent a different case than the Palestinians in Europe 
in relation to the way they exercise their links with their homeland. The Palestinians find 
traveling from the host land to the home land difficult, due to the security situation in the 
region. As Shiblak stresses, Palestinians suffer from the:"… absence of an effective link 
with their original homeland which, in the vast majority of cases, they are barred from 
returning or traveling to... (Shiblak, 2005:16)." 
 
In contrast, it is not problematic for Turks to travel from their host land to their homeland 
and vice versa. Aksoy and Robins, in their research on Turks in Europe, argue: ‘As 
communication and transportation become cheaper, people phone more, they visit their 
relatives or just go to Turkey for a holiday’. Aksoy and Robins continue: ‘They have a 
direct sense of it. And, paradoxically, having a direct sense of Turkey can make these 
Turks more detached’ (Aksoy & Robins, 2000:360). In contrast to the Turks, the 
Palestinians in Europe, who cannot visit their place of origin often, feel most connected 
to Palestine and its people. As argued in this thesis, the Palestinian diaspora actively 
supports the Palestinian cause, and even though they are physically far from the conflict 
area, they have strong ties to their home land.  
 
These strong ties are enabled due to new technologies. The new media are actually 
preventing immigrants’ detachment from the country of origin. The immigrants receive 
news updates which allow them to be part of events occurring in the place they left. To 
put it in Schulz words:  
 
"Although most refugees are barred from travelling…refugees do participate in 
transnational networks. Such transnational links and networks strengthen or 
maintain family relationships, but also in profound ways serve as to invigorate 
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Palestinian nationalism and homeland politics. Put differently, transnational links 
and activities boost nationalism rather than make it redundant (Schulz, 2005: 27)." 
 
Indeed, analysis of the Palestinians’ media consumption practices, discussed in this study, 
indicates the centrality of the internet as the major medium, both habitually and at times 
of crisis, and that the usage is for news consumption. Not all ethnic minority communities 
in Europe use the internet as a major platform and have a genuine interest in news, as the 
Palestinians do. 
 
Turks in Europe use satellite television as the major medium for contact with the Turkish 
diaspora. The number of Turkish commercial channels now available for Turks in Europe 
is around 25, and there is also the Kurdish channel, Medya TV and the Turkish public 
channel. The high availability of transnational Turkish television, has led a few 
researchers, i.e., Marenbach, and Heitmeyer, to conclude that Turks in Europe are 
disconnected from social life in the host countries. Other researchers’ approaches are 
more ‘mundane’ (Aksoy & Robins, 2000:345). For Palestinians the question about 
whether to watch Palestinian Television or U.K. television does not arise, for the simple 
reason that the reception of Palestinian television in Europe is limited. There is one 
Palestinian satellite television channel. I would therefore argue that the openness of 
Palestinians to Israeli and international media news websites is high, and they consume 
media critically, receiving information from a variety of sources. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the Palestinians’ interest in news is not so obvious in 
other diasporic communities in Europe. For Palestinians, the internet serves first and 
foremost as a vehicle that helps them to be informed on news from home, news from the 
host country and international news. To put it differently, the Palestinians do not use the 
new technologies to consume entertainment programmes from Palestine, but rather use 
new technologies for news consumption. The experience of the Turks in Europe, in that 
regard, is fundamentally different. The development of the Turkish commercial channels 
and their penetration of the European market has created a new kind of programming that 
includes reality television, soap operas, and so on. It has also involved a new openness to 
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programme formats, such as Blind Date, that have been adapted to local tastes (Aksoy & 
Robins, 2000:353-354).    
 
The comparison between the Turks and the Palestinians in Europe highlights the 
following issues: the Palestinians are a highly politicised community. Their interest in 
news is high and crosses age, occupation and economic status. The consumption of news 
is mostly more than once a day. The Palestinians use of Palestinian media is low. The 
reason is the need for professional news sources, and not because of lack of interest in 
news from the homeland. The next topic relates to the methodological approach of the 
research.  
 
Whereas most of the research on the Palestinian community has been conducted by 
Palestinian researchers, this research was conducted by an ‘outsider’ researcher:  an 
Israeli researcher. In order to be clear about my objectives, I will explain how I perceive 
the participants and how they perceived me during the period in which the research was 
conducted. 
 
 ‘Outsider’ Researcher 
The researcher is an ‘outsider’ who does not belong to the Palestinian community. What 
is more, the researcher defines herself as an Israeli, who belongs to a nation that is in 
continuous conflict with the Palestinian nation, the turning point of which was in 1948 
(with calming and escalating periods). The conflict between the two communities, the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, leads to a genuine problem in advancing research of the 
Palestinian community by Israeli researchers (as discussed in the methodology Chapter). 
The Jewish Diaspora which acts against Israeli government decisions, have also fanned 
the flames. As Shain points out: 
 
 "Diaspora activists exacerbated the sharp divide within Israel over the peace 
process, even to the point that U.S based ultra-orthodox rabbis issued rulings that 
sanctioned Israeli soldiers’ insubordination and the defamation of Rabin as a 
traitor (Shain, 2002:124)."    
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This researcher’s aim is to encourage additional Israeli researchers to follow her in 
conducting research into the Palestinian community. The advantage of this research is in 
presenting a refreshing and new analysis which is not written by an ‘insider’ researcher, 
as is usually done, but rather by the ‘other side to the conflict’. It is, though, important to 
bear in mind that, despite the conflict, both Palestinians and Israelis acknowledge the 
need for dialogue and a resolution of the ongoing conflict.  
 
Another issue in relation to the researcher is that, in addition to being Israeli, at the time 
of the field work the researcher was an immigrant to the U.K. and received British 
citizenship. This added to the multiplicity of the researcher’s identities, which helped her 
while conducting the research. In other words, the researcher did not perceive herself, and 
did not talk about herself, only as an ‘Israeli’. The immigration experience of both the 
researcher and the informants was a feature common to their daily lives. From this point 
of view, the commonalities enabled the researcher to look at the informants through the 
prism of an immigrant. Of course, it goes without saying, there are differences between 
Israeli and Palestinian immigrants to the UK, as discussed in this thesis.  The main 
difference is the struggle of the Palestinians for the recognition of a Palestinian state. The 
Israelis, in contrast, have ‘a home for the Jewish people’, as stated in Israel’s Declaration 
of Independence, 1948. 
 
 The difficulties of an Israeli researcher in conducting research on the Palestinian 
community are, as many published articles have said, in access to the community. It is 
important, therefore, for me to explain how co-operation can be achieved and to emphasis 
the importance of such research. The main problem of the Palestinians is their lack of a 
sovereign state. This issue is being discussed by many Palestinian researchers. My 
feelings towards this issue, in contrast to those of a Palestinian researcher, are obviously 
different. I am less involved and therefore do not have feelings in reference to state 
building aspirations. This starting point allowed me to conduct this research without 
having the obligation to convince the readers that there is a major problem in the region 
and that they should be aware to it. I highlighted the problem, but as the participants 
explained it to me, without bringing my personal feelings into the study. I studied this 
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community in all relevant aspects as a new field for investigation. Of course, some may 
say, there is another problem that might arise in this research – the ‘israelisness’ of the 
researcher, the lack of objectivity that derives from the fact that the researcher is an 
Israeli. In addition, the will of the Palestinians to provide honest answers is doubted.   
 
My answer is that Israeli researchers will always be suspect, and this is natural, but the 
researcher must be sure of his way and be able to prove his findings. The participants put 
many questions. Among them were: why are you interested in researching our 
community? What is your personal background? and so on. Once a dialogue was started, 
as I have explained in the thesis, I co-operated with the informants and helped them to 
understand more about me. The difficult stage was indeed in gaining access, but once this 
was achieved the personal dialogue between me and the informants was a solution for 
both of us. The participants hosted me in their homes, working places and events and 
treated me as a welcomed guest. It was in the light of this approach that this research was 
conducted.  
 
The use of the media from their country of origin is one of the important practices of 
immigrant groups. The media actually prevents the immigrants from their country of 
origin. The immigrants receive news updates which allow them to be part of events 
occurring in the country they left.  
 
The immigrants’ feelings that they belong and are not strangers can be attributed to their 
media use. Integration processes are varied, but the feelings of belonging to their group of 
origin leads to less difficulty in the integration process, the immigrants still belong to the 
country they left, in terms of preserving their language, reading news from home, and so 
on. For immigrants who see their immigration processes as temporary, the media also 
enable them to integrate easily, once they return home, as the media have helped the 
immigrants to overcome geographical distance during the immigration period. In other 
words, even though they were not physically in the country they left, they know in detail 
about news events and, in some cases, about cultural and entertainment news also.  
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The need to consume news from their country of origin applies to new and old immigrant 
groups equally. The reasons for news consumption are different among different 
immigrant groups, but this need exists in both groups: the new and the established ones. 
One reason, for example, could be the need of the immigrants who belong to established 
groups to feel that they have not lost contact with their homes, even though they have 
lived in the diaspora for many years. For the younger immigrants, the media might ease 
the integration processes and preserve their links to their roots. 
 
In this research I investigated a group of immigrants whose emigration entailed personal 
difficulties relating to questions of identity and belonging. For the Palestinians in the 
Diaspora, Palestinian identity comes first and foremost. The links in the Palestinian 
community are strong, as a result of the nakba and of their second deportation in 1967. 
Contact with the Palestinians in Palestine and in other countries in the diaspora is 
therefore vital. This contact is being enabled by new technologies. The internet serves as 
a tool through which the Palestinian in the diaspora can keep up to date with news events 
in Palestine. What is more, it is important to remember that travel to Palestine entails 
restrictions, a fact that empowers the role of the media in general, and the new media in 
particular, in the daily lives of Palestinian expatriates. 
 
Another thing that characterised the Palestinians in the Diaspora is the importance of 
politics and news in their lives. The Palestinians in the Diaspora actively support the 
Palestinian people in Palestine. The enormous number of online social networks online 
Palestinians have created for this purpose is a testimony to a politically active 
community. To put it differently, the Palestinian expatriates not only consume local 
media from their place of origin, but also create media products for global audiences. The 
Palestinians do not use the Palestinian media as their main media. Instead, they use 
multiple media channels. One of the interesting findings of this research, in this context, 
is that the Israeli media are the main media that Palestinians use habitually and at times of 
crisis. It is the media of the ‘Other’ in a language which is not their first language (Israeli 
media in English) that in most cases help the Palestinians to keep the link with the 
Palestinian people and to preserve their Palestinian identity. The website of the 
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newspaper Haaretz is the news medium that Palestinians use the most. This indicates the 
centrality of news in the lives of Palestinians; Haaretz newspaper includes in-depth news 
and analysis sections. This is a very interesting choice, by the Palestinians, since Israeli 
immigrants would usually read tabloid news online and not the broadsheet newspaper 
Haaretz¸ but this is a topic for further research. 
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Appendix 1 
Consumption of International Media and Breaking News 
 
Names of 
the 
participant  
UK media 
being used 
regularly 
UK media 
being used at 
time of big 
news events 
The medium 
being used 
habitually  
The medium 
being used most 
at times of big 
news events 
Reem  The Guardian, 
The 
Independent 
and BBC 
English 
websites. 
ITV 
headlines in 
Teletext on 
TV. 
Internet Internet  
Layla  BBC and The 
Guardian 
websites. 
TV - BBC 
News, ITV 
News and 
Channel 4 
News. 
BBC 
Television 
news. 
Television Television 
Professor 
Ramadi 
Reads the 
English press, 
first and second 
editions online. 
TV - ITV News 
at 19:00, News 
Night and Hard 
Talk. 
BBC and serious 
writers. 
Internet Internet 
Odai  Guardian BBC English Internet Internet 
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website. website. 
Dr. Al 
Hamad 
Reuters, The 
Guardian, The 
Independent, 
Public Media 
outlets and 
BBC English 
websites. 
TV- BBC 
News, Russia 
Today, France 
24, and CNN. 
CNN. TV and 
Internet. 
Internet. 
Professor 
Hassassian 
Reuters, 
Press 
Releases - 
British and 
International 
news. 
BBC World 
and News 
Night. 
Television. Television. 
Elizabeth  BBC News 
website and 
True Tube. 
BBC News 
website. 
Internet. Internet. 
Nael  BBC News, 
Financial 
Times and 
the London 
Paper online. 
TV- BBC 1 
and 2 - Ten 
O’clock 
News and 
BBC News. Television. Television. 
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News Night. 
 
Appendix 2 
The Palestinian Governmental and Private Websites 
Few participants prefer to read news online using Palestinian governmental and private 
websites, which are different from the political websites, but in some cases are affiliated 
to them. First, the description of the websites each participant uses, followed by an 
elaboration:  
 
1. Maryam: websites of Palestinian charities in the UK. 
2. Azzam: ‘I do not take the information from the Palestinian websites. I receive 
from my own sources, from Hamas, their press releases.’ 
3. Meisoon: Palestinian bureau of Statistics and The Palestinian Ministry websites. 
4. Mahmoud: Palestine Monitor in English and the Palestinian Return Centre -
private websites. The Palestinian Return Centre is an independent consultancy 
focusing on different aspects of the Palestinian refugees. 
 
The 4 participants hold a political stance. 3 of them act for the political party they 
support: Maryam is a volunteer at a U.K. Hamas charity. Azzam defends Hamas 
interests in different Arab and British forums, as well as writing books about Hamas 
party ideology. Their personal background: both Azzam and Maryam obtained their 
academic degrees in the U.K. Meisoon is a Political Councillor the Palestinian 
Authority. She obtained her academic degrees in the U.K. Mahmoud supports the 
Fatah party and participates in its political events. Maryam, Azzam, Meisoon and 
Mahmoud read news also on U.K. and Israeli websites. As for Palestine’s news, for 
the first three participants, it’s more then reading news for personal reasons, but rather 
they receive news because they have a public role in the Palestinian diasporic 
community – to mobilise international support for the Palestinian people in Palestine. 
Since the political websites do not answer to the demands of the participants for 
professionalism, they look for updated news on other Arab websites.  
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